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In this thesis I argue that Foucault's dispersive historiography is a 
deepening rather than a purifying of historical existence. This emphasis 
upon dispersion as a critical principle is contrasted with, and delimited by 
the possibility of the narrative comprehension of historical existence 
exemplified by the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Insofar as the 
responsibility to act is an important field where tfphis deepening takes 
place it cannot be subordinated to the responsibility to otherness which 
aims at dismantling the action orientated frameworks of traditional ethics 
and politics. Ricoeur's promotion of narrative refiguration as a response to 
the aporias of time is thus, a timely rejoinder to dispersive genealogy. I 
argue further that Foucault's historiography exhibits the productive tension 
of history as both difference and meaning and that the ethical thrust of 
such writing is to address the concerns of the present in a way that 
metamorphosizes rather than challenges the narrative function. Insofar as it 
connects with the struggles of disenfranchised and marginalized groups, 
and discourses, it also echoes a powerful element In traditional 
emancipatory historiography which attempts to fully embrace the 
slaughtered possibilities of the past 
The emancipatory potential of dispersive historiography is examined further 
by comparison with the aims and values of traditional critical theory. Two 
positions are delineated: (1) Complementarity, in which genealogy produces 
valuable insights into hitherto unacknowledged power structures; (2) 
Delimitation, in which Foucault's work is seen to be an important limitation 
on the epistemological and ontological interventions of critical theory. This 
JOIns the philosophical hermeneutical critique of critical theory In its 
delimitation of the finite horizon of all emancipatory discourse. 
Finally I argue that Foucault's work is itself limited by its refusal to 
countenance the utopian dimension of social reproduction in which the 
social imaginary is to be considered not as a delusory projection of desire, 
but as a driving force behind the projection of freedom. Dispersive freedom 
sees the formation of political, cultural, and social identities as always 
constraints upon the real practice of freedom. It is this marginalisation of 
liberation as a process with ends that I seek to dispute. I conclude that 
Foucault's dispersive principles are belied by the important contribution his 
work has made to the necessarily ceaseless task of the refiguration of the 
concepts of history, freedom, power and truth. 
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Introduction 
Dispersion and Comprehension 
This is a study of the emancipatory implications of Michel Foucault's 
dispersive historiographical practice within the framework of a 
comprehensive understanding exemplified by the work of Paul Ricoeur. 
In contemporary continental philosophy, Ricoeur has been a master of 
appropriative understanding1 that he quite rightly recognizes as 
standing in a uneasy relationship to the "Hegelian temptation" of total 
mediation.2 Ricoeur's own self-understanding of his work is marked by a 
strong tendency to "comprehend" which he takes to be the guiding 
feature of narrative interpretation, and which in turn enables a quest 
for "personal identity that assures the continuity between the potential 
or inchoate story and the actual story we assume responsibility for." 
(TN,1,74)3 Ricoeur's explicit authorial statement at the beginning of Time 
of Narrative that it forms a pair with his earlier study The Rule of 
Metaphor (TN,l,ix) contrasts sharply with Michel Foucault's dispersive 
conception of writing.4 Foucault's voice IS one of unremitting 
dissemination and his work exemplifies this in its attempt to scatter in 
different directions the tasks of penetrating the social world. And yet, 
even when setting up the grandiose machinery of The Archaeology of 
1 Ricoeur In Gadamer's words "never opposes without somehow 
reconciling". "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion" in Hermeneutics: Questions 
and Prospects, ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica, (Cambridge: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), p. 54. 
2 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3 tr. Kathleen McLaughlin 
and David Pellauer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), chap. 9, 
(hereafter cited as TN,3) and "Appropriation" in Hermeneutics and the 
Human Sciences, ed. and tr. J. B. Thompson, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), hereafter cited as HHS. 
3 See also p. 142. 
4 Foucault's admonition at the start of The Archaeology of Knowledge 
tr. A Sheridan, (London: Tavistock, 1972) (hereafter cited as AK) is 
exemplary here: "do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and 
so much pleasure in writing... if I were not preparing ... a labyrinth 
into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up 
underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding 
overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose 
myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I 
am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do 
not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same." p. 17. 
3 
Knowledge to subsequently leave it as a monolith of its time, Foucault 
cannot resist telling us, both in the introduction and conclusion, what 
he is and is not doing. Similarly, what is one to make of Foucault's 
persistent challenging of his earlier formulations and revision of what he 
was actually doing in former research?5 Parallelling these declarations is 
the willingness to undergo the interrogation and possible fixity of the 
interview form. 6 It is important to emphasize Foucault's narrativization 
of his own work In response, not only to his own professed desire for 
self-effacement, but also to sympathetic commentators who see in this 
principle of dispersion and singularity the key to his philosophy of 
freedom in a "post-revolutionary time. ,,7 What are we to make of these 
points of reflexivity that hint at hidden desires of authorial control and 
semi-arrestation of the dispersive/ disseminative impulse? 
I would suggest that such moments are themselves irruptions of a 
tension that structures Foucault's work on the level of the will to 
understand. Foucault never tires of insisting that his work IS a 
response to and intervention In the present. I wish to argue that this 
can only be understood in an absolutely fundamental sense along the 
lines of Ricoeur's notion of the "time of initiative". (TN,3,207-88) The 
present is the site where existing self-evidences can be broken up by 
rendering their production, and hence possibility for destruction, 
5 See the remarks in the interview "Truth and Power" in 
Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980) 
p. 115 (hereafter cited as PK) in relation to those in "The Subject and 
Power" Afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, p. 208, (hereafter cited 
as BSH) Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings of 
Michel Foucault, 1977-84 ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, London: Routledge, 
1988), pp. 32-3 (hereafter cited as PPC) and "What is Enlightenment?" in 
The Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986). 
6 It would not be an exaggeration to say that Foucault more than 
anyone else established this form as an vital element of modern 
professional philosophy. 
7 John Rajchman, Michel 
York: Columbia University 
Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, (New 
Press, 1985), p. 50, (hereafter cited as MFFP). 
visible. On one level this is profoundly recalcitrant to a reduction of the 
present to presence. On another level, however, it involves a recognition 
of the unsurpassability of the present as transition which in Habermas' 
words has "to be constantly renewed by radical historical thinking" In 
order to preserve its authenticity. 8 The privilege of the present IS 
preserved In ever complex ways even down to Benjamin's radical 
desevering of its future-oriented expectations in the "now-time" that 
"supplies a unique experience with the past". 9 Could we not say that 
Foucault's present in which he himself is writing history imitates this 
process of "thinking which suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant 
with tensions" and supplies the "revolutionary chance in the fight for 
the oppressed past." 10 And here, the unsurpassability of the present as 
the time of termination and inauguration, of temporary coagulations, IS 
repeated In both the spheres of writing and action. 
On the level of reading, this structure IS disclosed In the question: 
tWhat does Foucault mean for the present?' where the notion of meaning 
IS not to be reduced to the presentation of authorial intention nor to 
the fixity of a single use. Nevertheless, the narrativization of F'oucault 
finds its first point of comprehension in this question and one such 
intention: 
Reading interests me only insofar as it enlists itself into the 
reality of a contest as an instrument of tactics, of 
illumination. I would like my books to be, as it were, lancets, 
or Molotov cocktails, or minefieldsi I would like them to self-
destruct after use, like fireworks. 1 
8 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, tr. F. G. Lawrence, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 13 (hereafter cited as PDM). 
9 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in Illuminations 
tr. Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1973), Thesis xvi. 
10 Ibid. Thesis xvii. 
11 Michel Foucault, quoted in A. Megill, Prophets of Extremity, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley, London: University of California 
Press, 1985) p. 243. 
5 
Nothing is to be deduced from this other than the possibility of a 
transformation of the "Foucault effect" 12 from that of dispersion to that 
of synthesis. This is to say, that a understanding of Foucault in terms 
of a self-understanding of the present is unavoidable. 13 
Foucault's work as a challenge to our understanding of modernity; as 
the celebration of the "explosion of man's face in laughter, and the 
return of masks" and "the scattering of the profound stream of time by 
which he felt himself carried along" would be necessarily recuperated in 
the narrative of modernity/ postmodernity.14 As if to say that the 
closure of metaphysical humanism sought in the "absolute dispersion of 
man" that is multiplicity, play and difference is just your story. Yet 
would this not be the point; that there is no longer the possibility of 
constructing, let alone deciphering, the supreme plot. With the death of 
God and his murderer what can the meaning of comprehension be except 
the weakness of nostalgia? In response to this one might ask whether 
this does not reinscribe dispersion into the narrative of errancy, into 
the Nietzschean embarkation: "Woe when you feel homesick for the land 
as if it had offered more freedom - and there is no longer any fland ,It 15. 
12 See the preface to the collection of essays in The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality, eds. G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
13 Hayden White suggests that an entry into the "thicket" of Foucault's 
work is to concentrate on its nature as discourse "and with all the 
connotations of circularity, of movement back and forth, which the I ndo-
European root of this term (kers) and its Latinate form (di~, fin 
different directions', and currere, 'to run') suggest." An opening into 
Foucault through a self-understanding of the present would confirm this 
notion of circularity. See his essay in Structuralism and Since: From 
Levi-Strauss to Derrida, ed. with an Introduction by John Sturrock 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 82. 
14 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications), p. 385. (hereafter cited as OT) 
see also Alan D. Schrift, "Foucault and Derrida on Nietzsche and the 
End(s) of 'Man''', in Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary 
Nietzsche Interpretation, eds. David Farrell Krell and David Wood 
(London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 131-149. 
15 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tr. Walter Kaufman, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1974), p. 124. 
6 
Ricoeur would answer the aporetics of time (the necessity of dispersion 
and of entropy) with the poetics of narrative and in so doing institutes 
a particular narrative about the ultimate dissolution that time brings to 
all such attempts. 16 Here the circularity involved does not seem to me to 
be one of nostalgia for order but of a genuine impossibility of going 
beyond such telling. Consider Nietzsche's fable of the fable of the 
invention of knowledge as "the most arrogant and mendacious moment of 
universal history: but only a moment. Nature took but a few breaths and 
the star grew cold; and the clever animals had to die." in fOn Truth and 
Falsehood in an Extra-Moral Sense' .17 And what of the fable of "How the 
fReal World' at last Became a Myth,,18 as a closure of the possibility of 
describing either the apparent or the real world? The notion that there 
might be always something more to say IS a deeply seductive one, not 
least because its limits (death, meaninglessness) are necessarily 
constitutive of it. The suspicion that this merely repeats the drive to 
order and the desire for ontological security at a deeper level is correct 
but is immediately narratively recuperated (may we not just as well say 
transgressed) as a limit. The possibility of a conceptual reversal here, In 
which narrative comprehensive is characterized as a transgression, In 
the sense of a violent interpretation upon the absolutely unformed, 
should alert us to the metaphysical conceptualization of the dialectic 
between consonance and dissonance being employed. 
16 See the conclusion to TN ,3. See also David Wood, The Deconstruction 
of Time (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991), p. 
360. 
17 F. Nietzsche, "On Truth and Falsehood in an Extra-Moral Sense", 
quoted in R. J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1973), p. 130. 
18 F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, tr. R. J. 
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 40. 
7 
In these impossibly general terms it IS not difficult to conceIve of 
Ricoeur's magisterial meditation (and ultimately narrative comprehension) 
upon time and narrative as an implicit response to the poststructural 
and postmodern destabilization of metaphysical conceptual pairings such 
as presence/absence, identity/difference, being/becoming and especially 
the radical destructuring of the linear connection past, present, future. 
The degree of this implicitness is of course debatable. A statement such 
as "Perhaps in spite of everything, it is necessary to have confidence in 
the call for concordance" (TN,2,28). is shot through with "the lyrical 
figure of the lament" (TN,3,273) and sets his voice firmly against the 
end of narrative and the rule of advertising and resists the notion that 
"Drifting is in itself the end of all critique ,,19. From a postmodern 
perspective the "nostalgia of the whole,,20 is not far from the surface of 
Ricoeur's meditative thinking. If one feels the abandoning of the 
Hegelian desire as a "wound" rather than a healing or a dance outside 
the cave, it IS not surprising that a lyricism of lament permeates the 
hermeneutics of historical consciousness. Might one not say that it is the 
narrative urge to condition time rather than time's implacability or the 
nonmastery of thrownness that really produces this grief requiring "the 
courage of the work of mourning"? (TN,3,206) 
Understood as a self-understanding of the present, the motivation for 
the simple dichotomy of Foucault as dispersive and Ricoeur as 
comprehensive is to be seen as the finite opening of a narrative. This 
19 J. F. Lyotard, Driftworks, ed. Roger McKeon [New York: Semiotext(e), 
1984] p. 13. See also Walter Benjamin, "The Story-teller", In 
Illuminations. 
20 J F L ta d The Postmodern Conditl"on: A Report on Knowledge, tr. • . yo r , _ 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984), p. 81. 
8 
narrative does not take as its beginning a particular historical 
conjuncture that one might want to argue the West finds itself at, 
whether this be defined in terms of tlate capitalism', the tpostmodern', or 
an unfinished modernity. Rather it IS an opening that takes the 
narrative impulse itself as being subject to the dialectic of the Same and 
Different. All narratives repeat the opening of disclosure which itself 
cannot escape the closure inherent in any such act, and which is why 
there will always be something more to say. It is with this belief that a 
complete self-understanding of the present IS impossible that two 
narratives about the present state of philosophy and of history serve as 
a limited opening to an understanding of Foucault and Ricoeur as 
dispersive and comprehensive responses to an always difficult present 
self-understanding. 
9 
Chapter 1 
Two Narratives: The End of History and the End of Foundations 
10 
(i) Reflexivity: Between Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism 
A persuaSlve narrative of philosophical endeavour can be found In 
Richard Bernstein's book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Bernstein 
argues that philosophy throughtout the twentieth century, has been 
coming to terms with the desire to found, to reach the Archimedian 
principle that will ground its endeavours. 1 According to Bernstein, 
throughout the history of philosophy the metaphors of grounding, 
foundations, the right method for philosophy etc. have taken promInence. 
These metaphors are now, however, becoming less compelling for the 
continuation of a thinking that might bear the name of philosophy. 
Bernstein argues that there are "many signs that the deep assumptions, 
commitments, and metaphors that have shaped these oppositions ... 
(between objectivism and relativism) are being called into question. ,,2 In 
his latest book The New Constellation, this argument is fleshed out 
further by an attempt to explore the ethical and political dimensions of 
thinkers he had not addressed earlier such as Heidegger, Derrida and 
Foucault. Such thinkers exemplify the pervasIve "mood" of 
"modernity /postmodernity", "which is amorphous, protean, and shifling 
but which nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on the ways in which 
we think, act, and experience. ,,3 Bernstein argues that such thinkers 
came to see that the ethical-political consequences of their thinking were 
paramount, an attitude that can be pithily expressed in the Socratic 
question, tHow should one live?' There might not be such a grand 
exodus from certain philosophical values after all! 
1 R. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism And Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, And Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). 
2 Ibid. p. 2 
3 R J. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 
p. 11. 
11 
~How should one live?' is certainly not a mInor question subordinate to 
those grand philosophical questions: ~What can one know?', ~What am I?', 
~What IS the meaning of Being?', ~Where and who are we at this 
particular time in history?' and so on. Rather as the reference to 
Socrates indicates it is perhaps as old as Western philosophy. What IS 
important here is that the ethical-political constellation that Bernstein 
finds to be emerging In the writings of thinkers such as Lyotard, Rorty, 
Habermas and those mentioned above, is hardly a rupture from the 
tradition. Certainly it would be hard to find a declaration that this IS 
the case in their writing even if at times their rhetoric verges close to 
this position In recognition of the desire to stand outside of the 
tradition.4 This impossible relationship/distance with/from philosophy 
conceived of as an exclusionary, totalising rationalism or as a 
metaphysics or logocentrism is explicitly articulated by Derrida when he 
argues that: 
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of 
metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no 
language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is alien to this 
history; we cannot utter a single deconstructive proposition 
which has not already slipped into the form, the logic and 
the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest. 5 
4 For all his posturing about "the death of man" and the coming to end 
of philosophy in our day in The Order of Things, Foucault never quite 
detaches himself from the preeminently traditional process of commentary 
on the classics of philosophy as attested by his late meditation upon 
Kant's text "Was ist A ufkliirung?" in relation to his own work. See "What 
is Enlightenment" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) {hereafter cited as WE. 
5 J. Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences" in Writing and Difference, tr. A. Bass, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 280. See also Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, tr. Barbera 
Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
12 
The point to this focusing upon the status of the question tHow should 
one live?' as Bernstein's chosen summation of the theme of the "new 
constellation" IS not just to recognise that it is not in fact so new to 
philosophy but to bring out the problems of characterising one's 
thought as an escape or division from the tradition. It is true that 
Bernstein characterises the new intellectual and cultural matrix as a 
move beyond the vagaries of the debate between objectivists and 
relativists and seems to be suggesting that we have at last started to 
free ourselves from the constraints of the old paradigms of philosophy 
that emerged from its prevalent notions of centre, foundation, and 
grounding. At once, however, we are alerted to the tone implied in the 
"at last" that structures Bernstein's own narrative of philosophical 
desire. The metaphor of therapeutic release not only echoes the mood of 
optimistic certainty that accompanies the setting of philosophy on the 
royal road to science, it positively repeats its desire. A ttrue outsider' 
to philosophy might just as easily be sceptical of Bernstein's 
prescriptive narrative that the present shows strong signs of a need to 
move beyond objectivism and relativism and more importantly, question 
whether the empirical fact that because the foundations of philosophy 
have not been conclusively reached this implies that we should stop 
seeking. Indeed there is an irony involved in the call to renege the 
quest for groundings, because the model that reoccupies its space is 
heavily dependent upon an understanding of the tradition of philosophy 
as a living one. Moreover, this understanding has a tendency to 
substitute the master names of such groundings with the actual task 
that is always on the way and that is, in its desire at least, considered 
to be uniform throughout philosophical history. This move beyond is 
further characterised as a "new conversation" in order to dampen down 
any ideas that it defines itself as a total break with the past. 
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Ultimately, the force of what Bernstein wishes to say comes from his use 
of the word "beyond", signifying at least a desire to be free of and 
outside of the "Cartesian anxiety" that requIres a foundation for 
knowledge and life. We are no longer to be guided by this desire which 
has hitherto been incapable of satisfaction and presumably will always 
remain so. Bernstein has something important to say about the ethical 
and political thrust of his chosen philosophers, this is that their reasons 
for doubting the project of grounding philosophy, knowledge, and 
language all led to precisely the emphasis upon ethico-political matters. 
It is as if only a contact with the temptations of metaphysics and a 
working through such temptations brings one to the promised land of 
freedom from its unrealizable goals. This of course all happens at a 
certain remove from the everyday life of the majority of people. Freedom 
from the desire to ground one's philosophy comes only through the 
labour of philosophy, through precisely the attempt to ground it. 
Paradigmatic cases of this are now even part of philosophical tradition 
and myth.6 
Freedom from foundations and the desire for necessary truths here 
functions in its own way as a necessary point of departure for the real 
matter of living well. Anything less than an understanding of human 
6 For example, Wittgenstein comes to see that he had been held captive 
by the picture theory of language in formulating the Tractatus logico-
philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinesss (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1961) and gives up his self-induced solitude from 
philosophy in order to produce the anti-foundationalist Philosophical 
Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972). Heidegger 
distances himself from the fundamental ontology in Being and Time, tr. J. 
Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), (hereafter cited as 
BT) because of its assimilation into a foundational anthropology a.nd 
signals his dissatisfaction with his great work through the designation 
of a turning (Kehre) in his hermeneutical exploration of the question of 
the meaning of Being from an existential analytic to a meditation upon 
the happening of language. 
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being as precisely the kind of being whose Being is an Issue for it in 
Heidegger's felicitous formulation, simply will not do.7 Anti-
foundationalism as an existential project means that no form of life can 
be grounded but more than this its ethical or political thrust is to claim 
that the attempt to do so is deeply self-deceiving about the human 
condition. If no form of life can be grounded in a philosophical (that is 
metaphysical) way then it is pertinent to ask why forms that do claim 
such grounds are rendered inferior to those that do not. For this is 
more than an argument about the importance of deep reflection about 
the possible justification for one's life or for that matter the importance 
of such reflection as a prerequisite for living well. Ultimately, it ]s an 
argument that renders such meta-reflection about different life forms 
unnecessary because impossible to adjudicate and thus an argument for 
the radically situated and finite process of living well. This 
understanding of existence will be compromised if an appeal to an 
ahistorical foundation to living well is made simply because nothing (at 
least in philosophy) has been found to satisfy such an appeal amongst 
its community. 
This may seem to be an argument that short-circuits the philosophical 
drive to question by introducing a conflict between two forms of life 
and representing them as alternative philosophical moves when one In 
fact is not philosophical, but this is precisely the point here. For all 
their claims to be beyond traditional philosophical desires it could be 
quite as easily argued that it IS the anti-foundationalists who are 
bewitched by the philosophical game whilst theological foundationalists, 
for example, are beyond its call. Certainly this would entail a 
reevaluation of the claim that the history of metaphysics has been a 
7 See BT,24 
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serIes of (mis)-interpretations of Being or that philosophy IS simply 
logocentrism. In contrast to theology, philosophy might be conceived of 
as at least a long detour that even if it does end up reproducing the 
framework of a theology (maybe as an inevitable consequence of the 
decision for philosophy) opened up other possibilities along the way. 
There would be a case for arguing that it IS precisely the way In 
philosophy that is important and not the end, the questions it raises 
and not the answers it may supply. In this sense philosophy as a 
vigilance against the dangers of the privileging of presence and search 
for foundations would at least carry its own residue of 
transcendentalism In that it privileges the flight from security and 
groundedness as the more authentic response to existence. 
This reflexivity is inevitable and is a theme that Derrida, for example, 
will constantly circle around making the point that its inescapability is 
not to be decried but to be celebrated as the condition for the freedom 
that occurs through the loss of security when one gives up the desire 
for presence. The difficulty arises when one IS prepared to characterise 
this position as authentic In contrast to the inauthentic response of 
constructing metaphysical houses to dwell within. For Derrida himself 
rightly points out the dangers that reside in Heidegger's thinking about 
Being and its metaphors of proximity and the "values of neighbouring, 
. d l' t . ,,8 Th shelter, house, serVIce, guard, VOIce, an IS ening. e desire to 
guard oneself against the dangers of slipping back into metaphysics, to 
attempt an eternal vigilance against the possibility of finding oneself 
once more upon the philosophical terrain, can be construed not as a 
setting up camp at a distance from philosophy, but as an intensification 
8 J. Derrida, "The Ends of Man" in Margins of Philosophy, tr. A. Bass, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 130 
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of the philosophical ethos. This is not just the danger of reappropriation 
or the impossibility of contesting metaphysics from outside its logos. 
Rather it is a reading of anti-foundationalism that sees it as an integral 
moment in the history of philosophy and not just a passage taken on 
the way to secure presence. This is quite in keeping with Derrida's own 
declaration that deconstruction does not invert and therefore privilege 
the lower term of the hierarchies it attends to. It would be mere 
metaphysics to set anti-foundationalism up as the higher term in the 
cou plet foundationalism/ anti-foundationalism. Although this IS the 
instinctive move to make, the aim of a strategy such as deconstruction 
is to question the necessity of such conceptual pairings in the first 
place. This would all be very well except the intractable problem they 
force upon us IS not erased with the erasure of the terms.9 Not at least 
for now. It is all very well Nietzsche proclaiming that we have not been 
able to do without God because of a certain belief in grammar, but the 
reflexivity of his own position remains caught in similar problems at 
least on one level. That IS, even his purported leaving behind of 
philosophy and dance outside of its house IS prone to the risk of 
recuperation, and perhaps necessarily so if it IS to succeed in its alms. 
The attempt to stand outside of the opposition foundationalism/anti-
foundationalism might for the present be considered a highly dangerous 
strategy. If Bernstein's hunch is right, and there really is a move away 
from foundational thinking, then it might be argued that the 
philosophical labour that is required for the near future cannot afford 
to do away with the constellation of concepts that have to some extent 
also given birth to a certain desire to be free of them. 
9 For a discussion of this problem see David Wood, "Derrida and the 
Paradoxes of Reflection" in The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic 
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), pp. 279-291 
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Once again one is reminded of Derrida's warnings about trying to shake 
metaphysics from a site completely outside of its concepts and 
strategies. Anti-foundationalism might be considered a strategy here in 
much the same way that Derrida intends his chain of ~names' for the 
processes of deconstructive thinking and yet like such names be at risk 
of restoration to the philosophical hall of fame. The fact that scepticism 
has belonged to philosophy almost from the outset, as both a certain 
process of thinking and a certain movement that one could profess 
sympathy if not allegiance with has hardly detracted from its power to 
begin anew, not only the project of metaphysics, but also the project of 
overcoming metaphysics. Anti-foundationalism's family resemblance with 
scepticism underlines its complicity with the philosophical game even 
whilst professing a certain distance from what are seen as the 
fundamental desires that initiate that game. It IS here that anti-
foundationalism can be guilty of essentialism if it does so portray 
philosophy as springing from the desire for security and firm 
groundings. Such a uni-thematic characterisation just does not do 
justice to the manifold well-springs of philosophy. Even as classically 
told within the tradition, philosophy IS said to spring from wonder and 
not just the kind of wonder that IS the desire to know. lO 
So far I may seem to have been skimming over the concrete issues that 
are at stake in Bernstein's representation of the current mood of at 
least an important section of the philosophical community. What have 
10 This is how George Steiner chooses to summarize the thrust of 
Heidegger's work for instance: "Martin Heidegger is the great master of 
astonishment, the man whose amazement before the blank fact that we 
are instead of not being, has put a radiant obstacle in the path of the 
obvious." Such a characterisation of the seminal ~de-structor' of Western 
philosophy as the history of presence is hardly surprising but can it 
seriously be declared that there is no genealogy of this attitude to be 
traced entwined with the alleged ~real' business of philosophy. G. 
Steiner, Heidegger (London: Fontana, 1978), p. 150. 
18 
such general dialectical remarks to do with the specifics of an ethics or 
politics that he claims to be emerging in the new conversation? Whilst 
anti-foundationalism may have enormous consequences for the way we 
might perceive the constructs of human civilization, in what sense would 
it lead to a change in our relation to ethics or politics? It is for 
instance, possible that it would have little effect on the present way one 
lives their life. In some sense this consequence is to be found in one of 
the most prominent anti-foundationalists, Richard Rorty. This IS an 
interpretation Cornel West gives of his neo-pragmatism which on the 
"macrosocietal level" simply leaves much of the values of bourgeois 
humanism In place whilst on the "microinstitutional level" it has 
"immense anti-professional implications for the academy" .11 For West: 
Rorty's historicist sense remains too broad, too thin -
devoid of the realities of power; his ethnocentric 
posthumanism is too vague, too nonchalant - and unmindful 
of the decline of liberalism. Furthermore, Rorty's 
demythologizing of philosophy seems to retreat into the 
philosophical arena as soon as pertinent sociohistorical 
issues are raised. 12 
Certainly it is easy to see Rorty's faith that "truth and justice lie in 
the direction marked by the successive stages of European thought,,13 
as calling for little change in what he deems the central moral values of 
European intellectual life. So returning to the charge of abstraction In 
my appraisal so far of Bernstein's new conversation, the point would be 
that such a conversation is precisely itself constantly in danger of 
abstraction and hence of inconsequentiality to politics, economics, and 
the social world. In West's words what is required is to: 
11 Cornel West, "The Politics of American Pragmatism" in Post-Analytic 
Philosophy, ed. by John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), p. 267. 
12 Ibid, p. 268. 
13 R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1982), p. 173. 
pursue thick, i.e., social and heterogeneous, historical 
accounts for the emergence, development, sustenance, and 
decline of vocabularies and practices in the natural and 
human sciences against the background of dynamic changes 
in specific (and often coexisting) modes of production, 
political conflicts, cultural configurations, and personal 
turmoil. 14 
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Recognition that one can not stand outside of the concepts of 
metaphysics in order to challenge its strategies, motives and privilegings 
leaves one peculiarly prone to the dangers of leaving everything as it 
IS. This does not have to be the case. One important response to 
Derrida's deconstructive strategies, (in the sense of their political 
effects) has been to argue that it precisely does leave everything as it 
is, being concerned only with texts. This is a response that is to be 
found both in certain instantiations of deconstructive practice as well as 
in criticism of it for example, by Marxists. It is surely not part of 
Derrida's tintention' to leave everything as it IS, but to make a 
difference to political practice (though how one IS to interpret the 
notion of tintention' here is itself fraught with difficulty). Just what this 
might be is not easily defined and this itself is an intrinsic condition of 
a strategy that is ceaselessly on the move. That it is necessary to at 
least continually attempt to understand how a tdeconstructive politics' 
might operate and articulate what difference it would make institutionally 
is nevertheless an imperative. As Terry Eagleton asks: 
Is tdeconstructing' an institution just a more modish name 
for traditional forms of socialist transformation, or does it 
imply practical strategic differences?15 
If f Eagleton's perspectlOve the encounter between Marxism and , rom , 
Deconstruction is still to come (or at least be fully developed) it is 
14 Cornel West, "The Politics of American Pragmatism" 
15 T. Eagleton, "Freres Jacques: The Politics of 
Against the Grain (London: Verso, 1986), p. 87. 
Ibid. p. 269. 
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around West's declaration of what is required to supplement Rorty's 
fierce pragmatism that one way forward might be found. The "thick, 
social and heterogeneous, historical accounts" that he proposes might 
enable a point where deconstructive concerns with texts and discourse 
and Marxist concerns with material conditions and practices can produce 
theoretical work with political effect. This strategy at first seems 
plausible. What could be more enlightening than historical work upon 
where we have come from and where we are now as a response to our 
new found anti-foundationalism? The difficulty is that this response has 
serious problems if it proceeds unreflectively (not least if the f we' here 
goes unchallenged). It is all very well arguing that what is required is 
the ceaseless practice of history as the appropriate response to the 
dissolution of eternal truths, but far from being a given, history is 
itself a problematical and shifting concept, and necessarily so within the 
bounds of anti-foundationalism. 
(ii) Foucault and the Decentring of Western History 
This questioning of the giveness of the practice of history is something 
that structuralism and poststructuralism has placed firmly on the 
agenda. My second point of departure for an understanding of the work 
of Foucault is Robert Young's argument that postmodernism is a "certain 
self-consciousness about a culture's own historical relativity... (which) 
also involves the loss of the sense of an absoluteness of any Western 
account of History." 16 He argues that: 
16 Robert Young, White Mythologies: History, Deconstruction and the West 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p. 19. 
the suggestion that structuralism and poststructuralism have 
denied history is a persuasive one which now has wide 
currency. Such an argument, in implying that the problem is 
simply a question of the lack of history or of its presence, 
as if history were some undifferentiated entity that could 
just be added or taken away, stepped into or got out of, 
skates over the fact that the real question has always 
focused on the much more difficult issue of what kind of 
history, and of what status can be accorded to historical 
thought. The reproach that poststructuralism has neglected 
history really consists of the complaint that it has 
questioned History. 17 
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Young points out that attempts to account for poststructuralism in terms 
of the "aftermath of May '68 seem positively myopic" and that one 
should see it as an "active critique of the Eurocentric premises of 
Western knowledge" and thus part of the wider "sense of the loss of 
European history and culture as History and Culture, the loss of their 
unquestioned place at the centre of the world" which has increased 
apace with the advent of postcolonialism.18 
The difference with Rorty's assessment of Western culture could not be 
more pronounced. Rorty does not take the loss of centre and ground as 
cause for concern about the value of "the conversation of Europe" and 
ultimately sees it as a positive space for its celebration free of angst 
about the need for justification. Young, on the other hand, sees it as 
important precisely as a decentralization and decolonization of European 
thought that might lead to a respect for the radically Other rather than 
just the Other constituted by the processes of European colonialism. 
Young does not wish to present an alternative practice of history but 
by arguing that the "conditions of history's possibility are also its 
conditions of impossibility" and showing this through an appraisal of a 
number of theoretical interventions in the field, come to a different 
17 Ibid. p. 23 
18 Ibid. p. 19-20 
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understanding and a different framework for thinking about history. It 
is the theoretical perplexities that the writing of history presents that 
are themselves productive and point to its possible political and ethical 
importance: 
From Sartre to Foucault history has repeatedly emerged as a 
contradictory concept, both totalizing and detotalizing, 
essentialist and non-essentialist. Such contradictions can be 
productive: the attempt to reject historicism absolutely 
results either in an utter particularism or in a surreptitious 
return of historicism in a different form. Only an 
understanding that recognizes that an irresolvable tension 
works within the historical schema itself will be In a position 
to make its contradictory claims productive.19 
Young argues that even the work of master theoreticians of history such 
as Althusser and Sartre powerfully illustrate this tension. Borrowing 
from Merleau-Ponty one might say that the most important lesson history 
teaches us is the impossibility of a complete History and that history is 
a process that has to be repeated indefinitely.20 How one understands 
and comes to terms with this situation is itself dependent upon historical 
factors. If history IS understood as an economy of totalization and 
recuperation, then this situation will be considered a failure. However, 
the impossibility of closure and resulting interminability of interpretation 
that irrupts from this can be taken as a positive condition of cfreedom' 
to be affirmed and celebrated. This productive tension would become 
apparent in the work of historians who let themselves be immersed in its 
undecidability. This is at least what Young considers to be the case, and 
he takes it not as a sign of failure but of intellectual honesty and 
19 Ibid. p. 83 
20 "The most important lesson... the reduction 
impossibility of a complete reduction." Maurice 
Phenomenology of Perception, tr. C. Smith (London: 
Paul, 1962), preface. 
teaches us IS the 
Merleau-Ponty, The 
Routledge and Kegan 
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theoretical insight. In contrast to Peter Dews' negative appraisal of 
Foucault's shifting perspectives, for example, he argues that: 
With respect to history, the vacillations of Foucault's writing 
enact the impossibility of its simultaneous finitude and 
infinitude, the irresolvable conflict between history as 
meaning and history as difference, between history as a 
teleology and eschatology and history as the event, as 
finitude and mortality. Here we encounter the recognition 
that at a conceptual level the idea of history cannot be 
taken further: rather it can only be addressed through a 
tension in the writing itself.21 
Once again one IS reminded of Derrida's caution about any attempt to 
stand outside of metaphysics In order to criticise it. Even though 
history may well be peculiarly susceptible to bourgeois humanist values 
such as continuity, identity, and totality and in turn complicit with 
European colonialism, it IS not suggested that one simply renounce 
history as guilty until proven innocent. That the writing of the history 
of the relations between colonialism and the rise of historiography is 
replete with difficulties and self-reflexivity is not an argument for its 
wholesale rejection. It is, however, a situation that presents one with 
the necessity for the utmost vigilance as to the effects of that writing. 
It also presents a constant reminder that similar desires for totality, 
identity and security are always as ready to emerge in the discourse of 
resistance as the discourse of oppression. 
What might a counter-history consist of here? Surely not a mere 
inversion of traditional historical practices; a declaration of absolute 
discontinuity amongst discrete elements, series, and frameworks, a call 
for a pristine ahistoricism. This is certainly not the case with Foucault 
who is often misleadingly portrayed as the philosopher who founds his 
theory of history on discontinuity. (PK, 111-15). Foucault is explicit in 
21 Ibid. p. 85. See P. Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist 
Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (London: Verso, 1987). p. 234. 
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his rejection of the "Hegelian skeleton" of dialectics and the reductive 
movement of a "semiology" based upon communication and dialogue. The 
model he puts forward in the interview "Truth and Power", for instance, 
he believes steers a path between the Scylla of a pure structuralism 
that evacuates the event from history and the Charybdis of a purely 
event constituted history. This is a "recourse to analyses In terms of 
the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics" 
in which the: 
history which bears and determines us has the form of a 
war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not 
relations of meaning. History has no tmeaning', though this 
is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the 
contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of 
analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance 
with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. 
(PK,114) 
At a cursory glance, Foucault might be seen to be exchanging one 
master framework (that of dialectical or teleological progress) for 
another, that might be said to be embodied by the master signifier 
tpower'. Just what is this "form of a war" and could not history cease 
to take this form even if it does take such a form presently? It is 
noteworthy that Foucault defines his own particular brand of history 
against that of history which has a single grand tMeaning'. It might be 
argued that such a conception of history is an easily criticisable target 
and one that has been largely discredited during the twentieth century. 
What Foucault has primarily in mind, however, is history that proceeds 
always as a totalising mechanism in which a transcendental consciousness 
is able to represent the past as leading inexorably to the present22 
22 See the especially the introduction to AK. 
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The denial that history could have a multiplicity of incommensurable 
meanings does not rest necessarily upon the notion that it has to have a 
single meaning, however. It could consist of an argument that ultimately 
there can only be one true meaning of history but that this may never 
present itself because of the historicity itself of history. In this sense 
the possibility of there being one true understanding of history is 
based upon the possibility of a viewpoint from outside of history. That 
this would be something like God's perspective automatically marks the 
discrepancy between such a history and human history. What it might 
mean to take God's absolute viewpoint as a regulative ideal for 
historiography IS a question that perhaps only helps In an 
understanding of the limits of human and hence finite history. This has 
not prevented theoretical attempts to circumvent this discrepancy, 
however. This is certainly the thrust of, for example, Marxist versions of 
history (especially those, might we not say all here, heavily influenced 
by a Hegelian understanding of history) in which there is one true 
interpretation of events to be ascertained either by scientific analysis 
and or by its justification through the future communist society. Such 
an affirmation of the one true interpretation of history to be confirmed 
by the future classless society in which history comes to an end, or by 
the theory of scientific Marxism which distinguishes between ideological 
(false) and scientific (true) historical interpretation is, like historicism, 
subject to questions regarding its unwarranted closure of the 
interpretative process of history. The claim to totalize all meanings 
whether by a criteria of truth or by the radical levelling of all 
interpretations is singled out for its own specificity within the conflict 
of interpretations. On this level the similarities between an objective 
history and a relative historicist history are seen to be greater than 
their differences. They might be said, following Bernstein, to be 
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precisely dependent upon each other. Each works upon the presumption 
that particular historical meanings or interpretations can be subsumed 
within a greater meta-historical perspective. For Marxists (or indeed 
historians working within the tradition of scientific positivism) there is 
Ultimately one true story to be told of the historical record. Historicism, 
which takes as its premise the idea that every interpretation is a 
relative truth of its time, privileges its own interpretation of the 
historical record. This presentism might be thought to be hardly a fault 
if one is arguing against the notion of a single unified theory of 
history. A major element of the idea that there can be no complete 
interpretation of history is the historicity of historical understanding. 
Historicism in its emphasis upon the interminable production of historical 
interpretation IS thus a theory closer to those who argue against a 
uni~rsal history than objectivist history. This certainly might be the 
case if one is adamant that to give up the notion of a single true 
history is to fall prey to the relativism of a radical historicism in which 
the dominant interpretation of the present holds sway regardless of its 
cognitive claims. The problem with historicism taken to its logical 
conclusion, however, is its refusal to theorize the concept of fhistory' 
itself. It IS one thing to assert the relativity of all historical 
interpretations, it IS another to problematize the notion of historical 
understanding itself. Historicism IS far too quick to gloss over the 
problems of the status of historical understanding in favour of its over-
inflation into a transcendental category of human life. This is comparable 
to the notion that history is outside of philosophy or theory and is 
itself a theoretical stance, usually empiricist. It might be that historians 
with a objective bent proceeding according to the principle that theory 
seriously impedes the discovery of the facts are closer to a radical 
historicism than they would care to admit. 
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This is precisely Young's point when he argues that one cannot invoke 
history as a sort of outside, a concrete that remains exterior to theory 
in much the same way as the fpolitical' is appealed to in conflicts of 
theory. That history has always been a problematical concept, and never 
had an immediate certainty is the reason why in recent years theorists 
have turned their attention back to the question of the historicity of 
historical understanding, to its status as interpretation, representation 
or narrative, and, more radically to the problem of temporality as such. 
The most explicit articulation of history's limited status as a form of 
knowledge comes with Levi-Strauss' challenge to Sartre. According to 
Levi-Strauss, it is precisely Western civilisation's assumption that man 
can be truly known in a single one of the historical and geographical 
modes of his existence that reveals how much Western societies are 
indistinguishable from other cultures. Every culture sets itself up as 
universal and thus, history, far from constituting a privileged form of 
knowledge, is simply the myth of modern man, and merely amounts to a 
particular method of analysis.23 Levi-Strauss suggests that as a science 
anthropology should be attempting not to provide a definition of man as 
he is known experientially in our own society, but should rather begin 
by fdissolving' him as a concept of the experiencing self defined against 
an other. His argument against Sartre was based upon his 
universalization of a particular experience of what it is to be human, an 
existential conSCIousness dehistoricized into a general foundation for a 
concept of History. 
23 See Claude Levi-Strauss, "History and Dialectic" In The Savage Mind 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), p. 249 
The difficulty with Levi-Strauss' characterisation of history IS that, 
although it has been inextricably connected to Western culture and been 
a practice that undeniably provided a theoretical armature for Western 
imperialism, it has also been in certain theoretical forms at the forefront 
of a radical undermining of the dominance of the West. This is certainly 
the case that Young wishes to put forward In his defence of a 
poststructuralism that courageously struggles with the West's self-
consciousness about its historical relativity and questions its very own 
pretensions to arrive at a secure understanding of the relationship 
between the possibility/impossibility of history. One might be tempted 
along with Rorty, to begin to question how radical an undermining of 
European intellectual values can go when poststructuralism is undeniably 
a product of such values. One is indeed reminded of Nietzsche's famous 
depiction of truth that finally dissolves itself after a long career in 
which "the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final 
consequence" the necessary "advent of nihilism" and the recognition 
that there is no truth. 24 Might one not say that the forces cultivated by 
history have also finally and necessarily turned against its "teleology, 
its partial perspective. ,,25 And if this is the case then what is the 
significance of posing the question rHow should one live?' Does not 
Nietzsche's project for a genealogy of morals and a revaluation of all 
values begin to make sense in this light. 
Young argues that poststructuralist history is motivated by the quest 
for the singular, the contingent event which by definition refuses all 
conceptualization, and that this can be related to the project of 
constructing a form of knowledge that respects the other without 
24 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale 
~~ew York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 4 
Ibid. p. 10. 
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absorbing it into the same. From this Levinasian perspective, the notion 
that history can be transcendental forms part of the imperialism of the 
Same in which the totalization aspired to is accomplished only by the 
appropriation of the Other. History IS particularly guilty of this 
imperialism hence Levinas' declaration that "when man truly approaches 
the Other he is uprooted from history.,,26 This possibility of extrication 
from history has clearly Messianic overtones; redemption from history's 
realm of violence comes only from the rupture that the Other represents 
in an infinite excess. A dialectical view of history that insists there is 
no possibility of its transcendence would obviously question the desire 
for absolute Otherness here. Either mankind realises that freedom 
emerges immanently in the finitude of the here and now or history will 
go on without us. More provocatively one cannot simply dis-invent the 
conscIousness of history which at the same time IS a self-reflexive 
cognition of itself as a means to change history. Poststructuralism IS not 
simply a fliquidation of history', however. As we have already seen 
above, Foucault believes that once the guiding values of traditional 
history have been questioned the real historical work only just begins. 
It is this tension between a vigorous critique of all transcendental, 
teleological and dialectical histories and the attempt to continue writing 
history at a distance from such theoretical totalizations that I wish to 
emphasize In the work of Foucault. It IS only here that an 
understanding of the dispersive drive can be productively met by that 
of comprehension. 
It is important to realize that Foucault does not simply question hitherto 
practices of writing historiography in order to simply propose another 
26 E. Levinas Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969) p. 52. 
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methodology. Rather it is precisely the constant task to articulate the 
limitations of methodology in order to produce a historiography that aims 
to be in some sense still tcritical' that constitutes Foucault's tanti-
methodology'. This interminable task is I wish to argue, a necessarily 
constitutive part of a historiography that seeks to avoid philosophical 
naivete. I want to argue that this position is itself crucially dependent 
upon the historicity of historical understanding and the temporal nature 
of existence. Foucault's anti-methodology has often been described as a 
transgressive thought, and this is a characterisation he himself to some 
extent accepted.27 His histories are produced clearly with the intention 
of producing a shock of defamiliarisation and attempt to speak from the 
edge of our framework in order to produce a change In our relation to 
that framework. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, a work that some 
might regard as an explicit methodology28 he sets out this ethos of 
uncertainty: 
Hence the cautious, stumbling manner of this text: at every 
turn, it stands back, measures up what is before it, gropes 
towards its limits, stumbles against what it does not mean, 
and digs pits to mark out its own path ... It is not critical, 
most of the time; it is not a way of saying that everyone 
else is wrong. It is rather an attempt to define a particular 
site by the exteriority of its vicinity; ... I have tried to 
define this blank space from which I speak, and which is 
slowly taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be so 
. d 29 precarIOUS an so unsure. 
It is this constant need to go beyond taken for granted structures of 
thinking and experience that drove him to categorically distance himself 
27 See for example Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" and "A 
Preface to Transgression" , in Language, Countermemory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. by Donald Bouchard, tr. by D. 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) 
(hereafter cited as LCP). 
28 Alan Megill points out its parodic relationship with Descartes' 
Discourse on Method in his Prophets of Extremity, p. 228. 
29 AK,17 see also p. 205 
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from philosophies that derived their impetus from phenomenology. Simply 
put this was because of what he saw as the entwinement of 
phenomenology with problems of subjectivity and transcendental 
constitution that reproduce the problems they seek to ve 30 o rcome. 
However, Foucault's concern with the problem of the inescapable 
boundedness of historical understanding immediately suggests a 
comparison with the work of for example, Gadamer who has developed 
Heidegger's insights into a major defense of philosophical hermeneutics 
centred upon the finitude of historicity.31 Given Foucault's explicit 
rejection of a certain kind of hermeneutics32 , and his later interest in 
the practices that constitute the "hermeneutics of the self" it would 
seem a productive move to ask of his work questions formulated from 
within such a tradition In order to perhaps delimit the strategies he 
employs. This IS especially the case if one desires not to reduce these 
t t Ot " to" s ra egles 0 mere presen Ism , "relativism" and "cryptonormativism" 
(PDM, 276) or to see them vitiated by "theoretical incoherence,,33 
Foucault has produced a wide range of reactions In the academic 
community, something he himself found amusing and pleasurable because 
of the wide diversity of opinions formed about the meaning of his 
work.34 This inability to classify his work In an already known 
framework, Foucault took to be an indication of his relation to "political 
30 See OT,327-332. See also the article by David Couzens Hoy on 
Foucault's relationship with modern philosophies of knowledge, 
"Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?" in After Foucault: Humanistic 
Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges, ed. Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick, 
London: Rutgers University Press, 1988), pp. 12-41. 
31 See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975) 
32 That of a depth interpretation that aims at producing a (true' account 
which he defines disparagingly as "commentary" in The Birth of the 
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, tr. by A. M. Sheridan 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1973) (hereafter cited as BC). 
33. P. Dews, Logics of Disintegration, p. 169. 
34 Michel Foucault, "Politics, Polemics and Problematizations", in The 
Foucault Reader, pp. 383-4. 
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questions". It was the fact that his political attitude was not the result 
of a critique carried out in the name of the one true method but a 
questioning of how politics handles that "domain of acts, practices, and 
thoughts" that pose problems for it, that ensured the restless character 
of his work.35 This domain included for Foucault areas such as madness 
as a limit experience in the constitution of reason, crime and mental 
illness constituted as tabnormal behaviour' to be disciplined and ordered 
by political technologies, and sexuality as a sphere of practice that 
exceeds political regulation and solution. In this sense, Foucault's 
statement that he had "never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from 
the point of view of politics, but always to ask politics what it had to 
say about the problems with which it was confronted." can be used to 
understand his relation to the writing of history through a simple 
substitution of thistory' for tpolitics'. 36 The methods of history are to be 
understood as strategies for circumventing, overcoming, or abolishing 
the problems it faces in its appropriation of a past that is no longer 
and in being so theoretically underdetermined is particularly prone to 
the charge of ideological contamination. How is one to continue writing 
history once it is apparent that in most of its forms it is subject to 
suspicion not only for its narrow framework but for the apparently 
vicious reflexivity it fosters by historicising its own practice? 
This reflexivity is not a problem confined to the practice of history, 
however. It is just as much a condition of sociology for example once it 
engages upon an examination of its own origins and social production 
and upon a sociology of knowledge. Philosophically reflexivity has also 
been a constant preoccupation expressed in the famous early forms of 
35. Id. 
36 Ibid. p. 385. 
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the Cretean liar paradox and the sceptics claim that fWe cannot know 
anything.' Hilary Lawson has called reflexivity the post-modern 
predicament which has gained in significance because of the intense 
concern with language that has accompanied much of twentieth century 
philosophy. This predicament, according to him, is a crisis of our values 
and truths because of the "irreducibly textual character of our beliefs" 
which are " d expresse through texts, through language, through sign 
systems, no longer seen to be neutral. ,,37 Reflexivity here is associated 
especially with the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, who have 
taken the paradoxes of reflexivity to the limit mainly through an intense 
reflection upon the textual nature of thinking. Just what these thinkers 
propose as (living well' in the reflexive condition that they claim to be 
inescapable is not positively delineated and this is itself a necessary 
conclusion to be drawn from such a situation. What is clear, however, is 
that it involves in all three a changed relation to language through a 
greater understanding of its rhetorical, disclosive, and strategic uses. 
This greater awareness of the importance of language as the medium for 
thinking about thinking and its limits has also inevitably emerged within 
historiographical theory. Here, reflexivity does not just apply to the 
conclusions to be drawn from the attitude of a radical historicity that 
relativises its own origin but rather to the essentially narrativist and 
tropological nature of historiography. Such a theorization of 
historiography first emerges most clearly in the English speaking world 
with Hayden White's Metahistory.38 The stress upon the making or 
poetics of historiography has become an important strand within its own 
37 Hilary Lawson, Reflexivity: The Post-modern Predicament (London: 
Hutchinson, 1985), p. 10. 
38 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
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theorization fed by an increasing philosophical interest in the relations 
between narrative, history, identity, and human existence.39 
Much of this narrativist philosophy of history has, of course, been 
concerned with a justification of the historiographical enterprise in some 
form or other. Thus, it has not completely severed itself from such 
notions as the prImacy and security of meaning, of history as a 
discipline, and the connection between historiography as man-made and 
of history as thus also the creation of (man' through the mediation of 
historical understanding. That this IS so IS partly to be explained 
through a desire to justify history In the face of perceived radical 
challenges to its status as wrought by structuralism and 
poststructuralism. Under the threat of a reduction of history to the 
(Western myth' in which the (effect of reality' is generated by narrative 
discourse; narrativist philosophers of history have attempted to justify 
its continuance by arguing for its important existential underpinnings, 
especially that of human temporality. This is especially the case with 
Ricoeur's Time and Narrative which revolves around the thesis that: 
between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal 
character of human experience there exists a correlation that 
is not merely accidental but that presents a transcultural 
form of necessity. To put it another way, time becomes 
human to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when 
it becomes a condition of temporal existence. (TN,1,52) 
Narrativity here, is the meaningful representation of human beings in 
time, and Ricoeur believes that far from refuting this project, anti-
narrative historiography as developed by the French Annales school or 
by poststructuralists such as Foucault, contributes to a deepening and 
39 For example, see David Carr, Time, Narrative and 
(Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986) 
History 
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broadening of the sense of human temporality and its representation. 
This is a thesis that is characteristic of Ricoeur's desire to synthesize 
heterogeneous traditions and is commendable if only for being SUSPICIOUS 
of the blanket linkage between structuralism, poststructuralism and 
ahistoricism. Behind this desire to appropriate diverse traditions and 
understand the drive to fragmentation lies a deeper belief In the 
potentiality of historical understanding to enrich human experience. This 
itself is born of a belief that the replies of narrative to the aporias of 
time are not simply consolatory lies in the face of death and the 
dispersion of existence but positive responses "to think more and to 
speak differently. " (TN,3,274) Ricoeur's own reflections upon 
historiography stand within the oscillation of "the invincible suspicion 
that fictions lie and trick insofar as they console, and the equally 
invincible conviction that fictions are not arbitrary insofar as they 
answer a need of which we are not the masters, the need to put the 
seal of order on chaos, of sense on non-sense, of concord on discord" 
and exemplify from a different tradition, White's commendation of the 
tension of historical theory. (TN ,2,27) 
It might be fair to say, however, that taken to its logical conclusion, the 
theory that historiography does not depend upon a relation to a external 
and neutrally verifiable past, has also provoked narrativist thinkers to 
the equal conviction that history can only function as a de-sublimation 
of the chaos of the past.40 Another defender of historiography's 
essential narrative textuality, F. R. Ankersmit, is equally concerned to 
question the notion that there can be one true view of the past. On the 
40. Hayden White, "The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and 
De-Sublimation" in The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and 
Historical Representation (Baltimore London: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1987). 
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contrary, he argues that, if there is just one VIew of the past then 
there is no VIew because it is only the multiplicity of perspectives 
produced by historian's narratives that enable an appreciation of any 
one specific perspective.41 Within the confines of what could be called 
the (narrative turn' In historiography it might be thought that the 
crucial issue revolves around the adequacy of a historiography that IS 
conscious of its own conventionalism to represent the past. This of 
course would be a false demand because the notion of representational 
adequacy has no place within an understanding of historiography as 
always a perspectival (seeing' or In Ankersmit's words as "comparable to 
a belvedere" in which "The statements of a narratio may be seen as 
instrumental in our attaining a (point of view' like the steps of the 
staircase of a belvedere, but what we ultimately see comprises much 
more of reality than what the statements themselves express. ,,42 Instead 
of representational adequacy being the crucial issue it is rather the 
moral and political uses of history that are at the base of recent 
enquIrIes into narrative. This IS certainly where it JOIns the 
poststructuralist critique of history as an ideological practice. The 
differences to be found amongst anti-realist theorists as divergent as 
Ricouer and Foucault may be considered insignificant in relation to the 
realist and empiricist tendencies of much professional historiography. 
That there are differences between them is where the important work 
begins. 
That Foucault resists the desire to seek an origin, telos or 
transcendental subject which would centre history is quite clear. What is 
often not so manifest IS that thinkers working from within the 
41 See F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the 
Historians Language (The Hague, 1983), p. 240. 
42 Ibid. p. 223. 
37 
phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition, such as Gadamer and Ricoeur, 
also are at paIns to resist this Hegelian temptation in the thinking of 
history and that it is precisely this temptation, that like Foucault's 
reaction-formation to phenomenology In his own work, is the sign under 
which their thinking proceeds in a process of constant disengagement. 
Following a question that Bernstein asks of the thought of Gadamer, 
Habermas and Rorty In the context of an exploration of the common 
ground he finds in their "non-foundational pragmatic humanism", I would 
like to ask what is the difference that makes a difference between the 
work of Foucault, Habermas, and Ricoeur?43 That this question 
automatically takes up residence In a style of thought that Ricoeur and 
Gadamer have both enthusiastically endorsed, that of an open-ended 
dialogical encounter and the spirit of a critical appropriation of other 
traditions in a hermeneutical fusion of horizons, will immediately alert 
one to a certain domestication or tranquillizing of the work of Foucault. 
That this is a complete misreading of the provocation of Foucault is 
itself something that makes no sense if one is to take seriously his own 
challenge to the disciples and commentators of Nietzsche: 
Nietzsche's contemporary presence is increasingly important. 
But I am tired of people studying him only to produce the 
same kind of commentaries that are written on Hegel or 
Mallarme. For myself, I prefer to utilise the writers I like. 
The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is 
precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and 
protest. And if commentators then say that I am being 
faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no 
interest.44 
For Nietzsche one might substitute Foucault. If one is then to argue that 
the point of Foucault's own prescriptions IS to call for a use of 
43 See Bernstein's essay "What is the 
Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty" 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). 
44 Michel Foucault, "Prison Talk in PK, 53-4. 
Difference that Makes a 
In Philosophical Profiles 
38 
Nietzsche that necessarily goes beyond mere doctrinal repetition and 
thus to be critical via a process of disruption and transgression, then 
one can also claim that the attempt to use his work incorporatively and 
for a synthetic project IS no less "to deform it, to make it groan and 
protest." I see no problem In interrupting Foucault's own preoccupations 
and certain constant manner of disruption through what might 
derogatorily be named a desire for understanding and dialogue. This, 
however, IS a misrepresentation of a hermeneutics of historical 
conscIousness that has given up the constituting subject as master of 
all meaning and is fractured by its own finitude into an interminable 
task. The attempt to translate the destabilizing discourse of Foucault 
into the more conciliatory ethos of historical hermeneutics IS quite 
clearly a violence and disciplining of its attempt to transgress 
traditional ethical and political reflection. I do not think that it is an 
unproductive stance to take towards an understanding of the meaning 
Foucault's work may have for us, if only because it practises a 
interpretative violence that Foucault himself would acknowledge as 
inescapable and necessary. Moreover, it IS just as questionable to 
characterize his thought as situated at an absolute distance from the 
concerns of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and the ethical and political 
concerns of the tradition of critical theory. This is particularly apparent 
in the crucial text "What is Enlightenment?" where he is at pains to 
defend his own philosophical approach against the "blackmail" of the 
Enlightenment by appealing to that most modern of philosophers Kant. 
Foucault's relation and challenge to the presuppositions of critical 
theory as, for example, most comprehensively articulated by Habermas, is 
something that many have found productive.45 This productive 
45 See H. L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, "What is Maturity?" in Foucault: 
A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 
and J. Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy. 
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relationship, no doubt stems from Foucault's genealogical unmasking of 
the human sciences and concern with the workings of power. Thomas 
McCarthy refers to him as Habermas' "preferred partner" In his 
"rdialogue'(?) with French poststructuralism".46 This purported dialogue 
IS certainly of importance but perhaps one can say that its real 
importance from the perspective of dispersion, lies in the impossibility of 
the exchange between the two positions ever forming an expanded and 
comprehensive notion of reason. 4 7 
In one sense this is to endorse the Foucauldian understanding of reason 
as necessarily formed through exclusionary and dividing practices, most 
notably the oppositions between reason and madness and truth and 
falsity, and its inextricable connection to power.48 Being able to orient 
oneself productively In the tension that IS generated by this 
impossibility of completed dialogue is something that can be practised by 
bringing to bear upon it the insights of the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and 
Gadamer. This bringing to bear is not intended to be a encompassment 
of the tension in a Hegelian synthesis but rather to argue for the 
46 See Thomas McCarthy's, translator's Introduction to The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, p. xiv. 
47. Habermas' fear of Foucault's indictment of Western reason and his 
worry that it mystifies modern experiences is rooted in his fear that 
such claims were also the breeding ground for National Socialism and 
thus partly explains his skewed characterisation of it as 
Neoconservative. "For that is what this radical criticism of reason in 
effect amounts to, with its fabulation of pre-civilizational states. We have 
had all that, in Germany, so immediately at hand that you can smell it 
ever afterwards: the artificial mystification of something so close into 
something supposedly so primordial." "Life-forms, Morality and the Task 
of the Philosopher" in Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews 
with Jiirgen Habermas, ed. Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986), p. 203. See 
also his essay "Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United States 
and West Germany: An Intellectual Movement in Two Political Cultures" In 
Habermas and Modernity, ed. and with an Introduction by Hichard J. 
Bernstein (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 
48 See Michel Foucault "The Order of Discourse" in Untying the Text: A 
Post-Structuralist Reader ed. Robert Young (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 52-6, (hereafter cited as aD). 
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necessity of the "bad infinite" in critical thought, what might be termed 
by poststructuralism as ftransgression' or by critical theory as a 
ffallibilist conception of truth. ,49 The suspicion that what the name 
fhermeneutics' designates is a recovery of meaning and a profound 
strategy of nostalgia which perhaps can only be cured by a certain 
practice of live burial is a suspicion that I do not share. Rather it is 
precisely as a fhermeneutics of suspicion' in which there is a tendency 
towards uncovering deep meaning or structures beneath the surface of 
practices that its strategies are wedded to a certain nostalgia. 50 Once 
one gives up this notion of a hermeneutics of suspicion there is still 
room for a practice of interpretation that " grows out of pragmatic 
concerns and has pragmatic intent" and that, although it has limited 
pretensions about complete understanding can continue to foster 
strategies of how to go on that are not simply repetitions of the Same. 51 
It is in this context that the problems faced in the writing of history 
can be productive in understanding the dilemmas of critique. If one 
agrees with the early Heidegger in assigning a primacy to the future In 
understanding historical existence (and this is a big if insofar as it IS 
bound up with his understanding of authenticity and being-towards-
death) then one can begin to make sense of Nietzsche's demand that 
"only he who constructs the future has a right to judge the past. ,,52 
49 See H. G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, tr. Federick G.O 
Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press), p. 40. 
50 See H. Dreyfus, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late 
Heidegger and Recent Foucault" In Hermeneutics: Questions and 
Prospects (1984). The process of a hermeneutics of SUspICIon is 
articulated by Ricoeur in his book Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on 
Interpretation, tr. D. Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
51 See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 
xxii. 
52 F. Nietzsche, "On the Uses and 
Untimely Meditations, tr. R. J. 
University Press, 1983), p. 94. 
Disadvantages of History for Life" in 
Holling dale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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How to go on, how to practise the good life In the postmodern 
predicament is thus something that is inextricably linked with a changed 
relationship to historical existence. That Foucault should be read as 
stimulating such a changed relationship IS the guiding principle of this 
thesis. Rather than understanding his critical thrust to consist of a 
radical anti-history with no defined purpose In the sense of a 
contribution to a goal, end-state, production of action, or process, this 
presents Foucault in terms of the effect of his work upon the time of 
action as conceived in the notion of historical inauguration. In Young's 
characterization of his work as displaying the possibility/impossibility of 
history and hence the preeminence of the textual dimension of 
historiography there can also be gleaned another story of the 
preeminence of the ethical dimension situated In the present and 
conceived of as the time of initiation and decision. Foucault never 
imposes an ethically neutral vision of the world but induces a new 
evaluation of the world and of the reader at the same time. It remains 
for the reader to respond to this invitation In the world of action. 
That this appears as an unashamedly existential reading of historicity 
understood primarily as the moment of resolve, IS a signal for caution. 
Insofar as in the political and ethical field this IS not to be understood 
as the victory of narrative identity over difference and otherness but 
the task of preventing these two poles from becoming a schism then I 
believe Ricoeur begins an answer to Foucault's constant withholding 
practice towards political formation which IS the outgrowth of his 
sceptical and transgressive drive. That this IS itself a specific response 
both politically and historically already leads to a SUspICIon about it 
escaping Ricoeur's polarity. This IS not to endorse wholeheartedly 
Ricoeur's wager for concordance but it is to practice the possibility of 
going against the grain which Foucault calls working on limits. The 
limits of modern Western thought does not consist of a dominant mood of 
postmodern uncertainty and transgression but rather maSSIve and 
implacable structures of logocentric, identitarian and Eurocentric 
thinking which it is necessary to oppose. The dominant understanding of 
philosophy "at the limit" sees this as only a strategy on the way In 
which the desire for permanent land is to be left behind but can we not 
say that the visiting of new shores IS a better metaphor for the 
inevitable and necessary formation of ethical and political identities. 
Immediately as I write this I become conscious of its colonial imagery. 
The weighing of anchor In tforeign parts' IS also the process of 
imperialism. An answer to this can only be the mundane one that 
philosophy does not require the infinite sailing upon the high seas in 
order to be strenuous. It is such demands that have structured the 
search for necessary truths and/or authenticity and a cerL'lin 
transgression of this desire would not seem amiss. 
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Chapter 2 
The Narrativist Position: Historiography as Disclosive Refiguration 
In this chapter I want to explore first, the similarities and differences 
between three major voices in the debate about the potentiality and 
validity of narrative understanding for historical existence and 
historiography, namely Hayden White, Paul Ricoeur, and David Carr'! 
Insofar as these thinkers acknowledge the central importance of 
narrative In understanding the constitution of historiography and 
historicity they can be said to converge upon a certain rejection of 
what F. R. Ankersmit has termed "epistemological philosophy of 
history".2 However, I will argue that the differences that do emerge 
between these three thinkers are indicative of a wider problem and 
perhaps instability in the theorisation of history. This might be termed, 
in a Nietzschean vein, the question of the purposes of historiography 
and historical understanding for life. This question was initially raised 
by the challenges posed to traditional historiographical positions by 
structuralists and poststructuralists, specifically those of Barthes, Levi-
Strauss, Althusser and Foucault, who by vigorously subjecting the 
claims of narrative historiography to certain standards of scientificity 
and by practising a demythologizing of its claims to the status of 
universality and naturalness motivated by a certain anti-humanism, 
attempted to question the ideological uses that narrative history so often 
served.3 This challenge was no doubt itself a continuation in other areas 
1 See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth 
Century Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1973), The Tropics of 
Discourse (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1978), The Content of the 
Form (1987); Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (1984-88), and David Carr, 
Time, Narrative and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1986). 
2 F. R. Ankersmit, "The Dilemma of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy 
of History" in History and Theory, vol. ? p. 4. 
3 See Roland Barthes, "The Discourse of History" and "The Reality 
Effect" in The Rustle of Language, tr. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986) and "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives" in Image, Music, Text, tr. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 
1977). Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1966). Louis Althusser, For 
Marx, tr. Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1969) and with Etienne 
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of the Annales school's own criticism of narrative history as being 
deeply unscientific and concerned with the "froth" on the surface of 
real historical circumstances.4 The structuralist and poststructuralist 
challenge to traditional history has led in turn to a renewed attempt on 
the part of thinkers working from a position of sympathy for the 
historiographical enterprise as an interpretative process, to defend and 
expand the ethical and political implications of their positions and led to 
the remergence of an interest and defence of the ineliminable narrative 
character of historical existence. With Hayden White this has led to the 
necessity to confront the tOther' of the historiographical demand for 
meaning that is to be found in the "sublime" vision of history as a 
meaningless field. 5 Whilst with Ricoeur this has led to a deeper 
reflection upon the dialectic of tradition and utopia in social life.6 The 
defence of narrative modes of understanding and of the importance of 
the narrative expansion and dissolution of personal, social, and political 
identities has thus I argue, taken a more complex and subtle position 
than earlier accounts. Whether such a move really answers the radical 
criticisms posed by poststructuralism IS something that will be addressed 
by the confrontation with Foucault's undercutting of the positive 
identity forming thrust of historiography that will be presented in the 
next chapter. 
Balibar, Reading Capital, tr. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979). Michel 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (1972) 
4 See F. Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980) 
5 See "The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-
sublimation" in The Content of the Form, (1987) 
6. See Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. by George H. 
Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
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(i) The Decline of Narrative Historiography 
Historiography has been conceived and practised throughout much of its 
own history as the recounting of the past in the form of narrative. Even 
the twin masters of nineteenth century philosophical history, Hegel and 
Marx, both couch their sciences in narrative form. Hegel narrates world 
history as the journey of Spirit coming to self-realization, and even 
Marx's aspirations to historical scientificity are enframed In the 
narrative of the long and inevitable emancipation of mankind. This has 
been a predominant view of historiography and a largely unchallenged 
one due to the nature of much of the subject matter of such 
historiography, even when aspiring to scientific status.7 So long as the 
historical past has been taken to be ultimately about human events, 
human struggles and relationships, then it was fairly easy to conceive of 
the writing of history of such a past as a narrative, a story of these 
human events. The background to the debates about the place of 
narrative in historiography and the status of the discourse of history, 
is the much more general question of why tell history in the first place? 
In Nietzsche's cutting question (which we shall see in chapter three, 
still bears down upon historiographical reflection today) what are its 
uses and disadvantages? Before questions of epistemology are to be 
resolved it might be thought that questions of ontology, politics, and 
ethics should be raised. This has not always been the case, however, 
especially In discussions of the value of narrative in the service of 
historical representation. A good deal of the English speaking debate 
about the role of narrative in historiography had, until the publication 
7 This aspiration to the position of a science has been an important 
element of much historiography since the beginnings of its 
professionalization in the nineteenth century and it is around this desire 
that Foucault's own doubts about its value in-itself hinge. 
of Hayden White's seminal Metahistory In 1973, been predominantly 
concerned with the criteria for the truth and validity of historical 
descriptions and explanations. This focused specifically upon the 
epistemological question as to the conditions under which we are 
justified in believing the historian's statements about the past. This 
epistemological bent meant that the relation between historical statements 
and what they refer took priority over ontological questions about the 
nature of historiography as a human practice. It is this decision to 
prioritise epistemology that prevented, and still prevents an 
understanding of the thrust of recent narrativist themes In the 
philosophy of history. At the same time it must be recognized that most 
working historians have generally taken little serIOUS account of the 
philosophical debates about the status of historical knowledge and 
regarded them as liable to confuse rather than clarify the essential 
matter of historical research.8 This attitude is, however, remarkably 
consonant with a general positivist understanding of epistemology in 
which the historian's first and last task IS to accumulate factual 
knowledge about the past in a process that disregards the beliefs, 
values and social and political situation of the historian. 
One way to enter the increasingly mounting literature upon this subject 
is from the broader perspective of the debate between humanism and 
anti-humanism.9 Following Kate Soper, the term humanism is here used to 
denote a wide set of philosophies inspired principally by an 
anthropologizing of the work of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. This 
would include the Marxist existentialism of Sartre and the 
8 See G. R. Elton, The Practice of Histor;r (London: Fontana, 1969), pp. 
vii-viii. 
9 This is for example, the strategy that Kate Soper uses in Humanism 
and Anti-Humanism (London: Hutchinson, 1986) in order to delineate In 
broad terms between two essentially different styles of thought. 
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phenomenological anthropology of Merleau-Ponty. It IS from this 
perspective in particular, that one can usefully compare the work of 
Foucault and its implications for the writing of history, especially 
historiography associated with historical interpretation and philosophical 
hermeneutics. In relation to the writing of history this specifically 
concerns the question of who makes history and what constitutes the 
content of history. The main impetus of such positions is to insist that 
individuals are to varying degrees able to distanciate themselves both 
from their historicity and consequently society In the sense that it is 
their individual meaningful actions which lie at the source of the 
historical and social. It IS human beings who create the historical 
structures and institutions of society; they who are constitutive of 
historical and social life; and they who are able, therefore in the last 
instance, to control and shape the development of the historical societies 
which they inhabit and reciprocally constitute. The distinctive role of 
human activity in the creation of historical conditions of existence IS 
irreducible. An important part of this position consists in the claim that 
in order to understand human historical existence one cannot do away 
with the meanings, values and intentions that individuals bring to 
action. Within the tradition of the Geistwissenschaften this led to a 
fundamental separation between the study of human phenomena and the 
study of physical phenomena; Dilthey being an early proponent of the 
development of an independent methodology for the human sciences.10 
History differs from the natural process in its very nature; in having as 
its subject matter the creations of moral and rational agents. Meani ng IS 
10 See Dilthey: Selected Writings, ed., trans. and introduced by H. P. 
Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). The dismantling 
of this distinct separation between the human and physical sciences from 
both the scientific and hermeneutical points of view is well discussed by 
Bernstein in his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983) 
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literally part of the being of history, because history is itself contrived 
by those who act in the light of reasons, values and beliefs. Moreover to 
deny significance to history IS to adopt a (neutral', scientific stance, 
which is not a trans-historical position but rather a particular kind of 
value position in itself. History thus, derives its particular (non-natural' 
status from the fact that it is the product of a form of activity differing 
substantially from the behaviour of other species. Human events differ 
from natural events because the identity between the enquirer and 
history enables a far deeper understanding of the subject matter. In 
contrast to the tacit consensus around the empiricist values of 
observational facts, disinterested research, and the unity of science, this 
position places primacy upon the role of the enquirer in the formulation 
of historiography and can legitimately be understood as a form of 
Idealism in many of its incarnations. 
The elaborate positivistic understanding of scientific history In terms of 
general causal laws formalized by Hempel, and subsequently the su bject 
of much philosophical debate, has had little effect upon the practice of 
historians.II It is in this context that the attraction of a more loosely 
understood (scientific' model has been of paramount importance In 
contemporary historiography. This understanding of history as a kind of 
art which is itself equated with traditional narrative remains very much 
alive but nevertheless exists under the shadow of the scientific ideal. 
For philosophers In the existentialist-phenomenological tradition history 
has always been less an object of study than a mode of being-in-the-
world that makes possible understanding itself. 12 Historical knowledge is 
11 C. G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History" in Theories 
of History, ed. Gardiner (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 344-6. 
12 See Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 434-449. 
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produced on a basis completely different from the physical or 
structural-functional social sciences. For thinkers such as Gadamer and 
Ricouer, historiography is less a discovery or decipherment of the past's 
traces, than an interpretation or translation, a carrying over of 
meanings from one discursive community to another. It is tradition that 
unites the interpreter with the in terpretan dum, In an activity that 
establishes the individuality and communality of both. 
The question that most divides anti-humanists from the philosophical 
anthropology of humanists {and distinguishes them from traditional 
historians} IS twho makes history?' For those such as Levi-Strauss, 
Althusser and Foucault, all humanism is ideological. An anthropology is 
possible only on the condition that it rejects the concept of the human 
subject; men do not make history, nor find their truth or purpose in it, 
for history is a process without a subject. Foucault puts the Issue 
succinctly: 
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the 
founding function of the subject: the guarantee that 
everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the 
certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it 
in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the 
subject - in the form of historical consciousness - will once 
again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, 
all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, 
and find in them what might be called his abode. 
In various forms, this theme has played a constant role 
since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all 
decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject, and the twin 
figures of anthropology and humanism. {AK,12} 
This sort of position is obviously antithetical to claims that there might 
be a place for narrative in the practice of history. The very idea of 
history as a process that is meaningfully constituted by conSCIousness 
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as a past developing towards the present IS regarded as ethnocentric 
and profoundly unscientific. Moreover, poststructuralism In its 
Nietzschean attack upon the value of Ctruth', regards any attempt to 
represent history faithfully as the Cevents' themselves happened, as 
itself profoundly motivated by Western onto-theology, which represses 
other ways of relating to history and indeed other ways of being 
altogether. 
The value of narrative in the representation of history has been under 
attack at least since the Annales school first sought to undermine lhe 
narrative form In historiography. This explicitly objectivistic and 
scientific attack upon narrative continued with the rise of structuralism 
and, despite their rejection of such scientific aspirations, 
poststructuralists have generally been suspicious of the attempt to place 
the narrative form in the service of historiography. Typically it is seen 
as an outmoded and ethnocentric form of writing and as bearing the 
unmistakable imprints of metaphysical humanism. Hayden White, who has 
characterised poststructuralism as an " absurdist moment" 13 IS 
nevertheless clear on the reasons why narrative IS guilty until proven 
innocent. 
For White, the humblest narrative is always more than a chronological 
serIes of events and it is the meaning constituted over and above these 
simple elements that renders narrative a imposition upon freality', which, 
he claims, cannot be said to bear such overall meaning. Narrative 
synthesis does not bear true witness to historical reality which has no 
internal coherence in itself. In a similar vein, Barthes argued that: 
13 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse, (1978). 
For history not to signify, discourse must be limited to a 
pure unstructured series of notations: these will be 
chronicles and annals (in the pure sense of the word). In 
constituted historical discourse, the facts related irresistably 
function either as indices or as nuclei whose very 
succession has an indicial value; and even though facts are 
presented in an anarchic manner, they at least signify 
anarchy and refer to a certain negative idea of human 
history. 14 
In a discussion of the uses of narrative In historiography, White 
concludes with these rhetorical questions: 
Does the world really present itself to perception in the 
form of well-made stories, with central subjects, proper 
beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits 
us to see Cthe end' in every beginning? Or does it present 
itself more in the forms that the annals and chronicle 
suggest, either as mere sequence without beginning or end 
or as se1uences of beginnings that only terminate and never conclude. 5 
White has been especially influential in exposing the variety of literary 
and tropological structures which historians have used as frameworks 
for their accounts of the past and his contribution to the debate will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Recent debates within the historical profession often seem to suggest 
that what is at issue is the question whether the historian should tell a 
story that is. narrate his material in a chronological, cause-effect way or 
not. The alternatives to this practice are usually held to be the more 
Cmodern' methods which following the social and economIC sciences 
present synchronic and if possible quantitative, models of past affairs. 16 
14 R Barthes, "The Discourse of History", p. 137. 
15 White, The Content of the Form, p. 122. 
16 See the essays In Constructing the Past: Essays 
Methodology, ed. by Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
in Historical 
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It was the documentation 
dealing with the general and the mass rather than the particular and 
development of new historical methods and 
the individual and lacking in tevents', that first established a serIous 
basis for non-narrative history and challenged the traditional core of 
historical knowledge. The Annales group were the first prominent body 
of professional historians to be critical of narrative history (although 
Marxism in the primacy given to the dialectic of the forces and relations 
of production and its emphasis upon the class struggle as the motor of 
history, is arguably the first and greatest attempt at a scientific and 
total history.) For the Annalists, narrative history was simply the 
history of past politics and moreover, political history was conceived as 
short-term, dramatic conflicts and crisis lending themselves to novelistic 
representations, of a more literary than scientific kind. Narrative history 
consists of an interpretation of history dominated by dramatic 
happenings In the lives of men. In contrast they promoted a 
historiography devoted to the analysis of tlong-term' trends In 
demography, economics, and ethnology, that is, to much more impersonal 
processes. Such approaches really blossomed with the advent of the 
computer as a tool for processing large and complex data and of course 
take on an aura of authority simply through issuing In seemingly 
incontrovertible statistical declarations. Aside from dou bts abou t 
enthusiastic claims for the inherent objectivity of quantative 
methodologies, it IS important not to lose sight of the academic 
aspirations of the tNew histories' that have flourished since the war. The 
simple desire to evacuate the clearly non-scientific narrative form from 
historiography in order to approach scientificity proceeds with as much 
the same motives as earlier nineteenth century attempts to represent the 
past as it was. That is, with the aim of achieving respectability and 
power within the academy by imitating the alms and methods of the 
physical sciences. 
Nevertheless, although the debate about the scientific aspirations of 
history are important (particularly for Foucault) it is with another issue 
that I am concerned here. The rejection of narrative history was as 
much a result of a distaste for its conventional subject matter and past 
politics than a belief that its form was novelistic rather than scientific. 
This distaste for the dramatizing effect of narrative form can be 
construed as a decision to put impersonal processes and structures at 
the centre of history rather than human agents who have significant 
control over their own destinies. Thus, the debate over whether 
historiography should utilise narrative forms or look to more statistical 
techniques in order to represent the past is not as crucial a Issue as 
that of whether history itself IS a discipline implicated In humanist 
assumptions. While historians might attempt to process more and more 
data and seek the elusive goal of ttotal history', they are nonetheless 
working within the framework of meaning production that is itself a 
deeply problematic assumption. 
The countermovement against history as a discipline questions the 
strategies and conditions which allow the possibility of secure meaning 
in the very writing of history. History here, IS an especial field of 
contention because of its ultimate dependence upon and buttressing of 
humanism understood as the ideological site of the sovereign S11 bject. So 
although histories that proceeded with models taken from the economic 
and social sciences seemed to hint at a decentring of man, they merely 
renewed the notions of continuous and total history in their scientific 
totalizations. It was the very possibility of constructing a total history 
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that In turn became a natural common-sensical perspective that was 
peculiarly ripe for ideological critique. The fact that historical analysis 
itself revealed seemingly inevitable components of human life to be 
constituted did not mean that the historical perspective could itself be 
immune to such deconstruction. 
As we have seen above, from the structural-anthropological perspective 
as represented by Levi-Strauss it was not narrative so much as history 
that was the problem. In his famous polemic against Sartre, he denied 
the validity of the distinction between historical or civilised and pre-
historical or primitive societies and the notion of a specific method of 
study and mode of representing the structures and processes of the 
former. 17 Historical knowledge was in this sense hardly distinguishable 
from the myths of (savage' communities. Historiography is here charged 
with being merely the myth of modern Western societies. Its diachronic 
method which represents events in chronological order is for Levi-
Strauss a poor scientific model compared to the analytical techniques 
that enable the identification of the common properties of events as 
elements of a structure. 
The chronological ordering of events IS thus regarded as culture 
specific in that the representation of time can take many cultural forms. 
Narrative chronologies can claim no especial privilege in this plurality 
and it was the fact that Western history does claim such a privileged 
status amongst others that enabled Levi-Strauss to pronounce it to be a 
deceptive and ethnocentric method of analysis. This ethnocentric 
blindness was compounded by the fact that the practice of narrative 
historiography meshed extraordinarily well with other societal practices 
17 Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 263. 
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to constitute a human subject conforming to the requirements and 
conditions of the modern Western states. 
This notion of the reproduction of the subject IS something Barthes 
linked to Nietzsche's depiction of humanity's ability to make promIses. 
The possibility of the subject becoming a unitary and identical 
individual IS facilitated by the acquirement of the capability to 
understand and tell narratives and thus the ability to place oneself in a 
coherent network of intelligibility. We shall see later that Ricoeur makes 
this ability a crucial component of our ethical responsibility but without 
wishing to imply the closure of the unitary subject. The coherence that 
the narrative capacity enables here does not signify the centred 
conSCIousness that masters its world but the imperfect network of life-
stories that are more the entanglements than the orderings of a closed 
subject. 
According to Barthes the development of realism In the nineteenth 
century novel and objectivity In historiography were inextricably 
intertwined. The crux of their mutuality lay In the narrative mode. 
Barthes argued that: "CWhat takes place' In a narrative IS from the 
referential {reality} point of view literally nothing; Cwhat happens' IS 
language alone, the adventure of language, the unceasing celebration of 
its coming." 18 In cThe Discourse of History', he extended this arguing 
that: 
in "objective" history, the "real" is never anything but an 
unformulated signified, sheltered behind the apparent 
omnipotence of the referent. This situation defines w hat we 
might call the reality effect... historical discourse does not 
follow the real, it merely signifies it, constantly repeating 
18 R. Barthes, "The Structural Analysis of Narratives", In Image Music 
Text, tr. S. Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 124. 
this happened, without this assertion ever being anything 
but the signified wrong side of all historical narration.19 
J ( 
According to Barthes "Our entire civilization has a taste for the reality 
effect" to be found in as diverse mediums as the realistic novel, the 
private diary, documentary literature, the news item, the historical 
museum, etc. The disappearance of narration in contemporary historical 
science was for him a "veritable ideological transformation" indicating 
that the "sign of History is henceforth not so much the real as the 
intelligible." 20 However, this does not mean that somehow modern 
historical methods such as those used by the Annales group are more 
trealistic' simply by being less narrativistic. Barthes is clearly in favour 
of Nietzsche's dictum that "facts is precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations,,21 It is because historical discourse promotes the model 
of "linguistic existence" as a pure and simple "copy" of another 
existence, situated in an extra-structural field, the treaP, that it is so 
fit for in Barthes' terms demythologization. 
The critical rigour of historiography is thus to be achieved through a 
rupture with the natural life-world of narrative human consciousness. We 
shall see in the next section that it is precisely this intrinsicality which 
is appealed to as justification for the whole-hearted acceptance of 
narrative In the writing of historiography. The fact that narrative form 
has been widely regarded within the historical discipline as neither a 
product of a theory nor the basis for a method, but rather as a form of 
discourse that mayor may not be used for the representation of 
19 R. Barthes, "The Discourse of History", in The Rustle of Language, tr. 
R. Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 139. 
20 Ibid. p. 140. 
21 Ibid. p. 138. See F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Walter Kaufmann 
and R. J. Holling dale, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1968), p. 481. 
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historical events, at once leads one to suspect the hidden implications of 
its use. Usually it has been seen as merely a means to an end, that IS, 
to facilitate the communication of historical research and not an end in 
itself. As White points out, the question whether narrative represents 
historical events accurately thus centres upon the possibility of the 
distinction between form and content. This distinction in turn enables 
the separation of the fields of history and fiction. Of course a driving 
assumption amongst historians is that their storl"es refer to 1 t rea even ,s 
whereas fiction involves a suspension of belief in such a referring 
relation on the part of its audience. This in turn implies that history is 
In some way discovered rather than, like fiction, constructed. It is this 
assumption that Barthes questioned and which White in particular has 
sought to undermine via a concentration upon the textual production 
that IS historiography. 
Traditionally the narrative historian has seen herself as revealing the 
truth about the past from the documents and artefacts of the past In 
order to tell the most plausible narrative about this past. The form of , 
historical discourse IS seen to add nothing to the content In this 
respect; rather it IS ideally a reproduction of the structure and 
processes of real events that are seen as essentially elements of a true 
narrative. As long as the representation resembles the events that it 
represents, it can be taken as a true account. Thus, the narrative form 
does not contribute anything new to the historical past. The tendency 
amongst those who defend the legitimacy of the narrative mode for 
historical representation IS to stress its communicative function. For 
them, history's content IS both information and an explanation. The 
statements of a chronicle correspond to actual events and the narrative 
configuration is thus conceived to correspond to the actual structure of 
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the events in time. The form of this narrative is thus considered to be 
merely a structure which conveys the truth of its content without 
affecting the status of this inner core of truth content. 
White argues that this notion of narrative fails to take into account the 
various kinds of narratives that every culture arrays for those of its 
members who might wish to draw upon them for the encoding and 
transmission of messages, and also the enormous variety of codes which 
authors interweave for the production of infinitely rich stories. 
Discourse is not just a vehicle but consists In as much of its form as it 
does of whatever information it might provide. To change the form of 
discourse would change its meaning too. A set of events written In 
chronological order is not devoid of meaning but rather its meaning IS 
precisely the kind that any list is capable of producing. Narrative uses 
other codes than just the chronicle but it is not that narrative explains 
more than the chronicle, rather it produces a meaning different from 
chronicalization. 
White argues that In historical discourse, the narrative serves to 
transform into a story a list of historical events that would otherwise be 
only a chronicle. In order to effect this transformation, the events, 
agents, and agencies represented in the chronicle must be encoded as 
kinds of elements that can be apprehended as story elements. This 
inevitably directs the reader's attention to a secondary referent, 
different from the events that make up the primary referent, namely the 
plot structures of the various story types cultivated in a given culture. 
The comprehension of these story types IS at the same time the 
comprehending of the meaning of the discourse. 
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In Metahistory White elaborates a theory of tropes in the analysis of 
historical discourse. Language IS considered to be crucial In this 
process, in that rhetoric and theoretical self-reflection are essential to 
the writing of history and it IS the writing of history that IS 
constitutive of historical understanding. Historical narratives are: 
verbal fictions the contents of which are as much invented 
as found and the forms of which have more in common with 
their counter-Barts in literature than they have with those in 
the sciences. 2 
White's overall aIm IS to question the distinction between those who 
write history and those who write about writing history. For White it is 
more the "master historians" of the nineteenth century rather than the 
rigourous under-labourers of factual accumulation that provide an 
insight into the essence of historiography. This parallels the argument 
that SInce the middle of the nineteenth century most professional 
historians have self-consciously adopted a theoretical and methodological 
simplicity. 
White criticizes positivism and the simple use of traditional narrative in 
the writing of history. Both approaches share a conception of the tfacts' 
as the indubitable givens of history, and marginalise the interpretative 
nature of historiography by regarding it as a more or less plausible way 
of imaginatively completing the spaces in the historical record. Finally, 
both have an equal distrust of the kind of speculative history produced 
by White's visionaries such as Michelet, Ranke, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche 
and Croce. 
22 H. White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact" In Tropics of 
Discourse (1978), p. 82. 
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White sees narrative as a potentially repressive force, especially after 
rhetoric and the possible visions of history it engendered were rejected 
when history sought to become a scientific discipline In the early 
nineteenth century. In seeking the status of scientificity, historiography 
necessarily represses its interpretative nature and consequent insertion 
in the political field. One of the most important implications of this 
scientisation is the division between philosophy of history which aims at 
analysing the claims of history and history as simply practised without 
conscious awareness of the need for philosophical justification about the 
implicit choices in its actual constitution. 
White asks: "What is ruled out by conceiving the historical object in 
such a way that not to conceIve it in that way would constitute prima 
facie evidence of want of ~discipline,?"23 His answer is rhetoric, which 
he describes following Kant, as the awareness of a variety of ways of 
configuring a past which in itself exists only as a chaos of forms. By 
de-rhetoricizing history, in the drive to create a discipline, historical 
studies in fact chose a certain mode which excludes from its scope the 
possibility of expressing or imagining all that does not pass for the 
common sense of socially ~responsible' individuals at a given moment. 
In propounding a certain mode of rhetoric which found its natural 
expression in the realistic narrative forms of nineteenth century prose 
fictions, history became a ~discipline' by associating itself with ways of 
thinking and writing that were already established in existing practises 
and structures of power and discourse and which could therefore claim 
to be natural modes of thinking. 
23 The Content of the Form, p. 126. 
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White focuses on the historiographic genealogy: annal, chronicle, history. 
His suggestion IS that In this apparent progression In human 
consciousness of the past we see a growth of narrativity, which can 
only exist in a social world which recognizes some corporate entity 
which might serve as the organizing principle for a narrative selection 
of facts. The annal with its discontinuous gaps between years, its lack 
of any theme or subject that can be followed, and its variety of 
annalists can be seen at best as a record of time which might be 
meaningful only to God. Narrative appears with a social consciousness, 
and carries with it the burden of representing that consciousness to its 
members, with all the political and ideological consequences that the 
construction of social consciousness entails. 
What White calls into question, like Barthes, is the unfailing ability of 
narrative to make sense out of things, and to present them in a form 
that seems natural. As Barthes argues: 
In the historical discourse of our civilization, the process of 
signification always aims at "filling" the meaning of History: 
the historian is the one who collects not so much facts as 
signifiers and relates them, ie. organizes them in order to 
establish a positive meaning and to fill the void of pure 
series.24 
This is narrative's mythic aspect, both In the Aristotelian sense that 
narrative always gives things a plot of some sort, but also in Barthes' 
sense that narrative turns the chaos of history into an illusion of the 
immediacy and order of nature. Narrativity is virtually inescapable but it 
is for all that, not natural. One of the possibilities that is ruled out by 
the study of history is the possibility that history is meaningless In 
itself and White argues this should never be ruled out of any discipline. 
24 Barthes, "The Discourse of History", pp. 137-8. 
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White's theory IS clearly constructI·VI·st ·t h· th In 1 s emp aSIS upon e 
productive function of conSCIousness In contrast to the representative 
function stressed by the mimetic epistemology of traditional positivist 
and narrativist historiography. Tropes have a prefigurative and 
projective function in constituting a field of discourse, and the emphasis 
IS upon making explicit the interpretative and explanatory strategies 
implicit In historiography. The attempt to reduce this interpretative 
process by the flight into a natural positivism is always illusory and yet 
White's argument tends to issue in the argument that Creality' is not so 
much nonexistent as present as a kind of chaotic Kantian noumenal world 
behind the discourse of history. This is despite his intention that we 
should enquire into the nature of interpretation and its implications and 
positive possibilities in the reconstruction of the past. 
White has argued that there is an absurdist moment in contemporary 
literary theory in which he includes figures such as Barthes, Foucault 
and Derrida.25 Their responses to the problem of writing are considered 
to be indicative of the lack of conviction in Western culture and the 
culmination of the fate of modernity as a flawed project. 
However, I wish to argue that White's placing of historical discourse up 
against the limit of meaninglessness, which it cannot incorporate without 
the production of meaning, whilst an essential step in understanding 
historiographical writing as the production of sense from non-sense, IS 
only a element in grasping why narrative, in its broadest sense of 
historical interpretation, is so important and maybe indispensable to the 
writing of history. The possibility that the study of history be in some 
way meaningless is difficult to comprehend unless it is meant to imply 
25 See Tropics of Discourse, chap. 11. 
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the possibility of a world where there could be no possibility of the 
study of history. By this I do not mean to say that the study or 
process of history IS In some way inherently meaningful; that it carries 
with it an implicit telos of rationality and meaning. Nor do I imply that 
because history is a human production it is by definition meaningful 
because human being IS intrinsically meaningful. Rather I wish to 
challenge the meaningfulness of White's charge that history could 
possibly be meaningless In itself. This possibility arIses only from 
White's characterization of narrativity or history as non-natural because 
of its constructed nature. This is to assume that one could postulate 
over against the human constructs of historiography an in-itself of a 
chaotic realm of pure process that would in some way be the tnatural' 
beneath our interpretations. The strong constructivist tendencies 
inherent In White's theory, lead him at times to lend credence to the 
idea of an unprocessed historical record. This record is supposedly 
offered as a dormant object waiting to be animated by the productive 
wor k of the historian. Such a definite distinction between the natural 
and the non-natural is precisely the kind of distinction that White's 
theory of the linguistic figuration of historiography is designed to point 
up as a production itself. 
The recognition that the historical record is itself a text that is always 
already processed, implies that the historian always begins as situated 
in the context of traditions of discourse and weakens White's argument 
that history as a meaningless in-itself IS ruled out as a positive 
possibility of history. The notion of an unprocessed historical record can 
be seen as a critical fiction, a kind of sublime intimation of the chaos of 
history. The absolute negativity of this possibility, however, means that 
it is not something that can be regarded as a pure, primary t given' to 
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be derived through a process of distillation of the ~facts' from their 
implication in story, plot, and myth. 
In this sense, White's argument that narrative IS a "cultural universal 
because language is a human universal" has to be seen not as an 
argument for its arbitrary nature but as an indication of its intimate 
connections with the universal existentials of understanding and 
discourse as distinguished by Heidegger (BT ,203) From the perspective 
that historical discourse is necessarily interpretation which takes the 
form of narrative in order to be distinctively historical, the question of 
the function of narrativity in the production of the historical text 
indeed becomes paramount. White's emphasis upon the linguistic 
figuration of the historical text as "first and foremost a verbal artefact, 
a product of a special kind of language-use,,26 can thus be seen as an 
endorsement of the Barthesian SUspICIon of history as a kind of writing 
that cannot escape the (reality effect' if it is to differentiate itself from 
fiction. In this sense what is required is not new histories that somehow 
efface this desire for fidelity to the past as a extra-discursive referent, 
but a changed relationship to the historicity of human existence 
altogether. To the extent that this relationship will always be 
linguistically constituted White can justify the primacy of the analysis of 
language for the philosophy of history: 
In short, historical discourse should not be considered 
primarily as a special case of the "workings of our minds" 
in its efforts to know reality or to describe it, but rather 
as a special kind of language use which, like metaphoric 
speech, symbolic language, and allegorical representation, 
always means more than it literally says, says something 
other than what it seems to mean and reveals something 
26 H. White, "Figuring the Nature of Times Deceased: Literary Theory 
and Historical Writing" in The Future of Literary Theory, ed. Ralph 
Cohen (New York: Routledge, 1989) p. 22. 
about the world only at the cost of concealing something 
else.27 
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White's emphasis upon Irony for critical self-consciousness as both a 
dissolving and debunking attitude IS counter-balanced by his 
appreciation of the master historians of the nineteenth century and their 
genius for providing renewed contact with history and historical 
existence. In particular Nietzsche IS considered to be a prime example of 
someone who strove to keep alive a metaphoric relationship with the 
world without simply resorting to a naive mythologizing.28 
The question at the heart of White's reflections IS precisely the 
irredeemably textual nature of historiography: 
The peculiar dialectic of historical discourse - and of other 
forms of discursive prose as well, perhaps even the novel -
comes from the effort of the author to mediate between 
alternative modes of emplotment and explanation, which 
means, finally, mediating between alternative modes of 
language use or tropological strategies for originally 
describing a given field of phenomena and constituting it as 
a possible object of representation .••. This aim of mediation, 
in turn, drives him toward the ironic recognition that any 
given linguistic protocol will obscure as much as it reveals 
about the reality it seeks to capture in an order of words. 
This aporia or sense of contradiction residing at the heart 
of language itself is present in all of the classic historians. 
It is this linguistic self- consciousness which distinguishes 
them from their mundane counterparts and followers, who 
think that language can serve as a perfectly transparent 
medium of representation.29 
It IS with a more affirmative and contestatory understanding of 
narrative which is related to the multiplicity of interpretations that one 
might be able to refuse the tendency in White's work towards relegating 
27 Ibid. p. 25. 
28 For a discussion of this aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy see Eric 
Blondel, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor, in The New Nietzsche, tr. Mairi 
Macrae, ed. D. B. Allison (New York: Dell, 1977). 
29 Tropics of Discourse, p. 130. 
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the structuring of language upon the world to a practise of fictive 
consolation. From this perspective, White's own work draws its strength 
precisely from promoting contestation and controversy. 
History is from White's perspective primarily interpretation because of 
its linguisticality and not because of the finitude of historical existence. 
This is why he makes the impossibility of clearly distinguishing between 
the discursive form and interpretative content of historical writing the 
central tenet of his position. From a philosophical hermeneutic standpoint 
the ontological prImacy of historicity and hence of interpretative 
understanding emerges equiprimordially with linguisticality 
(Sprachlichkeit). The possibility of history appearing as meaningless is 
ruled out because following Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as being-in-
the-world, existence is always already "submitted to a fworld', and exists 
factically with Others." (BT,435)30 The facticity of existence, the 
belonging to history before it belongs to us means that the possibility 
of treating it as meaningless in itself can only arise after the event. It 
IS thus far from being a chaotic realm which a linguistic figuration 
forms into the "formal coherency of the kind of plot structures met with 
in narrative fiction". 31 Rather, White's argument that emplotment works 
upon a kind of pure chronologically ordered series of events fails to 
bring out the fact that such a series is itself more the product of 
abstraction than narrative emplotment. Following Heidegger's discussion 
of the "as" structure of understanding and interpretation we might say 
that freeing history from the structure of "something as something" 
requires a "certain readjustment" and, far from being primordial, is 
derived from "the kind of seeing in which one merely understands." 
30 See also p. 174. 
31 White, "Literary Theory and Historical Writing", p. 26. 
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(BT,190) This is bound up with the rejection of interpretation as a kind 
of throwing of "tsignification' over some naked thing which is present-
at-hand", (BT,190) b t t u a s ructure grounded In the essential fore-
having, fore-sight and fore-conception of understanding. This 
thrownness, in turn, leads to the concern with what it means to belong 
to a tradition and to the possible distantiation from that tradition that 
becomes the basis for philosophical hermeneutics. 
White's position stems from a belief that "stories are not lived" and that 
"there is no such thing as a creal' story. ,,32 Hence, because he sees 
history as the transformation of a chronicle into a story guided by the 
plot structures of arbitrary cultural traditions, he IS unable to 
countenance the possibility of the kind of hermeneutical event of truth 
of the tradition that Gadamer wishes to argue for. In contrast to White's 
convictions that life is not a story and that experience is not structured 
narratively, Paul Ricoeur and David Carr have argued for quite the 
opposite in order to shore up the philosophical importance of narrative 
for historical existence. It is to these two positions that I now turn. 
(ti) The Universality of Narrative for Life: The Roots of History 
David Carr argues that historical narrative is rooted in an everyday, 
pre-thematic historical experience, and that this ordinary temporal 
33 h h" to"' t" " experience has a narrative structure. T e IS rlan s narra lves are In 
this way extensions of pre-scientific, historical experience. Their content 
is fed by this common pre-thematic grasp of the historical past and 
their form is supplied by our lived experience of time. History is thus a 
32 Ibid. p. 27. 
33 David Carr, Time, Narrative, History (Bloomington, Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press, 1986) 
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secondary reconfiguration but nevertheless bears and imitates similar 
structures to ll"ved experl"ence. In thl"S respect ther t e are s rong 
similarities between Carr and Ricoeur's evaluation of the place of 
narrative in existence. Carr, however, has been concerned to distance 
himself from a complete identification of their respective theories34 The 
major difference as he sees it is in the connection and importance of 
this connection, between lived experience and historical narratives. Carr 
IS concerned to emphasize the rootedness of the form of 
historiographical narrative in ordinary life and he believes that Ricoeur 
wrongly emphasizes the disjunction between the two to the detriment of 
his own reflections upon the value of narrative. However, one should 
keep in mind that the two authors are working within a tradition (the 
phenomenological-hermeneutical one) which divides them from 
positivistically minded scientific historiography as well as structuralist 
and poststructuralist perspectives that reject or problematize the 
constitutive role of human subjects far more than any differences might 
divide their own positions. 
For Carr the intimate connection between time and history arIses from 
the mediations between the two in the form of narrative. Carr argues 
that our temporal experience is always already organized and that this 
organization can be said to take the narrative form. Here narrative IS 
not just a literary form secondary to life-experience and distortive of it 
by an imposition of coherence upon formlessness. Rather narrative is the 
primary way our experiences are organized throughout the 
"connectedness of life". Even though historical narratives do go beyond 
these initial narrative structures of experience and acquire a kind of 
34 See Carr's contribution 
Narrative and Interpretation, 
pp. 160-174. 
to the discussion in On Paul Ricoeur: 
ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), 
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unity that IS forever deferred In ordinary experience, they are 
nevertheless of the same basic form. Life may not be a coherent story 
but the attempt to recount it is not overly distortive of its actual lived 
structures. 
In order to demonstrate the narrative structure of our temporal 
experIence Carr uses Husserl's analyses of internal time consciousness. 
Carr believes that Husserl principally shows that our consciousness of 
time has a horizonal structure which enables a transcendence of the 
point-like "now" of measured time and the comprehending of both the 
immediate past and future through retention and protention. Husserl's 
great phenomenological discovery IS to show that our temporal 
experIence IS not a simple series of unconnected instants which is then 
artificially structured by conSCIousness, but always already structured 
into temporary temporal wholes. It is in this first basic experiential 
structure that Carr believes can be found the basis for one of the most 
simple narrative structures, that of closure, of beginning, middle and 
end. 
Carr believes that other typical features of narrative can be found in 
our lived experience and action (suspension-resolution, departure-
arrival, means-end). Moreover, not only does life display such basic 
narrative features it also bears an equivalence to the narration of a 
story. For Carr the narrator of fiction, although she may have a 
knowledge of the whole story thanks to the privileged standpoint of 
authorial mastery, has a similar structural counterpart In life. The 
horizons of temporal experience may be inescapably open to new 
experience but this at the same time allows for one to occupy a 
multiplicity of perspectives on ones life, including those of the past and 
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the future. The privileged position of the narrator therefore bears 
similarities to the possibility of transcending the horizon of the present 
and viewing it both from the point of the past and the future in order 
to tell the story of one's life from a variety of interconnected 
perspectives. 
Carr argues that our capacity for attention and for working through 
complex projects manifests our ability to select certain strands of our 
experience and bracket our others. Thus, the argument that life is full 
of "static" and arbitrary meaningless actions and events with fictional 
narrative precisely does without is a misplaced one. In life there is a 
constant hierarcization of projects and this inevitably implies a 
marginalization and rejections of certain possibilities and happenings In 
order for one to concentrate on the foreground of one's cares and 
projects. The absence of an authorative narrative voice does not mean 
that there is not a comparable functional process in life. Furthermore 
the poststructuralist challenge to authorial mastery strengthens rather 
than weakens the parallels between narrative text and experience. We 
are not the authors of our own lives In the strong sense but the extent 
to which we do bear responsibility for the projects we take up is also 
inextricably entwined with the stories we tell in the process of living. 
The "connectedness of life" is a natural relation and not an imposition 
upon a neutral series of experiences and moreover this is a thesis that 
bears strong moral implications. Instead of saying that stories are not 
lived but told, Carr would like to say that they are lived in the telling 
and told as they are lived.35 
35. Time, Narrative, History, p. 61. 
A full understanding of history, Carr ultimately argues, has to include 
the social dimension of narrative. This IS why he attempts to 
demonstrate that narrative structure exists at the social level. In Hegel's 
analysis of the independence and dependence of self-consciousness, Carr 
argues one can see the origin of a community that transcends the 
solitary I and provides a basis for a socially constituted narrative that 
transcends the multiplicity of private narratives. Although narrative 
structure can be found on the higher level of social existence Carr does 
not think that this justifies one in claiming it to be a universal trans-
cultural phenomena. Rather he sees it as culturally bound and tour' 
. 
Western way of structuring temporal experience. At the same time this 
does not mean that narrative is artificial in the sense of a fictive 
production because it IS an important structure of Western human being 
in and dealing with time.36 
As we have already intimated, Carr criticizes Ricoeur for holding that 
narrative structure primarily a literary device and thus ultimately 
tragically applied to the temporal dispersion of life.37 The whole impetus 
of Carr's thesis is thus to imply that without a connection between these 
two spheres there will always be a need for the imposition of narrative 
structure from the outside in order to prevent the discordance of 
time.38 
Carr himself, underplays Ricoeur's own emphasis upon the universality 
of narrative, however. Ricoeur hardly wishes to imply that narrative is 
alien to life, an artificial web thrown over its dispersive tendencies. 
36 Ibid. p. 183. 
37 It is of course, ironic that such a position is attributed to Ricoeur in 
the context of this thesis which sees his work as motivated by the equal 
claim for comprehension in the human existence. 
38 Ibid. pp. 14-15. See also n. 2 above. 
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Instead, Ricoeur argues that experience has an inchoate narrativity that 
constitutes a genuine demand for narrative. (TN,1,75) For Ricoeur, the 
belief that the concordance of life is a fable, a projection from the 
literary domain IS itself a result of the modern anti-novel. The 
discordance of our temporal experience is itself a literary form and one 
no less violent an imposition upon lived experience. (TN,1,72-3) Carr's 
insistence upon the narrative structure of experIence IS it seems merely 
a difference in emphasis about the actual legitimacy of narrative for 
existence. Whereas for Ricoeur, narrative brings something more to lived 
experIence and it is this secondary reconfiguration that is of interest, 
for Carr, the importance of narrative springs precisely from its 
rootedness In our always already narratively structured experIence. 
Ironically, Carr thinks that Ricoeur's statement that "time becomes 
human to the extent that it IS articulated through a narrative mode" is 
evidence of ethnocentricity. This "transcultural necessity" is something 
that Carr would dispute as unhistorical and yet it is he who wishes to 
emphasize the claims of narrative for the service of historiography via 
is isomorphic connections with lived experience. 
Carr's claims for the value of narrativity in historiography are in some 
sense undermined by the denial that time (which for Ricoeur always 
bears an important otherness preventing its transparent articulation) IS 
human time when articulated through narrative. Although he wishes to 
claim a strong connection between the narrative form and historical 
existence he does not wish to claim a necessary connection. To this 
extent he believes that narrative may be the only way of confronting 
time and its dissolutory threat by creatively producing form in historical 
existence rather than escaping into timelessness. 
More importantly, Carr privileges self-narration far too much In the 
formation of self-identity. We shall see in the next chapter that for 
Foucault, it is precisely this emphasis upon continuity (and in Carr this 
exists both on the level of personal identity and on the level of the 
relation of language to the world) that has to be ceaselessly subjected 
to dispersion in order to obtain critical distanciation. It is the desire to 
see life as if it were narrative that is to be questioned. Ultimately I do 
not think that Foucault's own attempt at a systematics of dispersion can 
escape the orbit of narrative but this is much more complex than the 
mere argument that life is narrative through and through. This is why 
Ricoeur's own meditation upon time and narrative can articulate the 
dangers involved in Foucault's tendency towards the extreme of anti-
narrativism. 
(iii) The Articulation of Time Through Narrative 
In truth the historian can never get away from the question 
of time in history: time sticks to his thinking like soil to a 
gardener's spade.39 
In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur has explored the nature and role of 
narrative in its relation to temporality and language in the context of its 
two major modes of fiction and historiography and produced profound 
reflections upon each. In the case of the writing of history it might be 
said to constitute a defence of the use of narrative forms, except the 
complexity and subtlety of Ricoeur's theory make it a far cry from those 
39 F. Braudel "Towards a Historical Economics" In On History, p. 77. 
( ~) 
who would simply write historical narrative in the belief either that it 
adds nothing more to the supposedly atomistic events of the historical 
record or that narrativity is the correct representation of such events 
as they actually occurred. The notion that there is an epistemological 
break distancing historiography as critical inquiry from simple narrative 
understanding IS something that Ricoeur insists upon. (TN,1,175-88) 
Nevertheless, he finds much to commend in the arguments of theorists 
such as Louis 0 Mink and Arthur Danto, who VIew narrative as 
providing a kind of explanation different from, though not antithetical to 
nomological-deductive explanations.40 He holds that narrativity In 
historiography is more attuned to the attainment of an understanding of 
the events of which it speaks than to an explanation of them along the 
lines found in the physical and social sciences. This is obviously a 
position firmly embedded within the tradition of hermeneutics as 
developed by such thinkers as Dilthey and Heidegger. For Ricoeur, 
unlike analytical philosophers, understanding IS not opposed to 
explanation, rather these two modes of cognition are related dialectically 
especially in the case of knowledge that deals with human actions rather 
than natural events and "to explain more is to understand better. ,,41 
In this respect action is read in the same way as one reads texts and to 
understand its meaning one has to apply similar hermeneutic principles 
which ultimately derive from one's own participation in shared contexts 
of meaning. Thus, the study of the past, for Ricoeur, has the ultimate 
aIm of the understanding of human actions. (TN,1,56) The many types 
40 A. Danto, Analytical Philosopy of History (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965), Louis 0 Mink, "The Autonomy of Historical 
Understanding" History and Theory 5, (1965). 
41 TN,1,x. This echoes Paul Veyne's statement that "to explain more is to 
narrate better" cf. TN,1,171. See also Ricoeur's essays "What is a Text? 
Explanation and Understanding" and "The Model of the Text: Meaningful 
Action Considered as a Text" in HHS. 
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and models of explanation that might be utilised In this process, 
including those of the various social sciences, are ultimately means to 
the understanding of meaning. Historiography seeks to portray human 
events In a way that discloses their always already potential for 
becoming meaningful and history always obliquely intends the "field of 
human action and its basic temporality. tf (TN,1,92) 
This grasping of the meaning of human events does not simply involve 
explanation of their causal sequence. Explanation IS, however, an 
important strand in the effort to understand the meaning of human 
action which always possesses a surfeit of meaning over its initial 
meaning, whether this be the actors own intention or the initial reading 
of the action by an audience at the time. Action produces unforeseen 
and unintended consequences and becomes reciprocally embodied in 
social convention, institutions and formations which are then open to an 
understanding that goes beyond the prImary subjective meanings. 
Understanding historical action means precisely going beyond this 
surface meaning production to grasp the complex interplay and 
consequences of action conceived of as extending both spatially and 
temporally in social and cultural contexts. 
Ricoeur argues that historiography especially reveals this process of 
reading meaningful action because of the configuration of it by 
narrative. Narrative is not just a feature of fiction but also an important 
element in the representation of action as historical. In this narrative 
representation the aporias of time and historical existence are poetically 
resporided to because ft: 
combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, 
one chronological and the other not. The former constitutes 
the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the 
story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the 
configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which 
the plot transforms the events into a story. (TN,1,66) 
--f f 
The narrative IS not an imposition on the pristine events. Rather it 
constitutes the historicality of human action in which temporality and 
narrativity come together. Events become historical because they are 
more than just unique happenings and it IS narrative which produces 
this historical intelligibility: "the events themselves receIve an 
intelligibility derived from their contribution to the development of the 
plot." (TN,1,207) Narrative is a response to the paradoxes of time to be 
found both In lived experience and philosophical analysis, and 
historiography because of its essential narrativity, is an important field 
where this response can occur and develop. This is especially the case 
because its referent IS the real events and processes of history rather 
than the imaginary of fictive narrative. Ricoeur IS situating 
historiography firmly within the question of its role as one particular 
response to the human experience of time. 
As with Carr's analysis of historiography, the narrative function, for 
Ricoeur, enables one to pass from the simple representation of time as 
that in which events take place (within-timeness) to historicality where 
emphasis IS upon events as elements of wholes functioning as 
inaugurations, transformations, endings etc. to meaningful action or 
processes. This possibility IS facilitated by the narrative nature of 
temporality as articulated through language. Within-time ness is the mode 
of representation which is articulated by the chronicle as we have seen 
above in White's analysis of narrative form. Narrative goes beyond this 
in its depiction of events as elements of complex continuities which does 
not necessarily imply the smooth ordered continuity of traditional 
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teleological narratives. For Ricoeur, a narrative IS an operation of 
configuration in which the world is redescribed and at the same time 
integrated back into the world from which it arises in order to produce 
the meaning peculiar to the human experience of historicality. It is 
because of the temporality of human being stretched ecstatically between 
birth and death that narrative is also a legitimate symbolisation of 
history. Symbolisation is not alien to historiography because historical 
events are ultimately symbolic themselves. This is why explanation In 
terms of structures and causality is never enough in the articulation of 
time or history because such processes always bear a meaning over and 
above this explanation. This does not, as remarked above, mean that 
narrative does not also explain (TN,1,178) but in historicality understood 
as repetition we are able to grasp the possibility of the retrieval of our 
most basic potentialities inherited from the past and this presents our 
historical existence from ever becoming mere causal sequence.42 
For Ricoeur, the value of narrative for historiography lies in the fact 
that ultimately the referent of history is historicality and that this can 
only be represented faithfully through the narrative articulation which 
brings time to a human dimension. Ricoeur locates narrativity in the 
human soul as its fundamental way of comprehending the fact of death. 
In this way questions about the purpose of historical study are placed 
firmly at the forefront. Ricoeur asserts that narrative remaIns the 
essence of history even when history ceases to be about events as In 
the work of the Annales school. 
42 This recovery of suppressed potentialities I shall 
fundamental structure of Foucault's genealogical history 
appearance of being driven by the will to dispersion. 
argue, is a 
despite the 
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What frames this thesis is Augustine's meditation upon time that creates 
enigmas and aporias even as it seeks the answer to the intractable 
question: fWhat is human time?' and Aristotle's theory of emplotment 
that, without resolving these aporias theoretically, provides a poetic 
response to them. It is Augustine's reflections upon the nature of time 
as a ceaseless "slippage" In the distention of the human soul that 
enables Ricoeur to postulate narrative as a poetic response to the 
ultimately discordant experience of time present in human existence. 
(TN,1,21-2) The neatness of Augustine's threefold present dissolves with 
the endless and unavoidable "slippage" of the present of the future into 
the present of the present and of the past. (TN,l,ll) 
Augustine's meditation on time, Aristotle's theories, or for that matter 
any philosophical reflection upon time and human time, all struggle with 
aporias that ultimately cannot be resolved either on the philosophical or 
lived plane. All such attempts at articulating time cosmologically or 
phenomenologically are for Ricoeur, struggles against time's ultimate 
mystery and implacability. At the same time they can be said to increase 
our understanding of time and our ability to creatively live and deal 
with the aporias of existence in that they are themselves also poetic 
responses which reach their limit In the concept of eternity or 
timelessness and which nevertheless deepen our experIence of time In 
relation to this limit concept. This notion is also, for Ricoeur, the key to 
understanding the attempts of historiography and literature to fde-
chronologize narrative'. According to him, far from being the denial of 
temporality, this de-chronologization deepens it. This notion of deepening 
our understanding of time and history is one that I will argue is the 
unavoidable framework for understanding the work of Foucault. 
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Ricoeur thinks that the attempt to de-chronologize narrative and replace 
the event by, for instance, the long-time span fails to recognize that 
such replacements are themselves implicitly articulations of human time. 
Just as the philosophical grapplings with the elusiveness of time are 
further extensions of our understanding (and this preeminently includes 
Ricoeur's own reflections) so too are the historiographical attempts at 
putting time and history on a sure footing. Any attempt to evacuate time 
from their models is also an implicit call to different forms of experience 
that can always be recuperated back within human temporality. The 
blindness to this is for Ricoeur a moral one: 
For the discovery of the long time-span may simply express 
the fact that human time, which always requires the 
reference point of a present, is itself forgotten. If the brief 
event can act as a screen hiding our consciousness of the 
time that is not our making, the long time-span can likewise, 
act as a screen hiding the time that we see. This disastrous 
consequence can be avoided only if an analogy can be 
preserved between the time of individuals and the time of 
civilizations: the analogy of growth and decline, of creation 
and death, the analogy of fate. (TN,1,224) 
Ricoeur is well aware of the challenge to narrative by both the French 
historians who have opposed event-oriented history and analytical 
philosophers who seek to dissolve history's claim to distinction in the 
general project of the unity of science. This is why he proposes an 
understanding of the event which 1S produced by the concept of 
narrative, rather than the other way round. Events are not the brief 
and nervous motions described by Braudel, but variables of the plot, 
which literally comprehends, "grasps together" as an "intelligible whole, 
circumstances, goals, interactions, and unintended results." It is the 
extension of human temporal understanding in the form of what Ricoeur 
calls "quasi-plots," "quasi-characters," and " . t " quas1-even s which points 
to the analogical character of historical categories. 
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Thus, we can see that for Ricoeur, the attempts at anti-narrative history 
are far from a complete rejections of the intrinsic narrativity of 
historical existence but a deepening and broadening of the possibilities 
for our very experiencing of this temporality. This might seem to be a 
~catch-all' solution to the challenges fo the anti-narrativists in that no 
attempt to efface narrative from historiography will be taken at face 
value and can always be said to issue in further narratives. In some 
ways, Ricoeur responds to this by considering the possibility that the 
narrative response to time may be mere fiction in that it consoles In 
response to discordance and may be merely the sum of fictions which we 
accept as human nature. This suspicion oscillates with the belief that 
such a response IS not arbitrary insofar as it answers the need of 
which we are not masters, to give order and meaning to chaos, non-
sense and discord. 
Ricoeur notes Benjamin's peSSImIsm that the end of the era of narration 
may come because human beings no longer have experIence to share. 
(TN,2,28) There may be other ways of being In which the solace of 
history would play a different part or no part at all but Ricoeur 
regards such life-forms with suspicion. As we have seen, such a position 
for White is itself to be automatically distrusted, for the transformative 
elements in narrativity which Ricoeur so values, and which he connects 
with the search for concordance as an "unavoidable assumption of 
discourse and communications", (TN ,2,28) are more likely to possess, like 
any other apparently essential quality of human nature an ideological, 
socializing dimension masking some appeal to power. Ricoeur's 
apprehension at the possibility of the end of narrative has to be seen 
as one born out of a distrust of those disciplinary, bureaucratized 
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power structures that squeeze out the very meaning and possibility of 
experiencing the world in a narrative way. 
What has been ruled out according to White, is what Ricoeur fears may 
reappear, the sense of the possible meaninglessness of history, and of 
human life. White questions the role of narrative as the natural mode of 
presentation for all serious formulations within a discipline. The orderly 
meaningfulness of narrativity is implicated in the repression of the 
potential sublimity of the field of history as an essentially meaningless 
chaos. This does not imply a call for some sort of anti-narrativism that 
might escape the ideology, discipline and constraints of linguistic and 
social productions. White insists that it is our awareness of the human 
power to construct realistic images, such as histories, and of the choices 
involved in doing so, that he wants to foster. Possible visions of the 
past far outnumber those sanctioned by the historical discipline. 
Although Ricoeur's metaphysics of narrativity rests on the assumption 
that human experIence of temporality IS deepened by and reaches 
language In narrativity and echoes White's call for multiplicity, the 
emphasis is still upon a bringing of coherence and unity to what Ricoeur 
himself acknowledges as an experIence of time that IS ultimately 
mysterious and, at its limit mute and unformed. In the face of a radical 
Nietzschean intellectual honesty that views order and coherence mere 
consolation in the ultimate face of death, Ricoeur holds that in spite of 
everything such order is our homeland. (TN,1,72) This, as he might say, 
is his own personal wager and faith. Narrative consonance from this 
perspective is a violent interpretation upon temporal dissonance, which 
as a poetic response to the aporia of time can never be a complete 
resolution of the predicament but a preservation of it in all its paradox. 
Just as there might always be something more to say (and this applies 
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to Ricoeur's own narrative about the struggle between time and 
narrative) this possibility of retelling rests upon the ultimately 
disintegrative power of cosmic time conceived as that which radically 
negates human time. And yet even here we remain within the circle of 
narrative that is the story of the impossible and futile task of ever 
achieving absolute transparency about the human condition. 
The attractions of the narrativisation of history as opposed to merely 
documenting discursive formations in a scientific manner can be clearly 
seen In Ricoeur's appeal for comprehension and coherence. This is the 
creation of a domain In which orientatation in, and control of a thrown 
existence, that at its limit remains mute and mysterious, is made possible 
by the linkage of this thrown existence to the projective horizons of the 
future through the initiative of the present.43 This structure IS 
preeminently a structure of action In which the future IS the privileged 
ekstasis of temporality because action, from this perspective, IS 
predominantly a teleological phenomena. The privileging of the future 
thus goes hand in hand with the attempt not only to bring meaning into 
a thrown existence but also to recapture this thrown inheritance for the 
purposes of forging a future under human control. This has been the 
dominant understanding of ethical and political practice in the modern 
West associated with the achievement of practical ends in the world. 
That this understanding can be challenged and indeed the privileging of 
the future disputed is a important theme of postmodernism. I will argue 
that Foucault's constant attempt to disengage from this ultimately 
teleological structure is part of this postmodern sensitivity about the 
43 I would compare this notion to something like Hans Blumenberg's 
understanding of myth as a response to the problem of the tabsolution 
of reality'. See Work on Myth, tr. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985). 
future conceived of as fulfilment of a deficient present. However, as with 
Ricoeur's doubts about the possibility and ethical desirability of 
completely dechronoligizing historiography, I will argue that this impulse 
in Foucault has ultimately to be seen as a deepening rather than a 
purifying of historical existence. Insofar as the "responsibility to act" IS 
an important field where this deepening takes place it cannot be simply 
subordinated to the "responsibility to otherness" which alms at 
dismantling the action-orientated frameworks of traditional ethics and 
politics.44 The argument that such attempts at intensifying our 
relationship to historical existence are themselves misguided and illusory 
rests upon the belief that history has little to do with human intentions, 
beliefs and values and that attempts to control its otherness through 
the appropriative web of narrative time are not only an impossible 
dream, but a deeply hubristic exercise. To assert this, however, is not 
to remain neutral to the question of history, it too is an interpretation 
with its own political and ethical effects. 
In "The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (an "untimely 
meditation" that we shall see reverberates remarkably in the latest of 
the German controversies about the purpose of history) Nietzsche argued 
that if one is to attempt to interpret history then one can only do so 
"out of the fullest exertion of the vigour of the present." (UDHL,94). At 
the same time Nietzsche recognized the possible stultifying potential of 
historical existence as a burden upon the present. In response to this 
he called for either the art and power of forgetting in which one 
encloses oneself within a bounded horizon, or the suprahistorical power 
to bestow upon existence the character of the eternal and the stable. It 
44. See S. K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 19-23. 
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IS between these two extremes of a willed presentism bounded by its 
specific needs and interests and the transcendent power of aesthetic 
refiguration (which are perhaps not so indistinguishable insofar as they 
are both antidotes to the "malady of history") that a greater 
appreciation of Foucault's own historiographical enterprise can arise. 
Insofar as this understanding of Foucault is limited by the attempt to 
understand the purpose of historiography then it remains doubly bound. 
First, by the attempt to come to terms with historical existence which 
ultimately must be understood through its connection to the 
appropriativeness implied in the phrase fcoming to terms with history' 
and second, by the inherent teleology implied In the word fpurpose' 
which Nietzsche uses In order to break with the problem of knowledge 
In favour of life. Whether Foucault can disengage from these senses in 
order to provide a clearing for a radically other form of historiography 
is the question that guides this study. Ricoeur's preferred solution to 
this, in which our responsibility is to live and express the paradox and 
mystery of historical existence without resolving it in favour of one or 
the other extreme, also becomes more plausible in this light. 
The real concern of Ricoeur's meditation on time and telling becomes 
clear in the final volume of his study. Here the philosophical bases of 
his work are revealed through his analysis of the philosophies of time of 
Heidegger, Husserl, and Kant and through a confrontation with the 
Hegelian temptation of Absolute knowledge. This debate with four major 
thinkers ultimately leads Ricoeur to a reaffirmation of his belief in the 
long detour of historical hermeneutics in order to provide an ontology of 
man. 
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Ricoeur bell'eves that we have t thO k b t h' o In a ou lstory In full 
consciousness of the "event l'n thl'nkl'ng" th t' th " d a IS e exo us from 
Hegelianism". (TN,3,206) Even though we can no longer think in the same 
way Hegel did, we have, as post-Hegelian's, to acknowledge the powerful 
seductions of hl'S thought. Thl'S' 'bl f tat' . lmpOSSl e con ron Ion IS something 
that many others have found to be indispensable in order to continue 
the practice of philosophy and has even led Habermas to claim, for 
example, that as regards the present major disputes in philosophy, we 
still remain contemporaries of the Young Hegelians. (PDM,51-5) For those, 
like Ricoeur, who have been particularly struck by Hegel's thinking the 
abandoning of its aspiration for totalization is felt as a "wound" that 
cannot be healed. Ricoeur remarks that he is close to Gadamer in this 
regard.45 
For Ricoeur, Hegel's idea of "total mediation" does not exhaust the field 
of thought. Rather it can be seen as the other over against which a 
thinking that remains that of a "open-ended, incomplete, imperfect 
mediation, namely, the network of interweaving perspectives of the 
expectation of the future, the reception of the past, and the experience 
of the present, with no Aufhebung into a totality where reason In 
history and its reality would coincide", can define itself. (TN,3,207) 
45 Gadamer argues in Truth and Method: "It is necessary to recognize 
the compulsive power of reflective philosophy and admit that Hegel's 
critics never really succeeded in breaking its magic spell". p. 307. For 
both of these thinkers it is impossible to simply refute Hegel through 
arguments that reproduce moments recognized and surpassed in his 
speculative enterprise. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based upon the anti-
Hegelian premise that: "to exist historically means that knowledge of 
oneself can never be complete". (TM,269) He argues that: "The 
Archimedian point from where Hegel's philosophy could be toppled can 
never be found through reflection". (TM,308) Instead Gadamer renounces 
the Hegelian "absolute fusion of history and truth", and "the total 
opening up of our historical horizon,.. the abolition of our finiteness in 
the infinity of knowledge". (TM,306) 
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The question to be asked IS, how far IS a renouncing of Hegelian 
thought an actual intellectual position? Does Hegel not anticipate such 
positions and designate them as bad consciousness? If Ricoeur 
acknowledges the power of Hegel's thinking how can he so easily take 
leave of it as no longer a force for us today? Is this not just a 
historical phenomenon and one that is destined to be recuperated by the 
tcunning of reason'? This problem is also to be found in Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics which exists in an even closer proximity to 
the dialectics of Hegel, and which John Caputo has characterised as "the 
most liberal version of a fundamentally conservative idea" in which the 
Hegelian absolute is to be found in the transcendental principle of non-
closure.46 
Ricoeur takes the "strategic decision" to reverse the problem of the past 
as something to be recovered and to begin from the project of history, 
"from history as what has to be made, in order to rediscover in it the 
dialectic of the past and the future and their exchanges in the present". 
(TN,3,207) This decision IS, I think, fundamentally correct. Firstly, it 
circumvents the age-old problem of producing historiography that re-
presents the past tas it actually was' and places the writing of history 
unequivocally in the present understood as a constellation of forces. 
Secondly, it emphasizes the preeminently ethical and political thrust of 
historiography insofar as it IS inextricably linked to the sphere of 
human action and temporality. Thirdly, it provides the basis for a 
response to Young's characterization of history as an "irresolvable 
tension" that becomes productive in the writing itself. Young's 
sympathetic reading of the productive contradictions of historical 
46 J. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1986), p. 112. 
theorists such as Sartre, Althusser, and Foucault, in terms of the effects 
their writing produces in the general dissolution of the transcendental 
categories of History and the West, is echoed by Ricoeur's understanding 
of narrative as deepening rather than resolving the complex dialectical 
relationship between narrative consonance and temporal dissonance. 
Following on from this poetic response to the aporias of time we can see 
that the present is not to be turned simply into a presence because it 
has a terminal position in the interplay of temporal perspectives. Rather 
it is to be conceived of as "the time of initiative". The present is the 
place where the past is "deposited, suspended, and interrupted, and 
when the dream of history yet to be made is transposed into a 
responsible decision." (TN,3,208) 
It is this connection between historical existence as a response to the 
aporias of time In the field of action and especially communicative action 
that I propose to defend in relation to Foucault's own reflections upon 
the possibility of historiography, conceived of as an emancipatory 
process Vla genealogical dissolution. In Young's characterization of 
Foucault's work as an enacting of the "irresolvable conflict between 
history as meaning and history as difference", one can detect not only 
the predominance of the textual dimension of history as the place where 
the tension becomes productive but also the preeminent ethical thrust of 
such writing situated in the present. I wish to argue that this imperfect 
mediation in the field of action can be schematized through another 
dialectic that Ricoeur has proposed, that of ideology and utopia and that 
this provides a productive comparison with a reading of Foucault that 
characterises his understanding of freedom as that of the dissolution of 
identities and a refusal to universally endorse definite political projects. 
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Yet this IS not to endorse wholeheartedly Ricoeur's hypothesis that 
"narrative IS the guardian of time" and thus that historiography 
ultimately refers to the meaningful expression of human action within 
time. The unashamedly existential understanding of historiography which 
sees it as a response to the mystery of the encompassing immensity of 
time, which is also intimately related to its dispersive power, is tempered 
by the ultimately inadequate response that a poetics of narrative makes 
to such cosmological vastness and indifference. Foucault's challenge that 
the "time of discourse is not the time of consciousness extrapolated to 
the dimensions of history, or the time of history In the form of 
consciousness" (AK,210) IS the clearest denial of the consoling 
possibilities of a narrative poetics In this respect. Yet this claim is itself 
situated within a narrative of dispossession that is echoed in an ethics 
and politics of renunciation. This is where Foucault's own historical 
narratives, such as the spread of pastoral power through the 
disciplinary matrix and confessional technology, draw their peculiar 
resonance In an age which has seen the increasing decline of the 
traditional meta-narratives of the West. Foucault has In this way 
contributed to the deepening of our understanding of history as a 
multi-layered and contradictory practice whilst addressing the concerns 
of the present in a way that testifies to Ricoeur's belief that: 
in spite of everything, it is necessary to have confidence in 
the call for concordance... and to believe that new narrative 
forms, which we do not yet know how to name, are already 
being born, which will bear witness to the fact that the 
narrative function can still be metamorphosed, but not so as 
to die. (TN,2,28) 
An understanding of Foucault as engaged in the task of producing an 
experience of dispersal and dissonance in the face of modernity's search 
for unity and identity is therefore too rapid an analysis of the effect of 
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his work. This IS not to deny that the ontological thrust of his thinking 
IS towards the exposure of the tother' that is consistently marginalized, 
devalued, and constrained by the powerful forces of the modern world. 
It is, however, to see in this strategy only the beginnings of a response 
to how to proceed once the pursuit of conflict, controversy, and 
dispersal have been reinstated into the interstices of intellectual and 
ethical action. That his discourse produces effects beyond those 
immediately apparent In his declared intentions IS not something that 
would concern Foucault, indeed he would necessarily celebrate such a 
phenomena. That these effects were to include the search for new 
narrative forms that "coordinate distension and intension" (TN,1,73) and 
seek to answer the fascination for the radically unformed temporal 
experience VIa a nostalgia for order and identity, might begin to 
undermine his claims that "Discourse is not life: its time IS not your 
time; in it, you will not be reconciled to death". (AK,211) It would be 
also to refuse the simple non-dialectical claim that the consonance of 
narrative IS a fictive veil over the ultimate dissonance of life, and 
corresponding to this, that the formation of political, cultural and social 
identities are always constraints upon the real practice of freedom. 
Ricoeur's thesis that narrative IS a transcultural phenomena that 
"synthesizes the heterogeneous" can thus be contrasted with the 
postmodern and poststructuralist emphasis upon difference, singularity 
and otherness. Narrative becomes the shadow of this dispersive 
orientation and, despite Ricoeur's confession that the narrative response 
to the aporetics of time has its limits, these are delineated precisely by 
the search "by individuals and by the communities to which they belong, 
for their respective identities." (TN,3,274) Here identity formation is not 
simply a politically oppreSSIve phenomena, even though it always 
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functions through marginalisation and exclusion. The task IS to 
understand how such processes actually become the frozen pole of the 
dynamic and creative conflict between sedimentation and innovation, 
discordance and concordance that constitutes the pairing of tradition 
and utopia. Insofar as there is a privileging of the future in this 
dynamic of historical change, it might then seem that there should be a 
concomitant privileging of the practice of turning the solidified 
traditions and apparent unities of the present into the real dispersion of 
their historical constitution. Yet this is to misunderstand the nature of 
social change and to set up a one-sided notion of the possibility of 
social critique that itself marginalises the act of making inherent In 
narrativisation. It is this marginalisation of liberation as a process with 
ends, even though these ends are always contingent and ephemeral, that 
I seek to dispute in a reading of Foucault as a philosopher of disruption 
and transgression. Although this is a source of what David Carrol has 
called the "most forceful and contradictory aspects of Foucault's work: ... 
the repeated play between limit and excess ,,4 7 , it nevertheless frames 
the critical power of his discourse in a limit to be further challenged. I 
shall also argue that this is imperative if the force of Foucault's 
historiographical work IS not to be dissipated by the charge of 
epistemological contradiction whereby his theory of the implication of 
power and knowledge supposedly vitiates his political commitments.48 
47 David Carrol, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida (New York: 
Methuen, 1987), p. 187. 
48 See P. Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 187-92. 
Chapter 3 
The Strategies of Dispersion: Foucault and the Dissolution of 
Memorative History 
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The historian does simply not come in to replenish the gaps 
of memory. He constantly challenges even those memories 
that have survived intact. 1 
93 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, there IS more to the 
narrative response to the problems of traditional historiography than the 
solution of epistemological and methodological disputes. As is apparent In 
the work of White, the narrativist study of historiography seeks to 
emphasize its ethical and political implications in the face of the neutral 
objectivism aspired to by analytical and empiricist historiography. This 
IS a concern of poststructuralist critiques of traditional history too, but 
without, for example, Ricoeur's faith in the emancipatory potential of 
memorative existence. In this chapter I will consider Foucault's own 
practice of historiography in which the recuperative model even in the 
modified form of a finite hermeneutics of historical conSCIousness IS 
radically challenged In the pursuit of an aesthetics and politics of 
dissolution. This I will argue IS an undermining of the ordinary 
understanding of history as recollection and remembrance which cannot 
effect a complete reversal without contradiction. Although the injunction 
to remember In order to facilitate the formation of identities that 
challenge existing ones is far from constitutive of freedom; neither is 
the dismantling of identities and experiences in the form of an endless 
transgression a sure road to the practice of freedom. In the last two 
sections of this chapter I wish to bring out this limitation through a 
discussion of Nietzsche's reflections upon history as memory and the 
creative power of active forgetfulness in order to set up a contrast with 
Foucault's avowedly more austere understanding of the possibilities of 
1 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), quoted in David 
Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) p. 22. 
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history as dissolutive rather than refigurative freedom. This will then 
serve as a link with the comparison of Foucault's notion of freedom and 
that of a more traditional critical theory which sees the lack of 
normative foundation (or more properly orientation) as a serious lack In 
the plausibility and coherence of a transgressive genealogical 
historiography. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow In their influential study of Foucault argue that 
his work is divided into two main phases: the archaeological and the 
genealogical. The archaeological phase IS according to their thesis 
distinguished by the influence of structuralism from which Foucault 
finally wrested himself when he came to thematize the problem of 
power.2 Although Dreyfus and Rabinow are careful to avoid structuring 
Foucault's work In a systematic way, it IS clear that they see his 
peculiar strategy for understanding human beings as evolving from the 
quasi-structuralist discourse analysis of the sixties to the diagnostic, 
genealogical tracing of power relations. This development in Foucault's 
methodology they term "interpretative analytics" by which they intend 
to signify that it is beyond both the hermeneutics of suspicion as well 
as structuralist theory. Foucault's method IS interpretative but not 
hermeneutic in the sense of seeking a deep truth or hidden meaning 
about human nature or society. I shall question the possibility of going 
beyond hermeneutics and whether in fact Foucault can be said to be 
engaged in such a strategy in chapter four. In this chapter, however, I 
wish to raise the question of whether Foucault's work represents a 
coherent approach to the question of historical existence or whether it 
does indeed serve to articulate history as a contradictory concept and 
thus seek productive strategies through the undecidability of the 
2 See BSE,104-5, see also PK,105. 
95 
interpretative process. This will go some way to answering Dreyfus' and 
Rabinow's claim that interpretive analytics is beyond the hermeneutic 
process and in itself a wholly distinctive approach to the diagnosis of 
cultural problems. It will also enable a clearer understanding of how 
Foucault's work lies at a tangent (rather than in opposition) to the 
critical theory of society developed by Habermas and yet cannot 
effectively be reincorporated into the normative demands of social theory 
based upon universalist regulative ideals. (see chapters 4 and 5) 
A division of Foucault's work into distinct phases and interests should 
not be seen as so well defined as to merit study for its own sake. At 
the same time it would be wrong to treat them as either an evolving 
sequence or highly complementary modes of analysis. Rather, the lack of 
a single doctrine to unify his work and its tendency to engage new 
strategies and areas of research, should be seen as a symptom of the 
genuine impossibility of ever completely understanding the social 
practices in which one is participative. This impossibility testifies to 
Gadamer's assertion that: "The interpretation of the common world In 
which we participate is certainly not in the first place the objectifying 
task of methodical thinking. ,,3 Foucault's major archaeological work, The 
Order of Things, IS an attempt to analyse the different modes of being 
of truth In order to show the historical disconnectedness of the 
different epistemes of the Renaissance, the Classical Age and the Modern 
Age. This phase culminated In The Archaeology of Knowledge, a 
summation of his previous work, in which Foucault defined his project 
as "a pure description of discursive events". (AK,7) Archaeology's task 
IS to make a "structural analysis" of discourse considered as "events 
f t " and functional segments gradually coming together to orm a sys em. 
3 H. G. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion", p. 64. 
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(BC,xvii) Its main adversary is the ill-structured domain of the history 
of ideas but far from setting up a new methodology, a discourse on 
discourse, it ultimately stands as a destruction of all attempts at a 
scientific description of knowledge. In this respect, Foucault's inaugural 
lecture at the College de France, indicates the uses of the 
archaeological machinery with its emphasis upon discourse as "the power 
which is to be seized" rather than simply described. (OD,67) 
Genealogy in its self-reflective understanding as a discourse with its 
own specific effects can be said to bear far greater possibilities fo 
political action than pure archaeology. In its focusing upon the 
interdependence between systems of truth and the functioning of power 
it attempts an articulation of the "political regime" of the production of 
truth which Foucault believes has enormous implications for the vaunted 
value-free aspirations of the human sciences. Where genealogy converges 
with archaeology is In its disturbance of what is thought to be unified 
and eternal. This IS what might be termed Foucault's principle of 
dispersion. If one were to proffer a unifying element in Foucault's work 
then it might lie in this principle, except that such coherence, as 
remarked above, IS a violence to the texts that bear his name.4 
Ultimately, I will argue that Foucault's work, as it bears upon historical 
existence becomes questionable when this principle is given unwarranted 
stress for its own sake in order to avert the dangers of providing a 
meta-narrative of historicity. That the kernel of Foucault's philosophy 
can be found In the effects of this principle is a common theme of 
commentators from Rajchman to Rorty. I will argue that although this IS 
an important element of Foucault's work and saves him from merely 
4 The notion of authorial coherence is of course problematized by 
Foucault himself and thus, the charge of violence here would surely 
have to be taken as an ironic one. See "What is an Author?" in LCP. 
being Habermas's pessimistic relativist unable to reflect upon his own 
methods and theoretical premises, it nevertheless remaIns itself In 
danger of becoming a master name; a dominant strategy that refuses the 
possibility of positive and critical participation in the continuity of a 
historical hermeneutics shorn of the metaphysical guarantees of 
Hegelianism. 
Initially Foucault's target for this strategy of dispersion is the history 
of ideas and its appeal to a continuous thread of change supported by 
the continuity of conSCIousness. In dispensing with the su bject, 
archaeology attempts to isolate the level of discursive practices and 
formulate the anonymous rules of production and transformation for 
these practices. It seeks to examine the space in which objects emerge 
and" are transformed and to describe "systems of dispersion" in which 
the subject becomes an empty function to be filled by historically , 
changing individuals. Genealogy, In turn, focuses upon the forces and 
relations of power connected to these discursive practices. The 
archaeological level IS still, however, an indispensable part of 
genealogical analysis and as late as the text "What is Enlightenment", 
Foucault insists upon their mutuality in the service of critique: 
In th~t sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its 
goal IS ~ot t~at. of ma~ing a metaphysics possible: it is 
genealoglc~l In ltS desIgn and archaeological in its method. 
~rc~aeologlcal - and not transcendental - in the sense that 
It wIll not seek to identify the universal structures of all 
knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to 
treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we 
think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this 
critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not 
deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible 
for us to do and to know; but it will separate out from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the P;ssibility of 
no longer being, doing or thinking what we are do or 
think. (WE,46)5 ' , 
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There is no doubt that if required to be placed in the constraints of 
traditional academic categories, Foucault's work would have to be 
assigned to history. The category of philosophy does not so easily 
subsume his work for many reasons, not least that Foucault himself was 
suspicious of its claims to unity. As Pamela Major-Poetzl argues, 
philosophy for Foucault is dispersed into varlOUS practices: linguistics, 
ethnology, history, politics, SCIence and it can no longer aspire to 
synthesis, its proper function being criticism, diagnosis, and 
demythologizing.6 As with philosophy so with history, however. History 
for Foucault is far more radical a tool than the version practised by 
academic professionals. History "can evade metaphysics and become a 
privileged instrument if it refuses the certainty of absolutes" (NGH,87) 
and it is only in this incarnation that it avoids the synthetic desire of 
philosophy. Genealogy is a weapon that produces scepticism about the 
present and those histories that serve as justifications for the present. 7 
This means that instead of treating the past as the seed-bed of the 
present, as part of a long continuous process stretching into the 
present, one treats it as radically other and emphasises its difference. 
5 See also OD,73. 
6 Pamela Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Reason 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1977). 
7 This also includes scepticism about the identity and actuality of the 
present in respect to a deficient past and future. 
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This methodological principle inevitably leads to an emphasis upon the 
ruptures or discontinuities of history. 
Foucault's version of historiography is a curious amalgam of Nietzschean 
evaluation in a neutral almost positivist tone.8 Genealogy is described as 
"grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary". (NGH, 76) His arguments 
are presented at times with seemingly penetrative erudition and bring to 
bear upon the archive an . .. InCISIve imagination and yet this patiently 
documentary style IS 1n thrall to a much wider project than the 
reconstruction of the past In its difference.9 At the beginning of 
Discipline and Punish Foucault asks why write a history of the prison? 
His answer is the key to understanding the attempt to fuse Nietzsche 
and meticulous research into a Gay Science: 
Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means 
by that writing a history of the past in terms of the 
present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the 
present?10 
Genealogy is a "history of the present", that is, history written in the 
field of power relations and political struggles of the present and as 
such IS an attempted intervention into the contemporary situation. It is 
thus Nietzschean reevaluation that takes precedence over re-presenting 
the past as it actually was. Not that there remains any vestige of belief 
8 See OD,73. 
9 The problem of how one can historically reconstruct difference and 
avoid its recovery into the Same is central in appraising Foucault's 
success at producing this initial archaeological distanciation, however. 
Derrida's critique of this strategy in Madness and Civilisation, remains a 
important stage in evaluating Foucault's connection of the genealogical 
mapping of suppressed and marginalized knowledges and struggles and 
the articulation of concrete and limited freedoms. See J. Derrida, "Cogito 
and the History of Madness" in Writing and Difference, tr. with an 
Introduction and Additional Notes, by Alan Bass (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978). 
10 DP,9 
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In the possibility of an accurate representation of the past. To judge his 
works solely by the traditional historiographical criteria of such alms 
would be to miss the point. Foucault does not wish to represent the past 
as it actually happened in the first place, because he believes that such 
a desire is not only unachievable but deleterious in its effects. Thus, 
even when his interpretations of the past are highly contentious and 
subject to historiographical criticism, their potentiality In terms of 
utility for the present becomes even greater. They In effect, have 
achieved one of their principle aims, the marking of conflict as the 
unsurpassable horizon of historical interpretation. 11 F. R. Ankersmit 
makes the same point when he argues that postmodernism IS best 
illustrated by historiography in which: 
Historical interpretations of the past first become 
recognizable, they first acquire their identity, through the 
contrast with other interpretations; they are what they are 
only on the basis of what they are not. Anyone who knows 
only one interpretation of, for example, the Cold War, does 
not know any interpretation at all of that phenomenon. 
Every historical ins~ht, therefore, intrinsically has a 
paradoxical nature. 1 
It IS not just that genealogy unearths the repressed, marginal and 
forgotten aspects of the past and raises them to the status of historical 
knowledge. It also in this process functions as a deconstruction of the 
aspirations towards integration, synthesis and totality that have 
dominated historiography and which ultimately envisages the fitting 
together of the multitude of specific histories In a cartographical way to 
11 This would, for example, be the principle acheivement of I, Pierre 
Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother, tr. F. 
Jellinek (New York: Pantheon, 1975), the historical study done under 
Foucault's direction at the College de France. 
12 F. R. Ankersmit, "Historiography and Postmodernism", in History and 
Theory, vol. XXV III, 1989, pp. 142-3. 
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form one complete picture of the past. Genealogical evidence points not 
to the essence of the past but to "other interpretations of the past" 
which" gives rise to the question what a historian here and now can or 
cannot do with it." 13 This equally is not just that the most interesting 
evidence is to be found in that "which IS not said, in what a period has 
not said about itself", but that which the present finds it cannot say 
about the past. Ankersmit summarizes this attitude neatly: 
The wild, greedy, and uncontrolled digging into the past, 
inspired by the desire to discover a past reality and 
reconstruct it scientifically, is no longer the historian's 
unquestioned task. We would do better to examine the result 
of a hundred and fifty years' digging more attentively and 
ask ourselves more often what all this adds up to. The time 
has come that we should think about the past, rather than 
investigate it.14 
I shall argue that the attempt to produce a pure description of a 
discourse object through the disinterested archaeological methodology to 
be found at the time of AK, should not be taken at face value. Instead it 
must be seen as a decision to purge the traditional historiographical 
desire to reach the truth of the past. In this sense it IS a tacit 
recognition that all such description occurs In a specific present 
structured by a multitude of powers, desires and interests that can 
never be fully articulated. The Nietzschean genealogist avows the 
polemical interests motivating her research and critique in such a way 
that ultimately it is not the historical text but the activity of writing 
history, or rather what that activity achieves, that becomes central. It is 
this practice of writing history that I ultimately wish to argue cannot 
simply consist in the attempt to disperse, to make heterogeneous and 
challenge the identities and continuities of the present in order to free 
13 Ibid. pp. 145-6. 
14 Ibid. p. 152. 
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a clearing for suppressed and undisclosed possibilities. Although 
Foucault quite rightly points out the importance of emphasizing the 
irredeemable antagonism of historiography, this has to be sited within a 
horizon of historical understanding which takes that dissension as 
always already involving a moment of discrimination in which historical 
judgement also works toward comprehension and participation. 
Following Rajchman, it IS the dominant theme of historical freedom 
constituted through a denial of an unequivocal distinction between the 
fact of history and the fiction of the pure play of discourse, that I wish 
to present as the essence of Foucault's historiography. This, we will see, 
IS ultimately bound up with the notion of genealogy as a constant 
transgression of constituted forms of power/knowledge in which there is 
always a tacit appeal to the subjugated and disqualified. (PK,81-3) 
Whether this strategy does in fact circumvent the hierarchization and 
marginalization of fglobalising discourses' or sets up its own, no doubt 
mobile, but nonetheless functional, ranking of the dispossessed IS a 
central question. If Foucault has taught us to ask from what position In 
the systems of power/knowledge a particular discourse emanates, and 
what authority it claims in relation to the limits of this system, then this 
must apply to his own subversion of the limit between the Same and the 
Different. Can there be a transgressive philosophy of difference that 
does not cross out its own limits in an interminable circle? Or is it 
possible to conceive the play of ateleological transgression in a way that 
avoids valorising difference and resistance for themselves? 
It is the critique of traditional history of ideas in AK that presents us 
with an understanding of what Foucault's theory of history is not. 
Equally, it is in the unashamedly Nietzschean text "Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
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"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" that we are presented with a picture of 
what history must perform if it IS to be critical and "effective". It IS 
around these two texts that I shall base my analyses of Foucault's 
historiography, beginning first with the ~Archaeology'. 
(i) Archaeology and the Dismantling of Continuous History 
Twentieth century French historiography, especially that of the Annales 
school tracing its lineage back to the structural-functionalism of 
Durkheim, formulated much of the intellectual tools that Foucault used In 
the subversion of their ultimately traditional historiographical aims of 
articulating the past in an intelligible way.15 These included concepts of 
threshold, displacement, redistribution, and transformation, all concerned 
with the structure of a field and with the process of restructuring 
which produces discontinuous change marked by sudden shifts, ruptures 
and systematic rearrangements. Critical of narrative history and viewing 
change not as progress, regular development or continuity, but in terms 
of a need for other functions, or as a part of a process of structuring, 
destructuring and restructuring, the Annales paradigm articulated a 
project for a synthetic and scientific history and challenged the 
exceSSIve emphasis upon political events within history. This involved a 
distinctly ~inter-disciplinary' approach which ultimately resulted in a 
diversification of theoretical concerns rather than a unified 
15 For an overVIew of the major trends in French historiography and 
the Annales school see, E. Le Roy Ladurie, "History in France", in Ideas 
From France: The Legacy of French Theory, ed. L. Appignanesi (London: 
Free Association Books, 1989), Paul Ricoeur, The Contribution of French 
Historiography to the Theory of History, The Zaharoff Lecture for 1978-
79, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), and also T. Stoianovich, French 
Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1976). 
104 
methodological paradigm. Subsequent generations of Annales historians 
have attempted to include psychology, linguistics and anthropology In 
the writing of history and produced a dazzling array of objects of 
historical concern. 
Fernand Braudel's analysis of temporal changes was one of the most well 
known innovations of Annales' historiography.16 This was his seminal 
distinction between three maIn varieties of historical time: { temps 
geographique', in which change is almost imperceptible and consists of 
slow cyclic regularities; (temps socia!, which deals with shifts In 
economic and social structures to produce a slowly rhythmic history, and 
{temps individue!, which consists of transitory, disjointed daily events; 
the events of traditional political history. Braudel sets out his criticism 
of traditional history of events thus: 
We must beware of that history which still SImmers with the 
passions of the contemporaries who felt it, described it, 
lived it, to the rhythm of their brief lives, lives as brief as 
our own. It has the dimensions of their anger, their dreams, 
and their illusions.17 
In his inaugural lecture given to the College de France, Braudel had 
announced the task to "get beyond this first stage of history" which IS 
"an authentic philosophy of history." 18 The decisive step to be taken IS 
the transcendence of the individual In history: 
we are against Treitschke's proud and unilateral declaration: 
tMen make history.' No, history also makes men and fashions 
their destiny - anonymous history, working in the depths 
16 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Phillip the Second, tr. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 
1972-4, 2 volumes). 
17 Ibid. Preface. 
18 F. Braudel, On History, tr. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1980), p. 11. 
and most often ~n silence, whose domain, immense and 
uncertain as it IS, we must now approach.19 
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In OD, Foucault points out that although such historiography emphasizes 
structures over events, it does not reject events completely; instead 
there IS a constant enlargl"ng of the f" ld f Ie 0 events, an endless 
uncovering of new layers of phenomena in order to establish those 
diverse, converging and sometl"mes dl"vergent but never to au nomous 
serIes that enable us to circumscribe the flocus ' of an event, the limits 
to its fluidity and the conditions of its emergence: 
History as practised today does not turn away from events; 
on the contrary it is constantly enlarging their field, 
discovering new layers of them, shallower or deeper. It is 
constantly isolating new sets of them, in which they are 
sometimes numerous, dense and interchangeable, sometimes 
rare and decisive: ... Of course, history has for a long time 
no longer sought to understand events by the action of 
causes and effects in the formless unity of a great 
becoming, vaguely homogeneous or ruthlessly 
hierarchised; but this change was not made in order to 
rediscover prior structures, alien and hostile to the event. 
It was made in order to establish diverse series, intertwined 
and often divergent but not autonomous, which enable us to 
circumscribe the fplace ' of the event, the margins of its 
chance variability, and the conditions of its appearance. 
(OD,68)20 
During the sixties Foucault's worked out an archaeological method that 
can be seen as a response to precisely the type of history which 
attempts to recover the meaning of the past in its authentic actuality 
and place man at the centre of its intelligibility. The prevalence of 
structuralism obviously influenced Foucault's attempts to purify his 
analyses of the kind of hermeneutical interpretation of meanin g that 
19 Ibid. p. 10. 
20 Similarly Ricoeur argues that "Braudel's art,... is to structure his 
history of events - and his history is not lacking in dates, battles, and 
treaties - not by dividing them into periods, as all historians do, but by 
reanchoring them in structures and conjunctures, just as he had 
previously called upon events in order to attest to the structures and 
conjunctures." (TN,1,213). 
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stresses the constituting role of man in discourse and which, he claims, 
ultimately leads to the " t" t pa len construction of discourses about 
discourses, and to the task of hearl"ng what h I 
as a ready been said." 
(BC,xvi) Despite his later vehement denials that he 
ever was a 
structuralist·
21 
it is fair to say that the intellectual currents of the time 
exerted a considerable l"nfluence thO t upon IS at empt to produce a 
"structural analysis", (BC,xvii) "purged of all anthropologism", (AK,16) of 
social, political, institutional, and discursive practices: 
In that area where, in the past, history deciphered the 
traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements that 
have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one 
another to form totalities.... in our time history aspires to 
the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of 
the monument. (AK,7) 
In OT Foucault concentrates on relatively short spans of underlying 
continuity. The goal of such history is, however, similar to that of the 
Annales in that it aims to sever the humanistic narrative threads of 
traditional historiography and bring about a greater discipline in the 
analysis of the history of ideas; an area of history peculiarly prone to 
explanation in terms of great events and the genius of individuals. Along 
with the Annales historians he shares the common problematic of how to 
constitute series, to define the elements and formulate the laws of 
series, and to describe the relations between different series.22 The 
formation of specific discourses such as natural history, and its relation 
to other discourses, (general grammar, and the analysis of wealth in the 
same period), are more important than the development of natural 
history into nineteenth century biology or the development of the 
analysis of wealth into nineteenth century political economy and 
21 See OT ,xiv. 
22 See AK, 7 -8. 
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twentieth century ethnology. Behind this analysis is the hypothesis that 
there can be found no continuous progress . h 1 1 In suc apparent y re ated 
disciplines. Rather, Foucault's proposal of underlying epistemes that 
structure the organization of such disciplines and their connetions with 
other fields and which are transformed when the whole space of 
knowledge is transformed, is designed to thwart any simple delineation 
of a long march of progress even in the apparent interconnected search 
for truth and knowledge that is science. In the great transformations of 
episteme there are many causes, including of cause non-discursive ones, 
but archaeology does not attempt to propose a unified systematic 
explanation of such transformation. Rather: 
The role of such a discourse (archaeology) is not to 
dissipate oblivion, to rediscover, in the depths of things 
said, at the very place in which they are silent, the moment 
of their birth (whether this is seen as their empirical 
creation, or the transcendental act that gives them origin); 
it does not set out to be a recollection of the original or a 
memory of the truth. On the contrary its task is to make 
differences: to constitute them as objects, to analyse them, 
and to define their concept. (AK,205) 
AK is an attempt at analysing the way these fields of knowledge are 
structured through an analysis of the space determining their 
emergence. Instead of analysing this space In terms of genesis, 
continuity, and totalization, Foucault argues that one must understand it 
as the site of a material dispersion where regularity is of no more 
significance than irregularity, originality of no more concern than 
banality. 
AK begins by rejecting traditional categories of history such as: ideas, 
tradition, period, oeuvre, author, book. The unity of the history of ideas 
which was principally derived from the transcendental human subject 
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and the assumption of progress in knowledge, is to be made problematic. 
This is because such unity emphasl"zes the" ta Impor nce of continuity In 
history ultimately issuing in notions of the teleology of reason and In 
the process of establishing such models there is an elision of the very 
real differences and ruptures that constitute the archaeologist's field of 
investigation. 
Traditional history always seeks to resolve these gaps and differences 
by dissolving them into a continuous causal sequence, teleological 
design, or dialectical mediation. The gap between the past and present 
and the otherness of the past, its material estrangement, can never be 
completely appropriated present interpretations but this is always what 
traditional history seeks to do according to Foucault. It by definition, 
seeks to erase differences, and mediate the difference between past and 
present. In contrast to this Foucault conceives his archaeological 
machinery as the attempt to describe events or statements as they 
appear In relation to one another (rather like the way traditional 
archaeology carefully uncovers the artefacts of the past) without the 
consoling grid of an present oriented interpretation. 
Change as a continuous linear process IS clearly a concept that 
archaeology IS designed to question. Along with this IS a whole 
questioning of related conceptual apparatuses such as the "spirit of the 
age", "tradition", "evolution", "influence", the unitary notion of books, 
oeuvres, authors or for that matter disciplines such as psychology, 
medicine or biology. The relation that all these concepts share stems 
ultimately, Foucault thinks, from the notion that consciousness IS itself 
unitary and transcendental in relation to the fields it traverses. 
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Foucault thus questions an entire network of related historical concepts 
which he sees as binding diverse phenomena too rapidly and preventing 
the real articulation of their contingent material relationshi ps 
differences. Philosophical hermeneutics which attempts to preserve a 
distance between the present and history and attests at the same time 
to the very possibility of a "fusion of horizons" because of this very 
distanciation would therefore appear as an anathema to Foucault. The 
notion that one can comprehend the dispersion of history no matter how 
mediated this might be simply does not do justice to the real 
complexities of history. Moreover, the question of the actual material 
transmission of historical contents IS reduced by the presentation of 
history as a story of difference within continuity. Foucault's insistence 
upon difference and rupture and the possibility of loosing the meaning 
of the past is one that attempts to approach the difficulties of historical 
existence and its reading without the reductive apparatus of "tradition" 
or "genius". We shall see in chapters five and six, how the concept of 
tradition does not necessarily have to lead to a elision of the complexity 
of change and how, following Ricoeur, it can be productively used to 
understand the dialectic of innovation and sedimentation (understood as 
utopia and ideology) that underlies all social practice. 
Foucault's questioning aims finally at the conception of history as "total 
history" which leads one to suppose that: 
between all events of a well defined spatio-temporal area, 
between all the phenomena of which traces have been found, 
it must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous 
relations; a network of causality that makes it possible to 
derive each of them, relations of analogy that show how 
they symbolize one another or how they all express one and 
the same central core; it is also supposed that one and the 
same historicity operates upon economic structures, social 
institutions and customs, the inertia of mental attitudes, 
technological practice, political behaviour and subjects them 
all to the same type of transformation. (AK,9-10) 
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Such historiography seeks to connect phenomena if only along the 
chronology of point-like instants and the work of the historian is always 
to remove apparent gaps In the historical record. Total history IS 
designed to re-member the past In a complete way through an 
interrogation of the disparate documents that come to light and a 
relating of them together in a unitary network of intelligibility. 
The move from total to "general history" according to Foucault, is a 
changed relationship to this notion of the document as evidence of the 
past. General history does not seek to construct a complete map of the 
past In piecemeal and accumulative way. Instead it addresses the 
documents and evidence that become present as much more problematic 
in their giving access to the past. The desire for totality IS In some 
sense renounced, both because of the implausible possibility of its 
achievement and because of the deleterious effects it produces through 
its promotion of an appropriative relationship to the past that issues in 
Ankersmit's "wild, greedy, and uncontrolled digging into the past". 
Sources, which are not "facts", must not be merely interrogated in order 
to decipher their hidden meanings or implicit essences, they must 
instead be invented in the sense that it IS the historian's implicit choice 
of problematic that provides them with a distinct and intelligible 
identity. The notion of evidence undergoes a profound reorientation: 
"The problem that now presents itself - and which defines the task of a 
general history IS to determine what form of relation may be 
legitimately described between these different series." (AK, 10) Historical 
evidence is not a representation of the past but material from which can 
be constructed varying events and series of events and more 
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importantly, made relevant to the pragmatic concerns of the present. As 
with the thrust of the Annales intervention, the emphasis IS upon an 
alternative to narrow-minded empiricism. Where Foucault differs from the 
rather typical historiographical values of methodological exactitude and 
comprehensiveness embraced by the Annales paradigm is in his rejection 
of the goal of ftotality' that is implied by the project of a scientific 
history. 
Foucault characterizes this change as one In which the treatment of 
monuments as documents gives way to the treatment of documents as 
monuments: 
History, in its traditional form, undertook to fmemorize' the 
monuments of the past, (to) transform them into 
documents .... in our time, history is that which transforms 
documents into monuments •.•. There was a time when 
archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, •••• 
aspired to the condition of history ... in our time history 
aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic 
description of the monument. (AK,7) 
In opposition to the twin excesses of totalized and continuous history 
Foucault proposes a different field for archaeology: 
Once these immediate forms of continuity are suspended, an 
entire field is set free. A vast field, but one that can be 
defined none the less: this field is made up of the totality 
of all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in 
their dispersion as events and the occurrence that is proper 
to them. Before approaching, with any degree of certainty, a 
science, or novels, or political speeches, or the oeuvre of an 
author, or even a single book, the material with which one 
is dealing is, in its raw neutral state, a population of events 
in the space of discourse in general. One is led therefore to 
the project of a pure description of discursive events. 
(AK,26-7) 
The object of historical analysis here, becomes "effective statements" 
which are always "finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic 
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seq uences that have been formulated." (AK,27) Ultimately this analysis of 
statements is founded upon the question "how is it that one particular 
statement appeared rather than another?" (AK,27)23 
Archaeological analysis is thus opposed to historical interpretation which 
sublimates discourse and works upon the assumption that the text must 
be interpreted for its hidden truth content. Foucault's archaeology 
proceeds by and evacuation of the transcendental themes that prevent 
analysis of discursive formations in their material dispersive existence. 
The historical a priori that Foucault postulates as governing 
knowledges in AK does not intend to the status of transcendence but 
seeks to articulate "the a priori of history that IS given, since it IS that 
of things actually said." (AK,127) The historical a priori does not impose 
a false coherence because it takes "account of statements in their 
dispersion in all the flaws opened up by their non-coherence, In their 
overlapping and mutual replacement, in their simultaneity, which is not 
unifiable, and in their succession, which is not deducible." (AK,127) 
Ultimately, Foucault admits in the conclusion to AK that his discourse 
about discourse is groundless: 
(F)or the moment, and as far ahead as I can see, my 
discourse, far from determining the locus in which it speaks, 
is avoiding the ground on which it could find 
support. (AK,205 ) 
Archaeology far from constituting a new science of discourse IS an 
instrument for revealing the endless play of discursive formations, 
Foucault's not excepted. Against this avowal of indeterminacy, Dreyfus 
23 Dreyfus and Rabinow characterise them as being "serious speech 
acts". (BSH,48) 
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and Rabinow's influential interpretation of Foucault's archaeological stage 
see it as a necessary but ultimately doomed attempt to step outside 
history and to produce a "transparent technical terminology" (BSH,97) 
that faithfully articulates a pure description of the facts of discourse. 
This they argue leaves him in a void because he avoids the serious 
truth claims and horizon of intelligibility that might give meaning to 
past discourse. This double bracketing is the methodological failure of 
archaeology because "like phenomenology it rests on the notion of a 
pure description" (BSH,85) that not only is impossible, but disallows 
archaeology from having any prescriptive social significance.24 
However, there IS more than enough Nietzschean rhetoric In the 
conclusion to AK to alert us to Foucault's strategy of disrupting rather 
than ordering history along the prescriptive regularities that govern 
discursive practices: 
Must we admit that the time of discourse is not the time of 
consciousness extrapolated to the dimensions of history, or 
the time of history present in the form of consciousness? 
Must I suppose that in my discourse I can have no 
survival? (AK,210) 
Foucault finally displays the Nietzschean world-play of 
interpretation in its true light at the very end of the book: 
Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will 
not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath 
the weight of all that you have said; but don't imagine that, 
with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will 
live longer than he. (AK,211) 
24 See BSH,89. 
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Archaeology's predominantly negative methodology alms to destroy the 
notion of historical progress and the traditional historiographical 
assumptions that sustained this. It: 
deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates that temporal 
identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when 
we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history; it breaks 
the thread of transcendental teleologies; and where 
anthropological thought once questioned man's being or 
subjectivity, it now bursts open the other, and the outside. 
In this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of 
our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that 
we are difference, that our reason is the difference of 
discourses, our history the difference of times, our selfs the 
difference of masks. (AK,131) 
In this attempt to disperse the coherence and refuge of the Western 
myth of history it might be argued, as Dreyfus and Rabinow do, that 
Foucault overestimates the possibility and coherence of a detached 
metaphenomenology to end all phenomenologies. However, I do not think 
that such an extreme position can be attributed to Foucault despite all 
the talk of "pure description". Rhetorically his archaeological period lS 
steeped in the reevaluations common to his later genealogy. It should be 
no surprlse, therefore, to discover how intimately linked Foucault's 
description of Nietzschean genealogy and his previous archaeological 
studies are.25 What remains undeveloped in AK and is made the explicit 
focus of the genealogical phase, however, is the role of power. Nietzsche 
as the philosopher of power becomes the dominant force in Foucault's 
next phase, heralded by the substitution of the term archaeology for the 
unmistakable Nietzschean term, genealogy. 
25 For a discussion of the complementary relationship between the two 
strategies see Arnold Davidson "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986). 
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(ii) Genealogy as the Dispersion of the Present 
Contrary to claims that Foucault is the "historian in a pure state" who 
desired only to practice value-free historiography (PDM,275) it is clear 
that one should not underestimate the Nietzschean maxim that there is 
only interpretation and nothing else behind interpretation that underlies 
his historical practice. We have seen that even in the seemingly quasi-
structuralist prescriptions of AK26 this underlying Nietzschean ethos 
bursts to the surface in the introduction and conclusion. In "Nietzsche, 
Marx, Freud" Foucault examines the methods of criticism instigated by 
these three radicals.27 He argues that they can be seen as working from 
the basis that there is nothing behind the process of interpretation 
except further interpretation. Foucault implies that these new procedures 
of conceiving of the world, have inaugurated the episteme of 
interpretation which has dominated the twentieth century. This is the 
ceaselessness of the hermeneutic process and the irreducible pluralism 
of interpretation. This view is most famously expressed by Nietzsche in 
The Will to Power: 
26 AK has aroused varying appraisals from commentators on Foucault's 
intellectual trajectory. For example, Richard Rorty describes it as "his 
least successful" book whereas Jeffrey Minson's commends it precisely 
for its circumspection. See Richard Rorty "Foucault and Epistemology" in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, p. 43, and Jeffrey Minson, Genealogies of 
Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1985), pp. 114-5. 
27 M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Marx, Freud," In Cahiers de Royaumont, Paris 
1967, tr. by J. Anderson and G. Hentzi, In Critical Texts III, 2 (Winter, 
1986), pp. 1-5. 
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena -tthere are 
only facts' - I would say: No~ facts are precisely what there 
are not, only interpretations. 8 
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With these thinkers the posslobloll'ty of an hermeneutic centred upon the 
discovery of the reflexivity of interpretation is launched. Instead of a 
hermeneutics that attempts to reach a bed-rock b h y anc oring signs to 
an origin, the emphasis IS placed (as In hI) arc aeo ogy upon an 
hermeneutics of the surface, focusing upon the explicit interconnections 
of signs rather than their references. Ultimately interpretation converts 
to an interminable quest where there is no absolute origin or goal that 
could act as a criterion for the determination of meaning. 
For Nietzsche there IS no origin of meaning. The practice of 
interpretation that attempts to burrow under signs to a more essential 
ground succeeds in unearthing only further interpretations. Meaning 
from this perspective results from the successful imposition of an 
interpretation. Signs are not in this respect prIor to interpretations; 
rather it is they that are always already the effect of interpretations. 
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud open up the era of the "malevolent sign" in 
which the sign is seen to be inherently dissimulating because it attempts 
to hide its interpretative character. The limitless realm of interpretation 
28 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1968), p. 461. Similarly G. Vattimo in The End of 
Modernity, nihilism and hermeneutics in postmodern culture, J. Snyder 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1988), argues that Nietzsche's accomplished nihilism 
implies that one has understood that nihilism is one's sole opportunity 
and that today we begin to be or are able to be accomplished nihilists. 
The notion of value is liberated in all its vertiginous potentiality and 
only where there is no terminal or interrupting instance of the highest 
value to block the process may values be displayed in their true nature, 
namely as possessing the capacity for convertibility and an indefinite 
transformability or processuality. It is here, in the emphasis on the 
superfluity of the highest values, that the roots of an accomplished 
nihilism may be found. The world has become a fable writes Nietzsche 
but because there is no truth that would unveil it to us as appearance, 
the notion of fable does not for that reason lose all meaning; instead it 
forbids us to attribute to the appearances that constitute it the cogent 
force that once belonged to the metaphysical ontos on. 
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that is thus unleashed is for Foucault the hallmark of the present and 
forms the basis of his own strategic intervention: 
The problem of the plurality of interpretations, of the war 
of interpretations, is, I believe, made strictly possible by 
the very definition of the interpretation, which goes on to 
infinity, without there being an absolute point beginning 
from which it is judged and is decided upon. Thus, the 
following: the fact that we are destined to be interpreted at 
the very moment where we interpret; all interpreters must 
know it. This plethora of interpretations is certainly a trait 
which profoundly characterizes Western culture now.29 
In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" Foucault discusses what a Nietzschean 
perspective on the past would look like in comparison with traditional 
historiographical ways of comprehending change. Instead of a focusing 
upon apparent momentous deeds and events genealogy is a careful 
sifting of the minutiae of history. It rejects lhe "metahistorical 
deployment of ideal significance and of indefinite ideologies" (NGH,77) for 
the play of interpretations, and the difference of history. This emphasis 
upon the "singularity of events" and the "relentless erudition" of 
genealogy forms the basis of Foucault's attempt to give an "analytic" of 
power (rather than a theory) through an investigation of the micro-
practices of power-know ledge. 
In opposition to the desire to seek an essence behind historical events 
that will bring coherence and direction to their multiplicity the 
genealogist marks the manifest diversity and discontinuity of the past. 
Genealogy IS clearly dependent upon some notion of hermeneutics 
because the genealogist seeks to find the multiple interpretations of the 
past, what she does not seek, however, IS a fundamental truth or 
essence to act as a measure of trans-historical judgement: 
29 "Nietzsche, Marx, Freud", p. 4 
I~ interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning 
hIdden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret 
the becoming of humanity. But if interpretation is the 
violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, 
which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose 
a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its 
participation in a different game, and to subject it to 
secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a 
series of interpretations. (NGH,86) 
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The search for meaning In history has been fuelled by the desire to 
give meaning and direction to the present through a tracing of its 
development in the past. This practice is, in a sense, always one of 
legitimation and was one of the main reasons for the development of 
historical research in the nineteenth century. To be able to trace and 
grasp the direction of history is to be able to license contemporary 
practices, to make them appear justifiable within a progressive 
development.30 Of course, the same delineation of a direction to history 
can be used to criticize those in power, Marxism being the classic 
example. Theories of history do not so much predict future historical 
change as justify a certain kind of political action in the present aimed 
at bringing about these changes. The whole effort to unearth meaning in 
history can be seen as arising from this desire to connect the present 
with the past in order to enable the legitimation of present actions and 
judgements. History here IS the site of continuity and stability and 
presents the possibility of acting In a meaningful way through 
adherence to hidden or manifest principles. 
Foucault disallows this as metaphysical. His notion of the historical sense 
thus appears counter-historical when compared with the Hegelian 
30 A fine 
be found 
Routledge 
analysis of the historical legitimations of those in power can 
in Marc Ferro, The Use and Abuse of History, (London: 
and Kegan Paul, 1984). 
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approach to the past.31 Rather than producing continuity, it severs the 
present and its pasts: 
The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: 
?n th~ co~trary, it disturbs what was previously considered 
ImmobIle; It fragments what was thought unified" it shows 
the heterogeneity of what was imagined consist~nt with 
itself. (NGH,82) 
The history of mankind IS conceived of as a series of interpretations 
and genealogy IS the task of articulating their appearance and 
disappearance. Interpretations (or coagulated discourse formations) are 
from this perspective, primary; there is nothing behind or beneath them 
except other interpretations. Genealogy does not assume a trans-
historical perspective but affirms itself as just one more in the series of 
interpretations. 
Foucault argues that there IS a "ceaseless articulation of power on 
knowledge and of knowledge on power." (DP,27) Again, Nietzsche is the 
influence behind this undermining of neutral, objective knowledge. In 
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", Foucault contends that genealogy IS not 
the study of origins but a disclosure of differences; a recognition of the 
dispersal that we are. Values do not develop from out of the past but 
emerge in a field of forces. 
Genealogy sites the points of emergence of values In a ~non-place' 
between opposing forces, thus, indicating that the adversaries do not 
31 However, it might be noted that Hegelian philosophy of history is 
itself subject to the emphasizing of ruptures and sudden upheavals in 
social formations. This, for example, is a reason why Althusser (an 
apparently most un-Hegelian thinker) has been criticized for his 
emphasis upon rupture and consequently been argued to be not so a-
Hegelian after all. See Robert Young, White Mythologies (1990) and 
Gregory Eliot, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London: Verso, 1987). 
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participate In the same space. For Foucault, genealogy is the articulation 
of history as a discontinuous sequence of interpretations. Genealogy IS 
thus, a variety of history in its documenting of the justifications of 
Power, an "effective history" as NI·etzsche would h ·t b t "t ave 1, U 1 IS 
utterly devoid of absolutes that might serve as the "basis for self-
recognition or for understanding other men." (NGH,87-8) Its principle aim 
is to undermine the security of foundations, continuity, and identity, 
and place the will to know within the fabric of our desire to interpret: 
traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive VIew of 
history and for retracing the past as a patient and 
continuous development must be systematically dismantled. 
Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage 
the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge even under 
the banner of history, does not depend on frediscovery', 
and it emphatically excludes the frediscovery of ourselves.' 
History becomes f effective , to the degree that it introduces 
discontinuity into our very being ... fEffective' history 
deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and 
nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a 
voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot 
its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its 
pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made 
for understanding; it is made for cutting.(NGH,88) 
Effective history is a precarious counter-memory articulating the lack of 
foundations for existence and the alien otherness of the past which 
threatens to burst asunder our desire for identity. 
In NGH, just as in the AK, Foucault gives an account of what he had 
done in previous works as much as a agenda for future research. The 
History of Madness, and The Birth of the Clinic, had already emphasized 
the importance of the discontinuous and the destabilizing. These quasi-
methodological principles for historical interpretation are reflected on a 
meta-level by Foucault's style of siting his own historical works upon 
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possible fault-lines In contemporary patterns of experience.32 His 
histories are thus effective insofar as they themselves contribute to the 
possibility of such displacements by exposing the limits of present 
t t f . 33 Th s ruc ures 0 experIence. e movement from archaeology to genealogy 
IS at once an attempt to articulate explicitly the inevitability of power In 
discourse and an attempt to rethink the role of the intellectual In 
relation to this inevitability and the struggles of the present. In doing 
so, however, it bequeaths the problem of the relativisation of knowledge 
that on an initial reading can only be subverted by a full-blooded 
embracing of Nietzschean philosophy of life or only somewhat half 
answered by a philosophy of hermeneutical historicity. It is with the 
latter approach that I propose to extend Foucault's legacy. Firstly, In 
order to answer the criticisms of his work stemming from placing it 
within the broader group of anti-Enlightenment, anti-modernist, and by 
implication, ultimately irrationalist thought. Secondly, in order to suggest 
the importance for historical existence of the principles his work 
accentuates. This is not in terms of methodological principles that if 
followed will provide us with an ever increasing understanding of our 
historical constitution and a superior ability to master this constitution 
and use it to serve our desires. Rather it is in terms of simply becoming 
aware of belonging to history before it belongs to us and a recognition 
that this unsurpassability is the source rather than the obstacle to 
freedom. 
Foucault insisted that the study of discourses in the human SCIences 
was important precisely because they are intimately related to the 
exercise of power. It is important to remember that his investigations of 
32 See AK, 130-1. 
33 See OT, 386-7. 
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discourse before the supposed upheaval of 1968 were also largely taken 
up with the ttruth' (and consequently status and power) of the human 
sCIences by analysing the historical conditions In which they had 
emerged. The aims and objectives of discourse aspiring to scientific 
status through the constitution of specific regimes of ttruth' was the 
principle object of Foucault's pre-68 studies and it is the power that 
accrues to such regimes that make the aspirations of this discourse so 
pertinent to the modern political situation. 34 
With Discipline and Punish, Foucault begins to analyse explicitly the 
connection between power and knowledge from the perspective of the 
exercise of power. He says there: 
We must admit that power produces knowledge ... that power 
and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations.(DP,27) 
It is this positing of an intrinsic relation between power and knowledge 
that has caused much misunderstanding about the possibilities for 
freedom in Foucault's work. 
According to Foucault, power IS not something that inhibits truth but 
something that actually produces it. Neither is power merely repreSSIve 
but has to be seen as intrinsic to the facillation of action and the 
medium whereby objects of discourse are created. In other words it is 
relational rather than substantial. DP is an attempt to articulate the 
strategies that developed with the emergence of the prison in order to 
reveal their insidious continuing effect in the present. Resistance to the 
34 See PK,115. 
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normalizing practices described In that book means resistance to the 
network of power in which the prison has existed: 
The meaning which bears and determines us has the form of 
a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, 
not relations of meaning. History has no (meaning' though 
this is not to say it is absurd or incoherent. On ~he 
contrary it is intelligible and should be susceptible to 
analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance 
with the intelligibility of struggles, strategies and tactics. 
(PK,114) 
The genealogist's act of interpretation is a conscious attempt to foster 
change in a situation that is always already one of transformation. Thus, 
it is complicated by the paradoxical condition or' working within a field 
of unanticipated and unintended consequences whilst at the same time 
authorizing the violence of a transgressive interpretation in order to 
impose a semblance of will-formation upon historical existence. This IS 
itself understood as always a specious imposition of the will given that 
the world is always already interpreted and exceeds the genealogist's 
own intentions. The description of this situation as an engaging in the 
play of language might thus not be so far from the mark.35 The notion 
of "effective history" becomes more concrete when we see that the 
desired effect of interpretation is the disintegration of our contemporary 
conditions of experience and knowing. This desired effect, however, IS 
not something that can be achieved by a simple act of reflection, nor IS 
it to be achieved in SUbjective isolation. At the same time the notion 
that genealogy is able to produce straightforward theoretical guidance 
for political action IS also precluded. Even though genealogy (like 
historiography In general) aspIres to document the minutiae and 
35 Cf. H. G. Gadamer, "On the Problem of Self-Understanding" in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, tr. and ed. by David E. Linge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), pp. 53-5 and Truth and Method, p. 
446. 
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backwoods of th.e past, it implies nothing about the concrete content of 
change because future epistemes are unknowable. This IS why an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which change takes place become so 
important, even if a complete knowledge of such processes IS In 
principle unattainable. How different forms of power are exercised In 
various movements for change, and the various resistances to these 
movements, becomes a central problem for analysis. Crucially this 
includes a greater awareness of the way in which movements for social 
change produce unintended and unacknowledged counteractions. Such 
analysis does not provide the values that motivate change but does seek 
to provide a denser interpretation, one that may make action in the 
present more open to discursive legitimation even though the possibility 
of absolute vindication is forever deferred. Semiology and dialectics are 
abandoned because both have pretensions to the possibility of universal 
knowledge and these pretensions ultimately serve to elide the 
investigation of the specific connections of power and knowledge. 
That social transformations In the past have been fragmentary and 
discontinuous also tells us something about how our historical sense 
should foster change in the present. Analysis of history if it is to be 
effective, must not only examine how power and knowledge are related 
but also situate itself In the present In accordance with specific 
strategies and tactics of resistance, and in accordance with another 
exercise of power. The emphasis on specific struggles, strategies and 
tactics here, is of course, a post-1968 phenomenon. One of the chief 
lessons of those events, according to Foucault's readin g, is that the 
state or power is everywhere and In order to combat it without imitating 
its structure, one has to organize resistance at the micro-level. Here the 
role of the intellectual also changes (to the extent that the necessity of 
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linking intellectuals with a function begins to vanish). This emphasis 
upon the specific is a consequence of the rejection of a universal 
history and of an anti-representational politics that underlines the 
indignity of speaking for others.36 
For Foucault, "the efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives," 
(PK,80) such as anti-psychiatric discourses and attacks upon the legal 
and penal system are evidence of an increasing vulnerability to criticism 
of institutions, practices and discourses. Concomitant with this is the 
recognition of the restrictions upon such struggles that global, 
totalitarian theories have. Such theories have indeed provided tools for 
local research but at the same time this has undermined the theoretical 
unity of the discourse in question. Critique must at all times recognize 
the necessity for "an autonomous, non-centralised kind of theoretical 
production," whose "validity is not dependent on the approval of the 
established regimes of thought." (PK,81) 
Accompanying this phenomenon IS what Foucault describes as "an 
insurrection of subjugated knowledges." (PK,81) By this he means two 
things. First, there are the "historical contents" that have emerged to 
enable a criticism of institutions such as the prison or psychiatry. It IS 
these historical contents that allow us to "rediscover the ruptural 
effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist 
or systematising thought is designed to mask." (PK,82) Second, by 
insurrected knowledges one has to understand "a whole set of 
knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated." (PK,81) This would include knowledges such as 
that of the psychiatric patient, the ill person, and the nurse, which 
36 See the interview with Deleuze in LCP, 206. 
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involve what Foucault calls popular knowledge, (Ie savoir des gens). This 
does not imply that it is just common-sense but rather 
a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential 
knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force 
only to the harshness with which it is opposed by 
everything surrounding it. (PK,82) 
It is through these disqualified knowledges that criticism IS able to 
operate by taking issue with the "government of individualization"; that 
IS, the practices and discourses which regulate and constitute 
individuals. 37 
For Foucault, it is this combination of assiduous, historical knowledge 
and indigenous specific know ledges that produces the force of critical 
discourses. In both cases each form of knowledge IS really concerned 
with " a historical knowledge of struggles. " (PK,83) What emerges from 
this IS "a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking 
rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their 
conflicts." (PK,83) These are principally opposed to the centralising 
powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an 
organised scientific discourse within a society. It does not matter what 
form this organisation takes for it is against the effects of such 
centralised power that genealogy defines itself. Their ambition IS to 
create a space that might at least allow one to produce "genealogical 
fragments" in the form of "so many traps, demands, challenges," (PK,87) 
It might be thought that Foucault's emphasis upon discontinuity, 
fragmentation and division immediately limits the possibilities for 
37 See the "The Subject and Power", afterword to BSH,212. 
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representation and communication In polIO tiO cal 11°f B ° bl 
e. eing a e to speak 
for others becomes dissolved In the perspective of politics as the 
pursuit of small, specific interests th h 
at ave hitherto been suppressed 
but might this not also weaken the possibility of such interests being 
adequately articulated? Certainly Foucault is aware of the danger of 
genealogy simply being ignored by the powers that be. The possibility 
and desirability of transcendent sites that relate specific struggles and 
strategies to ever wider and structured networks is abandoned as an 
illusion which forestalls the genuine democracy of the singular, however. 
Hence, there has to be a politics of diffused or dispersed struggles, for 
social holism is dangerous utopianism. On one reading this amounts to a 
deep suspicion of political participation that extends beyond small, local 
interests.38 
The possibility of a universal participation in a political community 
where the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all others, is 
something that Foucault's strategies seem to dissociate themselves from. 
The specific intellectual is called to work within her own immediate 
situation and develop specific interventions in the social structure that 
might ultimately work for wider transformation, although this is not 
guaranteed. There are, however, no universal justifications for the 
preferences that guide these interventions other than existential 
situatedness; she can not appeal to a human nature nor an equivalence 
to an object.39 Foucault rather vaguely defines the political task under 
these conditions as "detaching the power of truth from the forms of 
hegemony .•• within which it operates at the present time." (PK,133) 
38 See Michael S. Roth's discussion of this aspect of Foucault's work In 
his Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth Century 
Philosophy, (Ithaca, New York, London: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
39 However, see Foucault's answer to how his position differs from 
Sartrean existentialism in the Foucault Reader, p. 351. 
' .. . 
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The question that has been raised about the implications of Foucault's 
position here is what is the status of the new regime that one attaches 
to in this interminable process of social formation? Foucault does not 
wish to address this problem as it has traditionally been tackled. He 
says in an 1982 interview: 
For a rather long period, people have asked me to tell them 
what will happen and to give them a program for the future. 
We know very well that, even with the best intentions, these 
programs become a tool, an instrument of oppression.... My 
role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people 
that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept 
as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up 
at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called 
evidence can be criticized and destroyed.40 
This worry about the co-option of programmatic resistance echoes the 
epistemological limits announced in AK in which nothing can be said of 
the next archive because one can only think from within one's present 
archive. The leap of imagination that IS implied In the systematic 
restructuring of the present IS to be cast into SUspICIon because of its 
dangerous utopianism and simplistic reversal of present conditions. We 
shall see In chapter SIX how this thesis about the dangers of 
considering the future as a radical rupture, an "absolute danger" 1n 
Derrida's phrase,41 precludes a radical understanding of the present 1n 
which utopianism is reinscribed within the dynamic tension of the social 
imagination. In the next section I want to consider how this suspicion 
about the imaginative refiguration of the present IS displayed In 
40 M. Foucault, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview", in Technologies of 
the Self, ed, L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton (London: Tavistock, 
1988), p. 10. 
41 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 5. 
129 
F It'" t " oucau s aus ere sexual histories which In turn suggest their own 
peculiar practice of historical existence. 
(iii) An Aesthetics of Dispersive Existence 
For Foucault, history has no meaning and no direction and it cannot be 
simply be given a direction by producing the events that are predicted 
In a Kantian manner.42 He did not try to sidestep the issue of fwhat is 
to be done?', however. On a pre-theoretical level one might say that he 
simply dissolved this question in his own performance as a political 
citizen. If one required normative inspiration from Foucault as an 
intellectual then it would be available from this source. The struggles he 
invariably wrote about and supported were anarchistic and yet no one 
could accuse him of being frivolously engaged in struggles he knew 
nothing about.43 Political decisions are left to those who are involved in 
the conflicts of social life. John Forrester makes an incisive observation 
about the "humble and austere" volumes two and three of The History of 
Sexuality. This is the theory that Foucault was above all a "historian of 
the failures and intellectual crises of the present. ,,44 The failure 
addressed in his last books, according to Forrester, is the failure of the 
intellectual: 
42 See Immanuel Kant "The Contest of Faculties" and "Idea for a 
Universal History" both In Kant: Political Writings, ed. with an 
Introduction and Notes by Hans Reiss and tr. by H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 176 and p. 51 
respective ly. 
43 For someone who takes the opposite view see, J. Q. Merquior, 
Foucault (London, Fontana, 1985). 
44 J. Forrester, "Foucault and Psychoanalysis", in Ideas From France: 
The Legacy of French Theory, Ed. L. Appignaensi (London: Free 
Association , 1989), p. 68-9. 
The domain here is no longer political or strategic. This is a 
moral quest, the ascesis Foucault talks of at the beginning 
of Volume two - an exercise of self-restraint in which the 
style of the intellectual and the images of a 'freedom which 
is be~ond the reach of interpretive recuperation were given 
up, wIthout reluctance or nostalgia, in returning to Aristotle 
and Phidias.45 
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From this perspective, Foucault's later work seems to be attempting to 
understand how we have become subjects who desire to know to 
organise and master their lives. A critical understanding of the 
connections that have formed between our ways of knowing and desiring 
might help in this way to construct, not a foundation, but a framework 
for our action in the present. From this perspective, Foucault's turn to 
the history of sexuality is an attempt to reveal how we are constituted 
as subjects desiring control over the formation of such subjectivity.46 
Foucault locates his histories of sexuality thus, what is at stake is: 
"knowing to what extent the work of thinking one's own history can 
liberate thought from what it thinks silently and to permit it to think 
otherwise." (HS,2,15) 
There are moments in life where the question of knowing if 
one can think otherwise than one thinks and see otherwise 
than one sees is indispensable for continuing to look and 
reflect. (HS,2,14) 
This attitude is consonant with the notion that criticism is to put into 
crisis understood in the original Greek sense of to separate or divide 
signifying the idea of discrimination or decision. In ancient Greece, 
crises were moments of truth when the significance of men and events 
45 Ibid. p. 69. 
46 For a sustained expression of this perspective see John Rajchman, 
Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics (London: 
Routledge, 1991). 
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were brought to light.47 As I have argued, a guiding aIm of Foucault's 
work IS to turn the present into the past to the extent that every 
present IS thus called to judgement and revealed as an arbitrary 
constellation that one day will be adjudged to be eccentric. The turn 
towards a study of ancient sexuality can thus be viewed as part of a 
genealogy of morals, in which morality has little to do with how the self 
is understood. The difference between pagan and Christian morality is 
the difference in their strategies for forming an independent and free 
self: 
The evolution .... from paganism to Christianity does not 
consist in a progressive interiorization of rule, of act and of 
responsibility; instead it produces a restructuration of forms 
of the relation to self and a transformation of practices and 
techniques on which this relation was based.' (HS,2, 74) 
The history of sexuality reveals a way of life not determined or even 
conditioned by the attempt to follow a rule, but one that instead can be 
described as the cultivation of a style: 
Among the Greeks, the same themes of restlessness.... took 
form in a reflection which aims neither at a codification of 
acts, nor at a constitution of an erotic art, but in the 
establishment of a technique of living ..• The physical rule of 
pleasures and the economy it imposes are part of a whole 
art of the self. (HS,2,155-6) 
Foucault's histories in this sense, offer us latent potentialities in the 
past which might allow us to begin to think, and live otherwise. They do 
not present models to imitate nor rules to follow, but possibilities that 
enable an awareness of how to generate other modes of being. They can 
be considered precisely as material for aesthetic inspiration understood 
as productive strategies of how to go on In the present. The 
47 See Randolph Stern, "Historians and Crisis", Past and 
August, 1970. See also J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 
McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 1-3. 
Present, 52, 
tr. Thomas 
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possibilities that are disclosed 
are not sUbstitutes for deficient 
foundations but rejoinders to the historical givens we find 
ourselves 
situated within. This IS essentially a negative hermeneutic of 
understanding in which the origins of the present are not sought as 
an 
insight into its intrinsic constitution but as a differentiation and 
counterposing that unsettles the established structures of tradition. 
Foucault, finds In the Greeks the notion of morality as a style that 
might allow us to escape the demands of establishing universal values 
through the creation of philosophical criteria centred on the subject. 
This would involve an exploration of styles of existence as different as 
possible form one another as a point of inauguration for the constitution 
of specific individuals and groups.48 The search for a form of morality 
that everyone must submit to categorically is in Foucault's eyes the 
very problem that must be surmounted. The reluctance to provide a 
criterion for judging change should, therefore, be understood as a 
refusal to engage in such a search. In this sense the limit one has to 
think against is that of the supposed naturalness of the search for 
universal criteria for morality. To imagine otherwise is to attempt the 
difficult dissolution of some of the more pernicious effects of this desire. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault declares that thought "cannot help but 
liberate and enslave" . (OT ,328) Inasmuch as emancipation is inevitably 
succeeded by the constraint of a subsequent patterning of social 
relations one has a responsibility to dispute or transgress all orders, 
not in the name of a better order, but because opposition is the only 
choice, aside from absolute passivity, that one has. This means that one 
48 Compare Ricoeur's understanding of fiction as a laboratory of moral 
experiment in chapter seven of TN,3, "The World of the Text and the 
World of the Reader". 
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IS condemned to the ceaseless controversion 
of the historical structures 
and experiences that one finds oneself entangled ·th· d WI In an for 
historiography to acknowledge its place l·n 
the necessarily undecidable 
struggle of the political. 
Thus, as Rajchman rightly emphasizes, Foucault challenges the notion 
that liberation has to be towards a specific state. Rather it consists of 
the practice of ceaseless detachment from the historical limits that form 
us. Insofar as this does not imply a radical break from our historicity it 
is not a utopian impulse. The future here, is rather "heterotopian", 
where the arbitrariness of the present IS disclosed through its 
eccentricity in relation to a new system49 This is the motive behind the 
attempt to (disperse' prevalent notions of unitary phenomenon. The 
principle of dispersion thus functions throughout all phenomena 
including those of truth and reason and history is necessarily plural 
and partial. 50 
In OT Foucault points to the emergence of historicity as a mode of 
understanding and argues that (History' is itself a product of history. 
49 See the preface to OT, p. xviii. 
50 Charles Taylor argues that Foucault never really solves his 
paradoxical position on truth. As supposedly true descriptions of past 
discourses, the archaeologist's own utterances have to be exempt from 
the decision to treat truth as relative to an archive, episteme or 
conceptual framework. This produces the dilemma of being both a 
impartial observer and an active social critic. Insofar as Foucault wishes 
to use archaeology to show that the humanistic sciences of man are 
artificial and dangerous forms of reflection. the social critic who treats 
the present as already past must pretend either to transcend any given 
historical standpoint or to speak from a fictitious future. Taylor argues 
that if the majority are still talking in the vocabulary of modern 
enlightenment humanism, then the identification of that discourse as 
degenerating can result only by projecting backward from an as yet 
fictitious future standpoint. The archaeologist may be correct in 
believing that people will not always talk in this way but in the absence 
of any analysis as to how they will or should talk, the critique of 
humanistic discourse becomes empty. "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" 
in Foucault: A Critical Reader, p. 93. 
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This means that history cannot provide an unquestionable ground for 
knowledge, and that historicity cannot provide an a .. ··1 prlorl prlVI ege as 
the fundamental mode of being either. Foucault IS not concerned to 
dispense with history but to make it an object of historical investigation 
and thus to question its presuppositions. In order to come to terms with 
the past one must confront its strangeness rather than seek for 
similarities and continuities so that it can be equated with the present 
and thus, in effect, dehistoricized. Indeed coming to terms with the past 
might be said to be itself a notion that appropriates the other of the 
past into the identity of the present. This is why Foucault argues that 
we are loath to think difference rather than the consolatory form of the 
identical: it is: "as if we were afraid to conceive of the Other In the 
time of our own thought". (AK,12) This is specifically revealed by the 
continuing dominance of the philosophy of the subject which provides a 
refuge for the sovereignty of consciousness against the intrusion of 
heterogeneity. Hence Foucault's turn to an investigation of the 
conditions of the emergence of the modern subject as the basis of 
knowledge. 
For Foucault, the structure of totalization is implicated in the dominance 
of the theorist who provides an encompassing framework that enables 
the expropriation and control of the past whilst avoiding the issue of 
the situatedness that disallows any final totalization. In this sense the 
specific intellectual is a corollary of this historical situatedness where 
the answering of specific questions enables a partial discursive 
penetration into current practices and beliefs. Knowledge claims can 
never claim transcendence because they are made in relation to specific 
historical conditions which always elude the attempt to make them 
completely transparent. 
135 
Part of the problem, here, IS that the task of re-presenting ~reality' is 
considered to be already a actl"vl"ty that I ·t· " egl Imlzes and privileges it and 
thus a task that IS deeply .. " I to th Inlmlca ere-actualizing of the 
extinguished possibilities of the past. Foucault's histories, following the 
Nietzschean understanding of historical purpose and meaning, we might 
say are ffictions' insofar as they do not intend the explicit re-
presentation of the past (although this is not to imply that they do not 
intend to refer to a past that was in the way fiction has no freal' 
referent) That is to say, they do not aim to portray the past in the 
Rankean formula "how things actually were", rather they acknowledge 
their mythmaking function In the Nietzschean sense of history as 
something that propagates myths that will be useful in the present. 
Following Ricoeur's thesis about the interweaving reference of history 
and fiction we might argue that the disjunction between the ontological 
intentions of these two modes is not so clear cut, however.51 If all 
historical discourse is recognized as a redescription rather than a re-
presentation of the past and yet still constrained from arbitrariness by 
the "endless rectification" of the known and to be known documents, 
then Foucault's distrust of the desire to re-enact the past may be 
assuaged. Certainly Foucault's circumscribed respect for the docu ments 
as events of discourse, is conducive to this endless rectification. 
In this notion of redescription the purpose of such a practice becomes 
preeminent. For Foucault, the useful redescriptions are those that will 
disorder order and turn the present into a past by: first, dissolving the 
supposed immutable nature of the past and second, by placing the 
perceived necessity of the present (that proceeds, In part from this 
51 See especially the proposals in TN,3, chaps. 7, and 8. 
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tendency to solidify the past) and in part from h 
t e sheer presence of 
the present, in a relationship of contingency In regards to the future 
past of the present. "Effective history" here, IS 
a breaking up of the 
present order that has hitherto enjoyed the advantage of an assumed 
historical legitimacy. As such it makes the notion of the present itself a 
fragile and contradictory concept which can no longer serve as the 
unitary base of historiographical research. 
This IS why the motivating purpose behind his later studies upon 
sexuality can be construed as essentially the same in applying this 
effective history to a subject often adjudged to be immutable. It is in 
this last project that a tentative answer to the question of the 
normative basis of Foucault's theoretical production is intimated. This is 
the notion of an "aesthetics of existence" in which one is faced with the 
task of producing oneself as a work of art. In his investigations into 
how the Greeks defined themselves as subjects of ethical choice around 
the erotic he makes problematic the current Western belief that in sex 
lies truth. Sex, far from being the centre of existence is shown to be 
one aspect of an ethics of concern for the self, though nonetheless still 
an object of moral concern for the ancient Greeks. 
I do not think this study of the technologies of the self can be 
coherently presented as an alternative to ethics conceived of as a 
universalistic prescription, however. For this would ultimately be a 
repetition of the universalist demand for ethical groundings rather than 
a by-passing of its claim. Although Foucault does not intend it this way, 
the injunction to care for oneself becomes no less a universalist 
principle for social and personal conduct even though it is associated 
with the "art of lif " e . It must be remem bered in this context that 
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Foucault has no intention of returning to the Greeks and 
espousing 
their moral codes. The study of the past IS a means of providing a 
medium for a critical challenge to the present. This is not just by 
making manifest the potential arbitrariness of present practices but by 
also exposing the future as always already open to construction and 
reconstruction In the present, and to remind human beings of their 
historicity and potentiality. So, although it is clear that Foucault does 
not advocate the Greeks as an alternative to the exhaustion of modern 
ethics he does seek to question present practices through a contrasting 
of them with past epochs. It IS at this point In his own peculiar 
historiographical (recovery' that the impetus towards narration in terms 
of a reconfiguration of the Western history of the self becomes manifest 
and where there is clearly a case for arguing that tacit normative 
values are being appealed to In order to initiate a shaking (ebranler) of 
the present. From a different angle, the sense of being at the end of an 
epoch and the suggestion of a new dawn that Foucault's discourse seems 
to promise and withhold at the same time, enables a kind of anti-
narrative that is suspended between the thinking into the originary 
event of the Western tradition and the possibility of a sense of ending. 
This decision to place his own discourse in medias res (a desire he 
eloquently thematizes at the beginning of OD) may be considered no less 
an interpretative violence than the nostalgia that remains an ever-
present feature of the unheimlichkeit of existence. 52 
On the other hand the fragmentary nature of his methodology also 
serves as an indication that any attempt to secure a totalized critical 
historiography will ultimately find itself caught between the tension of 
history as meaning and teleology, and history as difference and finitude. 
52 See TN,1,72-3 
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Rather than be a obstacle to freedom, a situation of nihilistic stasis, it is 
precisely this tension that enables freedom to appear and for liberation 
to be seen as a process rather than a goal. This is the conclusion I 
think should be drawn from much of Foucault's shifting perspectives 
and equivocation over the epistemological status of his own discourse.53 
We can see Foucault as a thoroughly nominalist philosopher arguing that 
nothing IS exempt from the contingencies of historical constitution and 
yet, In the light of this turn to history problematizes the concept of 
history as something that IS irredeemably caught up within the 
theoretical field of recuperation.54 This IS precisely the aporIa that 
Ricoeur places at the centre of historical hermeneutics when he 
addresses Augustine's claim that the human body is undone; that human 
existence IS In discord In so far as it is a temporal rupturing and 
exploding of the present in contrast to the eternal presence of God.55 
As we have seen in chapter two, to this reading of existence as 
dispersion, Ricoeur opposes Aristotle's theory of emplotment as a way of 
unifying existence by retelling it. Narrativity can be seen In terms of 
this opposition: the discordance of time and the concordance of its 
telling. History begins and ends with the reciting of a tale and its 
intelligibility and coherence rest upon this recital. This does not require 
that the poetics of narrative resolves the aporias of time, however. It 
does not imply that one passes from the "notion of narrative identity to 
that of the idea of the unity of history"; but neither does it mean that 
ultimately narrative is a fictionalization spread over the dispersion of 
existence. Ricoeur's analysis aims to show how the narrative structures 
53 Ian Hacking makes a similar point in his article "Self-Improvement", 
In Foucault: A Critical Reader, pp. 238-9. , 
54 See Rajchman's presentation of Foucault s historical nominalism In 
MFFP ,50-60. 
55 TN,1,21. 
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of history and of the story operate in a parallel fashion to create new 
forms of human time and therefore new forms of human community. It IS 
an attempt to reinstate creativity as a social and cultural act and to 
respond to the strand of postmodernity which emphasizes the demise of 
tradition as well as modernity. 56 
The question of history's relation to totalization is one of the central 
problernatics for both Foucault and Ricoeur. It is from the perspective of 
a vigorous critique of historicism and its relation to the operations of 
knowledge and power that the distrust of totalizing systems of 
knowledge arIses. The quest for the singular, the contingent event 
which by definition refuses all conceptualization, can be related to the 
project of constructing a form of knowledge that respects the Other 
without absorbing it into the Same.57 This attempt to affirm the 
exteriority of the Other necessarily calls into question the construction 
of narrative as the story of subjectivity and the unfolding of 
conscIousness In time. However, the argument that history cannot be 
weaved into a single, coherent meaning IS not therefore an endorsement 
of the notion that it has no meaning at all. This would merely be a 
repetition of the structure of the Same In the form of a bad infinity of 
absolute sameness. 
56 Richard Kearney has developed the importance of this productive 
imagination in relation to the poststructuralist challenge to ethics and 
politics in his The Wake of the Imagination (London: Hutchinson, 1988) 
where he argues that the gravest error of anti-historical postmodernism 
is to neglect the hermeneutical task of imaginative recollection and 
anticipation. 
57 See the article by H. D, Harootunian, "Foucault, Genealogy, History: 
The Pursuit of Otherness" in Mter Foucault, ed. Jonathan Arac (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), for a sympathetic discussion 
of this desire. 
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Richard Rorty argues that Foucault eludes the irrationalist category he 
IS so easily placed in because he rejects epistemology altogether. This is 
In the best tradition of Rorty's edifying philosophers who are: 
reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms. They know 
their work loses its point when the period they were 
reacting against is over. They are intentionally peripheral ... 
Great edifying 15hilosophers destroy for the sake of their 
own generation. 8 
The principles of Foucault's Nietzschean genealogy are negative rather 
than positive. The negative paradigm that is offered to historian consists 
of cautions against the reductive concepts of progress, rationality, 
teleology, freedom, and necessity. Rorty's argument is that since the 
critical principles are negative they do not constitute a methodology as 
traditionally conceived. This is, however, to conceive of methodology as a 
purely positive prescriptive practice that . . Issues In a rich return of 
historiographical material. Quite apart from the problem of how one IS 
able to conceIve of such a purely positive methodology if there are no 
Inverse principles intrinsic to its working, Foucault does in fact have In 
some sense positive principles that are correlated to his negative ones. 
These would include an emphasis upon singularity and the event, upon 
difference and incommensurabilty, upon ruptures and breaks and upon 
specific or localised political resistance. Far from being simply negative 
themes or principles because of their apparent dependence upon their 
opposites such as universality, commensurability, coherence and 
totalization, they are actually principles with an equal demand for 
attention In historiography. In the light of their marginalization, 
Foucault is In some sense clearly concerned to bring such principles to 
prominence In historical investigation. More radically, however, he can be 
58 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1980), p. 369. 
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seen to be problematizing the idea that a critical history can function 
by either one of these two seemingly opposite methodologies alone. 
From this perspective he can be seen to be challenging the notion that 
all one has to do to produce a radical historiography is to invert the 
principles, (principally coherence, continuity, ideas of tradition and 
cumulative progress), that have served to make history throughout its 
existence in human culture merely a will to domination and domestication 
of the past. Such an inversion is not viable because it does not really 
challenge the idea that ultimately some form of recuperative history IS 
necessary for social existence. It instead works within the categories of 
history without really questioning history as a social practice especially 
In its problematic form of writing. This is where Foucault's undermining 
of traditional historiography marks its most radical intervention. 
Foucault himself tends to obscure this questioning of the intellectual's 
role to the extent that some have found a major weakness to be his 
reluctance to acknowledge the position of the critic or investigator in 
the formation of knowledge.59 Foucault's own practice as an intellectual 
belies this, however, especially in relation to his problematizing of the 
intellectual's potential for inducing emancipation through the production 
of theory. It would seem fairly inevitable that this suspension of the 
intellectual's power would be criticised by those thinkers who require a 
strong link between the intellectual's critical production and social and 
political practice. Foucault's alleged failure to provide a raison d'etre for 
his project in terms of a liberatory impulse is from this perspective not 
59 An exemplary case of this can be found in Susan Hekman's defence of 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics in her book Hermeneutics and the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 173 where 
she argues that Foucault fails to account for the role of the interpreter 
and that the theme of reflexivity is not prominent in his work causing 
him to "misinterpret the phenomenon of human understanding". 
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a deficiency and certainly does not aIm to question the possibility of 
such projective strategies. Rather, it is a position that recognizes that 
exclusion is always the consequence of such projections. 
Rorty himself accepts that Foucault may have a hidden positive theory 
insofar as he IS arguing that we ought to write history and do 
philosophy In the light of the possibility that the idea of convergence or 
an ideal speech community (the ideal totalisation of all cultures) may be 
a sham.60 From this perspective the urge to tell stories of progress, 
maturation and synthesis might be overcome if we took seriously the 
doctrine that we only know the world and ourselves under such and 
such a description and that we just happened on such descriptions by 
chance rather than them being given by any evolutionary development, 
God, or Reason. 
Where Foucault differs from Rorty is in his refusal to accept that the 
major descriptions that have just happened are thereby legitimate. It is 
precisely this fjust happening' that requires analysis because beneath 
chance there is really a complex intersection of forces that can be 
subjected to discursive penetration In the present. It IS this 
unsurpassable belief in the penetration of forces and powers that we 
shall see in chapters four and five, leaves Foucault's work vulnerable to 
the criticisms of more traditional social theory. 
Although Foucault belongs In the long tradition of rationalistic and 
constructivist historians who stress the constitution of the historical 
object, this sits alongside a romantic impulse to which genealogy attests; 
not only in its siting of the body as the substratum of history, but in 
60 R. Rorty, "Foucault and Epistemology", p. 48. 
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the conceding of the impossibility of ever constituting once and for all 
the object of historical research. Thus, positivist tendencies run beneath 
the aesthetic impulse to actively intervene in such a way that they can 
be described as the form of this very impulse. One might say that 
Foucault belongs squarely in the tradition of those visionary nineteenth 
century historians that Hayden White admires so much. Art and science 
classically interweaved in the discipline of history. This is not to be 
taken as a weak mis-match, despite Foucault's own often belligerent 
style of tpositivism'. 
As we have seen, Ricoeur regards the poetics of narrative to be a 
legitimate and honest response to the dissolutions of time. Would it not 
be easy to place Foucault on the side of those who regard this response 
as a dishonest fiction and moreover contributing to the kinds of power 
matrices that have su bjectified the body in restrictive ways? At one 
level this IS obviously true, but Foucault cannot himself escape the 
charge of narrativism. This is not just the simple rebuke that his own 
histories are steeped in narrative devices in order to shock the reader 
into thought. No doubt a study of Foucault's narrative rhetoric would be 
highly illuminating. Rather the charge is that his ceaseless practice of 
anti-narrativism is itself a peculiar poetic response to the present and 
that this present is invariably (and perhaps too rapidly) considered to 
be one of crisis and dereliction.61 What I have called the principle of 
dispersion in Foucault's work, functions in its own way as an ethically 
charged VISIon of the world and IS intended to induce such an 
evaluation in the reader. Moreover, Foucault's work can quite easily be 
recuperated into the long philosophical tradition of challenging the 
61 See Alan Megill's stress on this theme In his Prophets of Extremity. 
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ordinary understanding of time.62 Wh k 
en one as s what the purpose 
behind this challenge is, ultimately 1 
one can on y conclude that it is the 
recovery of difference and the unthought, or 1°f one prefers, letting the 
Other be. Politically, Foucault never desires to go beyond the horizon 
that genealogy serves the dO f hO d th lsen ranc lse, e marginal, and the 
repressed. 
Now this is not to suggest that dispersive history is thereby another 
form of representational politics. Rather it is to suggest that, contrary 
to Foucault's inquietude about the value of intellectual work,63 there is 
a unavoidable claim such work places upon cordinary life' as lived 
outside the academy. Foucault's writings have a potential utility, helping 
us to see the world in ways that we might not have thought otherwise, 
and this applies as much at the meta-level as it does in his specific 
histories. The fostering of a changed relation to historical existence in 
the specific field of historiography, cannot be insulated from ordinary 
understandings and equally it cannot be denuded of a certain utopian 
dimension. This is especially the case when the changed relation involves 
such a radical undermining of ordinary understanding. But of course, 
ordinary understanding does not just follow the postmodern 
relativisation of history and Western culture. Rather, in agreement with 
Young, we should acknowledge that the claims of postmodernists and 
62 The su bversion of the ordinary understanding of time is it seems to 
me a philosophical tradition that can no longer function along the simple 
model of authentic/inauthentic precisely because it is this tradition that 
has contributed to a multiplicity of ordinary understandings of time and 
because these all interweave with the principle modalities of time as 
distinguished by philosophical analysis, such as the time of action, 
intersu bjective time, mortal, finite time, and cosmological time. It is here 
that the effort to reinterpret the ordinary understanding of 
past/present/future can not be divorced from the notion of a double 
hermeneutic which allows for a mutual negotiation between philosophical 
interpretation and ordinary understanding. 
63 See his comments in PPC, 14. 
1-15 
poststructuralists are so pertinent because of "the sense of the loss of 
European history and culture as History and Culture, the loss of their 
unquestioned place at the centre of the world. ,,64 One might say in this 
sense, that Foucault's vehement anti-narrativism, is only indicative of a 
wider phenomena. And yet it is in the service of a reevaluation of our 
relation to history that on a meta-level can only be characterized as 
passionately ethical and not ascetically concerned with simple self-
transformation. To reduce this new relation to the interests of knowledge 
is short-sighted as Foucault insists, but similarly one cannot maintain 
that it is pertinent solely at the point of politics understood as an 
economy of power and force. With Ricoeur, I think we have to insist 
upon the equally intrinsic refigurative or disclosive nature of 
historiography as narrative. From this perspective one may say that the 
content of the form of Foucault's historiography is power, in that his 
style provokes and forces judgement, but that this nevertheless remains 
a limited vision, and it is precisely this limit which enables its critical 
force. 
Finally the will to dispersion that characterizes Foucault's politicisation 
of time, memory and history, is a disenfranchisment of identity for quite 
specific purposes. These are a saving of difference and the articulation 
of the Other understood as the unthought and slaughtered of history. If 
genealogy is an instrument for those who resist and not a stage In 
programming, then how does one select research in the first place? At 
its limit this tproject' cannot but insist on the necessity of 
transgression moving ceaselessly on. But it might be argued that this 
will to dispersion is precisely utopian in its desire; a hubris that does 
not recognize that identity In some limited form IS an essential 
64 Robert Young, White Mythologies, p. 20 
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phenomena in all politics. As a strategy of thought, genealogy escapes 
stricture, but then I do think it is in danger of being characterized (as 
Rajchman unwittingly argues In Foucault's defence) as scepticism. 
Rajchman intends to place Foucault's work at a certain distance from the 
philosophical tradition by doing this, but without characterizing 
Foucault's work as utterly inimical to freedom then I do not think he 
can succeed. Who would deny that scepticism IS a necessary trait of 
critical thinking? My scepticism about Foucault's will to dispersion 
begins precisely here. It seems to be a mere tautology to characterise 
freedom as requiring constant vigilance and scepticism towards the 
entanglements of the world. Without the connection to ceaseless 
transgression In order to ensure that resistance can never become a 
victory, the will to dispersion does not seem so crucial for conducting 
necessary. Might one not say alternatively with Benjamin that the 
present bears an absolute continuity in its responsibility for both the 
fate of future generations and the suffered fate of past generations. 
What is the impetus behind this privileging of dispersion? In the last 
two sections I wish to look at one of Foucault's ancestors, Nietzsche who 
first articulated the notion of "effective history" and "active 
forgetfulness" as important forces in existence and as antidotes to an 
overblown historical consciousness. The force of such strategies can be 
witnessed in their reverberation in contemporary German historiography 
and truly reveal their own peculiar historical effectiveness. 
(iv) Nietzsche, Active Forgetfulness, and the Historikerstreit. 
"I undertake to let myself be borne on by that force of any 
living life: forgetting. ,,65 
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Alan Sheridan concludes that Foucault "begins where all truly original 
. db' . h 66 
mIn s egIn, In t e present." Sheridan argues that Foucault's paSSIOn 
is to seek out the new, that which is coming to birth in the present and 
that his interest in the past is guided by this passion. Like his ancestor 
Nietzsche, Foucault is not the creator of a system but, as I have sought 
to argue, there is a certain coherence to his work in that it addresses 
our relationship to historical existence. Sheridan himself, sees a impetus 
behind his work stemming from Foucault's first book, Madness and 
Civilisation. This book and its thesis that modern rationalism and science 
have the same ignoble origins as the lunatic asylum, and that it is 
madness itself that originally gave objective knowledge a hold on man, 
provides the foundations of Foucault's enterprise insofar as it serves as 
a stimulus for a "wirkliche Historie" that actively intervenes in the 
present. 
In "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", the general 
possibilities of such a "wirkliche Historie" are set out by Nietzsche 
through an examination and criticism of the various forms of historical 
consciousness prevalent in his day. 67 His reflections were, as he himself 
acknowledged, "untimely". First because his conclusions about historical 
thinking and existence went against the grain of the nineteenth 
century's emphasis upon the problem of truth in historical writing. 
65 R. Barthes, cited in J. Culler, Barthes (London: Fontana, 1983). 
66 Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1980), p. 195. 
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life, in Untimely Meditations", trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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Secondly, because what he had to say had a relevance not only for his 
contemporaries but more significantly for future generations. 
This shift from epistemology to the meaning of historical meaning (Sinne) 
enabled the questI"on of h" t t t d IS ory 0 ranscen any actual historical 
consciousness in favour of the opposition between the historical and 
unhistorical. Indeed the relevance of this shift in perspective has not 
diminished as can be seen by the remarkable echoes of Nietzsche's 
meditation to be found in the Historikerstreit that recently engaged 
German historians, academics and public alike.68 Nietzsche's counter-
blast against the current trends of nineteenth century thinking 1S 
distinguished by a willingness to refuse orthodox solutions to the 
present's ills. Europe, for Nietzsche, was suffering not only under 
certain forms of historical consciousness, but more importantly, man was 
now at last beginning to reap the ruinous rewards of his capacity for 
memory by the overbearing historical consciousness that pervaded his 
life. It is this over-valorisation of historical conSCIousness that must be 
refused if history was to serve the needs of living men. 
UDHL is essentially concerned with the phenomena of remembering and 
forgetting, which Nietzsche saw as peculiar to the human species. His 
guiding aim was to ascertain how the recognition of time's passage, and 
man's awareness of his historical nature functions both creatively and 
destructively in human life. For Nietzsche, the inexorableness of this 
past is the root of man's own self-mutilation. Man would like to exist 
fully In the present but the encumbrance of the past continually 
frustrates this desire. Human existence is an "imperfect tense" that can 
68 For a review of this debate see the New German Critique, 
Spring/Summer 1988, No. 44. 
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never become a present and death alone can satisfy the deep desire for 
forgetfulness that is bred by this predicament. 
The problem for creative man according to Nietzsche, IS to learn to 
forget, to "stand on 
a single point... without fear or giddiness" - not to 
deny the past but to be able to forget it when necessary for the 
enhancement of life. Moreover, the capacity to remember the past out of 
which all specifically human constructions originate, is secondary to the 
capacity for forgetfulness which enables a necessary sifting of the 
potentially overwhelming input of human experience. More importantly, it 
IS this faculty that enables human being to have done with past 
experience and be open to the new. For Nietzsche, memory is the glory 
and ruination of man and IS painfully acquired through a partial 
overcoming of the logically prIor function of forgetfulness. In this sense, 
man carries his historicity with him regardless of his desire, but it is 
nonetheless for all that, a highly developed acquisition: "This precisely 
IS the long story of how responsibility originated. ,,69 The question 
Nietzsche asks of his own time, IS whether this capacity for memory has 
been overcultivated to the extent that it has become a danger to life 
itself. His response did not simply consist in abandoning history but of 
determining when man is justified in forgetting and it is this learning 
process that becomes the next stage in man's development towards the 
iibermensch. The historical and unhistorical are equally necessary to the 
health of the individual, community and system of culture and there is 
no question of simply opposing one to the other. It should be noted 
here that the productive tension sought by Nietzsche in the conflict of 
these two great modalities of human being resonates throughout 
69 F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. 
J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 58. 
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Ricoeur's characterisation of social llofe 
as a practice suspended between 
the embeddedness of ideology and the potentiality of utopia understood 
as metaphorical refiguration. It ° thO t ° IS IS enSlon which also structures 
Foucault's meditations on the approprlOate I t· hO 
re a Ions Ip with historical 
existence. and in chapters five and six I will stress the significance of 
this in evaluating Foucault's accomplishment. 
For Nietzsche, forgetting is the force inherent in the "plastic power of a 
man, a people, a culture" a power that has the "capacity to develop out 
of oneself in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself 
what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, 
to recreate broken moulds." (UDHL,62) Forgetting thus enables a closed 
and whole horizon within which a living being may remain healthy, 
strong and productive, free from the dissipation of historicity. However, 
we should be alerted to the very un-Nietzschean self-gathering that 
echoes In this call for the closure of the imperfect tense of 
remembering. We shall see later on how Nietzsche cannot be simply 
utilized for the promotion of permanent identities. 
Nietzsche is emphatically locating the problem of history and memory In 
the framework of the value or need which it serves. Man chooses to 
remember, to be historical, In specific ways and the modes of this 
remembering constitute various self-understandings which in turn can 
be assessed by their destructive or constructive contribution to life. 
Accordingly, the way one interprets the past determines how one will 
interpret the present and the future. Good history is to choose a past 
by constituting an image of it and thus choosing a future. It is thus 
apocalyptic, an implicit vision of a world of desire. Although man both 
forgets and remembers, in a uniquely human dialectic, in the present of 
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the nineteenth century it is forgetting that is important for Nietzsche 
because it enables a readjustment of the force of memory which had 
produced a unhealthy lingering over the origins and determinations of 
the past. This is why Nietzsche's thought can be preeminently described 
as untimely in that it marks an understanding of the future by the 
overcoming associated with the coming of the ifbermensch.70 
In terms of a diagnosis of his own time, Nietzsche was asking how a 
active forgetfulness could be opposed to the overpowering urge to 
remember which undercuts the will to act creatively. However, this does 
not imply that history is constituted by the subject, rather it IS a 
careful circumscribing of human needs in terms of the inexhaustible 
metaphor of life, which Nietzsche will later designate the will to power. 
For life does need the service of history, it is only an excessive abuse 
of this that dissipates rather than increases its productive powers. 
Nietzsche's famous differentiation between monumental, antiquarian and 
critical history IS not intended to exhaustively classify the modes of 
access to the past. Rather it should itself be seen as a particular 
historical response to understanding the interests of the nineteenth 
century. Nietzsche granted that man uses history in three ways: for his 
action and struggle, for conservative and reverential needs, and as a 
cure for his suffering and desire for deliverance but these all in turn 
generate their own peculiar threats to the possibility of creativity 
implied in active forgetfulness. 
70 See David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands, ~ew 
Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), "Nietzsche's TransvaluatIOn 
f Ti " o me. 
Monumental history's use IS In its exemplification of human 
l r-? ~-
nobility 
through its teaching that.· "th t h e grea ness t at once existed was in any 
event once possible and may thus be possible again." (UDHL,69) Its 
value lies in producing a sense of continuity and affinity between 
greatness of all ages which is why it is addressed to men of action and 
strength in search of inspiration and models that cannot be found in the 
present. This quite obviously lends itself to history conceived of as the 
story of great people accomplishing great deeds and makes use of the 
past in order to repudiate the mundanity of the present and accomplish 
a mastering that is oriented towards the forging of the future. However, 
this historical perspective has its disadvantages. It values the surface 
similarities of phenomena without inquiring into the diverse multitude of 
causes behind and it also tends towards the search for genius in each 
historical singularity. to the cost of causes but improperly seeks the 
possibility of universal genius in every singularity. Hence, it hides the 
"real historical nexus of cause and effect", erases the uniqueness of all 
great things, and has a tendency to romanticize the past. In this 
respect monumental history involves an obliteration of the difference 
that is historical constitution. In this dissolution of singularity, the past 
as an enigmatic otherness also suffers. As a stimulus to life, monumental 
history can be very effective, but at its limit it can betray the present 
and the future by intimating that the aspiration to greatness 1S 
ultimately a impossible task In the present because the value of 
greatness is only subsequently "conferred by history". 
Antiquarian history seems to devalue the present in a more immediate 
way through its pious reverence for the past. However, its usefulness 
for the present lies in this very respect for origins which enables the 
preservation of the conditions that brought the present into existence. 
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In this sense it serves life through the reverence for established 
tradition. It IS the "contentment of the tree I"n I"tS roots, the happiness 
of knowing that one is not wholly accI"dental and b" ar Itrary but grown 
out of a past as its heir, flower and fruit, and that one's existence is 
thus excused and, indeed, justified - it is this which is today usually 
designated as the real sense of history." (UDHL, 71) The usual criticism 
of such a mode of understanding is voiced by Nietzsche. Taken to an 
extreme this attitude tends to level things through unselective 
admiration of everything past, however great or small. It values the 
archaic for its own sake and creates distrust In anything new. If 
everything that IS past IS equally venerable history becomes a 
unthinking reverence and the mummification of a past no longer 
animated by the present nor inspired by it. 
The apparent answer to both these modes of historical existence IS 
critical history. This originates In the desire to shatter the burden of 
the past In order to live in the fullness of the present. The critical 
historian IS concerned with bringing the past "before the tribunal, 
scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it;" (UDHL,76). Critical 
history has as its arbitrator not critical reason but the strong life. 
Every past, from this perspective, is worthy of condemnation simply 
because it is no more; to live is to be unjust and unmerciful. This 
critical activity imitates the time of forgetfulness in the sense of giving 
"oneself as it were a posteriori a past In which one would like to 
originate in opposition to that which one did originate."(UDHL,76) The 
present is an active interpretation of the past which cuts through its 
myths of greatness and values, does away with old pieties, and 
repudiates its demands. This too, has its destructive side, because when 
it is carried too far by arguing that all that has past is "worthy of 
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perishing" according to the demands of life, it results In the precarious 
self-valorisation of the present. Critical historiography is history carried 
out in the conviction that everything is transient and worthy of being 
condemned but it is "hard to know the limit to denial of the past". This 
conception of history is creative when it acts in the service of present 
needs and undermines those of the past and the future but its merciless 
tribunal is always in danger of consuming this present too. A vision of 
history that destroys without any desire to construct, will ultimately 
destroy illusions in everything and will be punished by the ultimate 
tyrant, Nature. 
Each type of historical conSCIousness bears the possibility of extremism 
within itself: presentism, archaicism and futurism respectively. A careful 
balancing of the various modes of historical consciousness, it would 
seem, might be the most judicious way to proceed but this too has its 
problems, not least in its attempt to create a better history rather than 
question the effects of the desires of memorative existence: 
When the historical sense reigns without restraint, and all 
its consequences are realized, it uproots the future because 
it destroys illusions and robs the things that exist of the 
atmosphere in which alone they can live.(UDHL,95) 
Nietzsche's proposed remedies for all these forms of historical 
consciousness In their extreme, or destructive, aspects are the 
"superhistorical" and "unhistorical" points of view. 
It is only by fully taking account of its essential aesthetic and poetic 
qualities that Nietzsche argues one can turn the historical sense to the 
service of life. The attempt to turn it into a SCIence always detracts 
from this life-enhancing potential: "knowledge of the past has at all 
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times been desired only in the service of the future and the present 
and not for the weakening of the present f d .. or or eprlvlng a vigorous 
future of its roots." (UDHL,77) In opposition to the vaunted attempt at 
scientific obJ"ectivity pr It" eva en In nIneteenth century historiography, 
Nietzsche proposes that real historical objectivity is to comprehend the 
past and instil it with the "interestedness" of the artist: 
To think of history objectively in this fashion is the silent 
~ork of" the dramatist; that is to say, to think of all things 
In relation to all others and to weave the isolated event into 
the whole: always with the presupposition that if a unity of 
plan does not already reside in things it must be implanted 
into them.(UDHL,91) 
This implies that historical wisdom, as distinct from historical knowledge 
or information, IS creative insight and invention. The possibility of 
making ttrue' statements about the past IS here subordinated to the 
articulation of tright' or timportant' aspects of the past. The value of 
the historian's work does not lie in its general propositions, but rather 
In "composing inspired variations on" history, "enhancing it, elevating it 
to a comprehensive symbol... and thus "disclosing a whole world of 
profundity, power, and beauty." (UDHL,93) 
As an artist the historian must master the historical field in a way that 
enables a certain mastering of the present and justifies the command 
that one should interpretively master the past only by what is most 
powerful In the present. Nietzsche argues that the past "speaks as an 
oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present 
will you understand it." (UDHL,94). Only with the destruction of the 
emasculating historical consciousness that aspIres to observe history 
without any effect upon one's subjectivity can one begin to create a 
new resolute VISIon of life. 
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It is from the strength of the present that proceeds the strength to 
master one's past. Ricoeur argues that the untimeliness of Nietzsche's 
meditation arises from lOts d ° ° °fO en urlng slgnl lcance In reactualizing the 
status of the present in regard to history. (TN,3,239) On the one hand, 
the present is always the end point of a completed history and on the 
other, the present has the possibility of becoming the initiating force of 
a history that is yet to be made. It is here that the prohibition against 
deifying the past or the future at the expense of the present receives 
its full force. There IS no one authentic way of writing life-enhancing 
historiography, this is to be a matter for those artists of the future 
with their own understanding of the needs of their time (Foucault would 
presumably endorse this attitude wholeheartedly). In his "awesome" (the 
adjective is Ricoeur's) advocation of the "artistic drive" which spins a 
web over the past and in which "objectivity and justice have nothing to 
do with one another" {UDHL,91} can be found the secret complicities of 
Foucault's history of the present and the plea for the irremediably 
narrative constitution of historiography. 
{v} The Forging of Identities: History as Value Formation 
The Historikerstreit or "Historian's controversy" that erupted in 1986 In 
the German Federal Republic was a particularly explicit examination of 
the problematic relationship between historical consciousness and 
contemporary self-understanding. In the conflict over historiographical 
method, over generational perceptions, the political uses of history and 
the limits of the historicization of the emotionally charged subject of 
National Socialism, there was nothing less than the question of the use 
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of history for life in the broadest t . 
sense a ISsue. Nietzsche would no 
doubt have been able to recognize all the d . 
moves rna e In this debate. His 
own thinking about the perils of historical conscl'ousness does not simply 
place him on the side of those historians who call for a changed relation 
to the National Socialist past, however. This thinking can be summed up 
In the words of Franz Josef Strauss who argued that: 
We must end the attempt to limit German history to the 
twelve years of Hitler - the representation of German 
history as an endless path of Germans' mistakes and crimes 
criminalizing the Germans. ( ... ) We must emerge from the ' 
dismal Third Reich and become a normal nation again.71 
The desire to be able to forget the twelve year history of the Third 
Reich in order to project a positive identity for Germany in the present; 
one that would be able to take a larger lead in European and world 
matters free from the burden of the past, does at first seem close to 
Nietzsche's plea for the "unhistorical sense" In order to fashion a 
horizon around oneself that is advantageous to life In the present. 
Certainly there are very strong echoes of Nietzsche's statements from 
UDHL in the pronouncements of historian's advocating a change in the 
post-war consensus thinking about the Third Reich and its relationship 
to the present. We cannot, however, take this to be an indication of 
equivalent attitudes about history. For the conservative historians, 
historical conSCIousness is not placed into question, rather it is a 
particular form of such consciousness that uproots notions of continuous 
identity through an emphasis upon the specific construction sites of 
such identity that IS to be challenged. That Nietzsche's aestheticization 
of history cannot be easily appropriated for the task of promoting a 
71 Franz Josef Strauss, The New York Times, 13 January 1987. Cited In 
Hans-Georg Betz, "Deutschlandpolitik on the Margins: On the Evolution of 
Contemporary New Right Nationalism m the Federal Republic", New 
German Critique, No. 44. p. 149. 
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strong German national identity one only has to remember what it means 
for him to call himself a "good European". 72 
Three main historians can be identified on the revisionist side of the 
debate: Michael Sturmer, Andreas Hillgruber, and Ernst Nolte. Sturmer, 
who is a speechwriter and adviser to Helmut Kohl, sees Germany as a 
country without a history, where a loss of orientation and a search for 
identity are integrally related. He argues that: "In a country without 
history, he who fills the memory, defines the concepts and interprets 
the past, WIns the future. ,,73 Another t" h" " conserva lve lstorlan, 
Schulze has argued that: 
The flight from history has come to an end. The attempt of 
post-war West German society simply to cast off the burden 
of the past in order to live with the future has failed. A 
nation can confuse itself with a society aiming at the 
highest possible gross national product for only so long .... 
The more uncertain the present, the darker the future, the 
greater the need for historical orientation .... For individuals 
just as for peoples, there can be no future without history; 
and what is not worked through in the memory will 
reemerge as neurosis or hysteria. 7 4 
Hagen 
This attitude, which sees the controlling of history as vital to present 
understanding and to the shaping of the future, is one shared by all 
those involved in the controversy. It is precisely the fact that their 
vIews upon the nature of Germany's past are not just academic 
curiosities but effect the public realm and contribute to the formation of 
a specific identity, that prompted Habermas to engage In the 
controversy, not so much as a professional historian but as a citizen 
72 See F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, tr. R. J. Hollingdale 
CHarmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). 
73 Cited in J. Habermas, "A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic 
Tendencies)", New German Critigue, No. 44 p. "28. 
74 Cited in Mary Nolan, "The Historikerstrelt and Social History", New 
German Critigue, No. 44, p. 62. 
who is affected by the historical self u d ta d" 
- n ers n Ings of his society. 75 
Habermas insists on the unavoidable plurality of historiographical 
plural society, but is concerned to emphasize the interpretations in a 
equally unavoidable political implications of any interpretation and the 
danger of history that claims to be above political ideology by a claim to 
scientific status. Of concern for Habermas is the particular future people 
like Sturmer have in mind for Germany. Such a future depends for them 
upon the crucial issue that the Federal Republic had developed into "the 
centre-piece of the European defensive arc In the Atlantic system" in 
the post-war period.76 Hillgru ber argues that the historian: 
must identify with the concrete fate of the German 
population in the east and with the desperate and costly 
struggle of the German Eastern Army and of the German 
navy in the Baltic area, who sought to protect the East 
German population from the Red Army's orgy of revenge, 
from mass rape, arbitrary murder and indiscriminate 
• deportation •.• and to keep escape routes to the west open.77 
Such a claim must be seen In terms of a contribution to the 
contemporary ideological struggle for the past. The conservative political 
alm was to maintain the Federal Republic's pro-N.A.T.O. and anti-
communist tendencies in a period of shifting political constellations, not 
least of which was a Soviet Union that increasingly sought 
rapprochement in European and world affairs. Hillgruber is arguing for 
an understanding of the anti-Bolshevik impulse that nourished German 
fascism as a legitimate disposition and one that from the perspective of 
the Right has since proved to be a central factor in the fall of the 
Soviet empire. 
75 "A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic Tendencies)" p. 29. 
76 See David Morley and Kevin Robins, "No Place Like Heimat:. Images of 
Homeland in European Culture" in New Formations, 12, Winter 1990. 
77 Andreas Hillgruber, Two Kinds of Collapse: The Destruction of the 
German Reich and the End of European Jewry, cited in John Torpey, 
'Habermas and the Historians', New German Critique, No. 44, 1988, p.8. 
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Ernst Nolte In his essay "Between Myth and 78 Revisionism" presents 
another form of conservative interpretatI"on f o the Nazi past. This is one 
that emphasizes the similarities between Nazi crimes against humanity 
and other cases of politically motivated mass extermination. Auschwitz IS 
set off against the holocaust of Dresden but more importantly it IS 
compared to other programs of mass annihilation notably the elimination 
of the kulaks under Stalin: 
Auschwitz ... was above all a reaction born out of the anxiety 
of the annihilating occurrences of the Russian Revolution .... 
(T)he so called annihilation of the Jews during the Third 
Reich was a reaction or a distorted copy and not a first act 
or an original.79 
There are structural and functional parallels drawn between Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia but Russia it is implied is the model and 
cause for the worst aspects of Nazi Germany. The historical relativisation 
of the Nazi period, the playing down of its uniqueness in the twentieth 
century, goes hand In hand with a reinterpretation of German 
nationalism placed in the context of a thousand year history. Seen in 
this light the twelve year period of National Socialism is something that 
no longer carries the same importance for the present. Instead, the 
Third Reich IS subsumed In the grand narrative sweep of German 
history, a vast panorama of cultural development and varying political 
regimes. Two strategies are revealed in this move. First, there is a 
levelling out of the uniqueness of the Nazi regime and second, there IS 
much apportioning of blame for the period upon Hitler himself In order 
78 Ernst Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism", in Aspects of the Third 
Reich, ed., H. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 24. 
79 Ibid. p. 36. 
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to relegitimize the drive towards German national identity and a strong 
middle Europe. 
Ultimately the question of identity IS focused upon the extent to which 
Auschwitz and the excesses of the Third Reich are still part of German 
identity today? Corresponding to the understandable Jewish desire to 
remember the past, especially In relation to increasing denials of the 
Holocaust,80 is the equally understandable German desire to forget; to 
release the present from the burden of guilt that such a past creates. 
The uniqueness of the Nazi era is played down by a stress upon the 
normality and continuity of the Third Reich with other German regimes 
both past and present. This IS not Nietzsche's strategy of active 
forgetfulness as such. Rather it is the historical relativization that he 
precisely condemned as "weakness". It is also remarkable that such 
historiography that stressed the everyday continuities and normalities of 
much of National Socialism was until recently the domain of the Left. It 
was, for example, the principle motivation behind Marxist studies of the 
Third Reich to insist upon it as the perfectly logical outcome of 
capitalism. The historical relativization of such a seemingly unique period 
of history had, from the perspective of the Left, took two main forms. 
The first is a form of structural history that analyzes high politics in 
the light of long term structural developments, this especially 
concentrated on the pre-Nazi and pre-capitalist roots of fascism. The 
second was everyday history (Altagsgeschicte) which dedicates itself to 
uncovering subjective experience and reconstructing everyday life In 
80 See Gill Seidel, The Holocaust Denial, (Leeds: Beyond the Pale 
Collective, 1986) 
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order to recapture the normality of many aspects of a world whose 
extreme abnormality was already extensively researched.81 
The Historikerstreit has to be seen as part of I a arger controversy 
about the political uses of history and the relationship between 
historical consciousness and l°dentlOty. H th to ° f ere e ques Ion In terms 0 
historical continuity is (What sort of identity is possible and desirable 
for Germans after fascism?' Historians of the Right have utilised this call 
for the historicization or normalization of National Socialism and adopted 
the themes of continuity and normality with a different intent to those 
on the Left, however. The Right seeks to integrate the history of the 
Third Reich into German history and identity, to domesticate it, by 
stressing how much life went on as before and has done since the 
regime's existence. This historicization of the period IS thus two-edged. 
On the one hand there is a desire to level out the uniqueness of the 
regime in order to lessen its importance to the present and on the 
other, there IS a desire to emancipate all epistemological and 
methodological strategies from the controversial nature of the subject In 
order for the historian to be able to deal with it In a manner no 
different from any other phenomena. This latter perspective has the 
laudable intention of taking into account cross-cultural comparisons and 
placing National Socialism in the larger context of German history in 
order to reveal comparable developments elsewhere. Both strategies 
involve a privileging of historical continuity in which the question of 
present self-understanding is posed through the issue of identity that a 
poststructuralist understanding of history would dispute. It is not just 
that historians of the Right have been able to take over the strategies 
81 See Mary Nolan, "The Historikerstreit and Social History", New German 
Critique, No. 44. 
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of social history and used them for their own ideological ends, but that 
such strategies are always already profoundly implicated in the 
projecting of the value of presence. History as the recuperation of the 
past in terms of the present exemplifies the structure of presence which 
Derrida, for example, has been particularly concerned to deconstruct.82 
On this understanding it simply will not do to argue that the correct 
interpretation of the present will enable a correct interpretation of the 
past. The possibility of presenting such a correct interpretation IS 
inextricably fastened to one's understanding of both the past and the 
future in an interminable slippage that dissolves the possibility of ever 
attaining presence. Historical objectivity is just this desire for presence. 
What is interesting about the strategy of conservative historians such as 
Sturmer, is that they put forward a version of history that seeks not 
only to promote an identity for the society they live in but see history 
as the prImary method of providing a higher provision of meaning In 
modern society. This type of historiography is politically conscious of its 
responsibility to create and spread a historical world-view which will 
promote a strong national identity at a point In history when this has 
become deeply problematic. Historiography IS thus taken to be 
principally rooted in the what Nietzsche defined as historical meaning 
(historischen Sinne). Contemporary Germany, at the time of the 
Historikersteit, was undergoing a crisis of identity which the events of 
reunification have only served to deepen. The possibilities for winning 
the future through defining the past has never been greater than in 
such times. This is why Neo-nationalism has become an important theme 
82 The exemplary presentation of this is still to be found in Derrida's 
analysis of Husserlian phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena, and 
Other Essays on RusserI's Theory of Signs, tr. by D. B. Allison 
(Ev~nston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
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In German politics on both the Left and the Right.83 At the time of the 
Historikerstreit there was a significant minority of thinkers who claimed 
that dissolving the hostile blocs in Europe and reunifying Germany was 
the only way to avert a nuclear war and at the same time this went 
hand in hand with anti-Americanism and anti-communism and tended 
towards castI'ng Germany In th If' t' f e ro e 0 a VIC 1m 0 a great power 
conspiracy to deprive it of its legitimate place In the world. The 
situation was easily characterized as one of division and foreign 
domination linked to a past that is typified by guilt and defeat and a 
future that is hopeless. Given this situation the call to de-criminalize the 
history of Germany as the pre-condition for a normal national 
consciousness seems fairly innocuous and necessary to many. 
The interesting thing from the point of VIew of our thesis, is that this 
tcrisis of identity' is not really a specifically historical event defined in 
terms of great world events but a intrinsic structure of historical 
meaning. Why can a crISIS of identity arise? Nothing less than an 
understanding of identity in terms of the structure of repetition which 
is an always already absence will enable an appreciation of the 
possibility of such a crISIS In every present. The attitude that sees an 
"analysis of the present as being precisely, in history, a present of 
rupture, or of high point, or of completion or of a returning dawn, etc." 
is as Foucault points out a highly dangerous disposition. In contrast to 
this the modesty of an analysis of the present that eschews such 
solemnity and irruptive metaphors IS the modesty that refuses to 
understand the present as presence, "where everything is completed and 
83 See Hans-Georg Betz, "Deutschlandpolitik on the Margins: On the 
Evolution of the Contemporary New Right Nationalism in the Federal 
Repu blic", New German Critique, No. 44.) 
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begun again. ,,84 In the context of coml"ng t t o erms with the perceived 
rupture of 1933-45, one can readily compare, for example, Heidegger's 
devaluing of the meaning of the second world war to see how philosophy 
can readily site itself on the abyss of great decisions.85 
What is clear from the Historikerstreit IS that the nature of historical 
understanding is always a question of a contemporary understanding. 
Those who want to forget or at least play down the past, do so with the 
intention of emphasizing the importance of the present and of being able 
to define this present through the revision of historical understanding. 
The practice of a certain type of history, of a certain type of 
remembrance leads on this perspective to a life that "becomes stunted 
and degenerate" (UDHL,59) by the burden of guilt. Nietzsche's notion 
that we can suffer from the cultivation of history is one that would 
readily be acceded to by the Right; for them his comment that a 
"hypertrophied virtue - such as the historical sense ... can ruin a nation 
just as effectively as a hypertrophied vice" (UDHL,60), carries with it a 
resonant warning about the future of the German nation. Of course, 
professional historians do not want to do away with history as such. 
Instead history is used as value orienting force that places emphasis 
upon a healthy German identity. Such identity implies historical 
continuity which is problematized by the notion that the present is 
marked by catastrophe. The idea of a Stunde Null, of German history 
beginning all over again In 1945 IS plainly out of the question if one 
wants to reactivate ideas of a strong unified land of the middle, lodged 
between the Soviet Union and the West. Hence, the harking back to the 
roots of German nationalism relegitimized by a dismissal of National 
84 PPC, 36. 
85 M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, tr. J. Glenn Gray and F. 
Wieck (New York, London: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 66-7. 
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Socialism as a mistake forced upon the German people by the Austrian 
Hitler. 
Nietzsche's VIew about how to interpret the past takes on a uncanny 
prescience in this light. Certainly the neo-nationalists would endorse his 
statement that: 
If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so 
only out of the fullest vigour of the present: only when you 
put forth your noblest qualities in all their strength will 
you divine what is worth knowing and preserving in the 
past. (UDHL,94) 
Quite obviously what is worth knowing and preserving about Germany's 
past for them, is the seemingly ordinary Western democratic idea of 
national determination and the repressed aspiration for a strong world 
influencing Germany. In this scheme of things, the Crlmes against 
humanity committed in the name of the German people are not something 
worth preserving in any positive sense. 
When the historical sense reigns without restraint, and all 
its consequences are realized, it uproots the future because 
it destroys illusions and robs the things that exist of the 
atmosphere in which alone they can live. (UDHL,95) 
In the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche depicts 
memory as one of man's faculty's developed through the long and 
painful process of civilization. This faculty enables not only a 
commitment to a fixed past but to a particular future as well.86 This 
dangerous capacity is, according to Nietzsche, precisely what is meant 
by conscience. Memory enables one to bind oneself to the commitments of 
the past which in turns acquires a determining influence upon both the 
86 F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. 
J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 58. 
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Present and future. ThIoS °t bOb 
capaCI y rIngs a out an ordering and 
structuring of existence which if allowed to flourish without check can 
have devastating effects upon man's powers of life. For Nietzsche, this 
capacity becomes bad conscience when one is unable to accept one's past 
and good conscience is precisely the opposite, the ability to accept all of 
one's past acts and to be released from the debilitating effect of the 
past understood as that which is unchangeable, is precisely what is 
meant by conscience. The capacity to remember gives to an oath taken 
in the past the power to bear upon and to determine the present and 
the future. The oath taken, remembered, and adhered to Imposes a kind 
of order on human life, but one quite different from that imposed by the 
prior capability of forgetting. When the oblivion of forgetting is replaced 
by remembrance the will becomes bound to a prIor condition and desire; 
and more importantly, it continues to affirm that condition and desire, 
even at the expense of its own health. For Nietzsche, however, bad 
conscience is the inability to accept one's past acts as one's own whilst 
good conscience IS the ability to say that whatever happened or will 
happen is by one's own agency and a manifestation of one's qualities. To 
be oneself is to deny the obligations which both past and future lay 
upon one except for those obligations that one chooses for oneself and 
honours simply because one finds them good. 
In chapter twelve of the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche sets forth the ontological basis of true historical sense that 
Foucault took fully to heart in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History": 
there is for historiography of any kind no more important 
proposition than the one it took such effort to establish but 
which really ought to be established now: the cause of the 
origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual 
employment and place in a system of purpose~, lie w?rlds. 
apart; whatever exists, having somehow come Into beIng, IS 
again and again rein~erpreted to new ends, taken over, 
transfo~med and redIrected by some power superior to it; all 
events In the organic world are a subduing, a becoming 
master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a 
fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which previous 
to, d t , 
meanIng an purpose are necessarily obscured or even 
obliterated. (UDHL,77) 
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The historical process is seen to be not a process at all but a serIes of 
moments, each of which is related to what came before it and what will 
follow it by the intentions of the agents on the scene at that time. 
Behind this notion of history is the attempt to do away with not only all 
teleology but all causality as well. 
Nietzsche's recognition of the burden of memory does not just apply to 
the burden of past deeds that one would rather forget. More important 
for him, was the very way he thought memory had actually developed in 
man. The emergence of memory and its inculcation is the result of pain 
and punishment and this method of acquisition applies equally to social 
memory: 
Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices 
when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the 
most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-
born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, 
for example), the cruellest rites of all the religious cults 
(and all religions are at the deepest level systems of 
cruelties) - all this has its origin in the instinct that 
I °d 0 87 realized that pain is the most powerfu al to mnemonICS. 
By the cruellest methods the "individual was taught to remember a few 
o 0 0 h d ta f 0 t ,,88 tI will nots' ••. so as to partICIpate In tea van ges 0 SOCle y. The 
freedom of self-determination and reason are thus constituted by human 
cruelty. Man's guilt conscience and his sense of indebtedness to his 
87 Ibid. p. 61. 
88 Ibid. p. 62. 
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beginnings are intertwined and are ultimately for Nietzsche, the cause of 
his betrayal of the present world in the hope of a world to come. This 
sense of generational obligation (which Nietzsche located In ancient 
ancestor worship) and historical consciousness amount it would seem to 
the same thing. The capacity to remember lies at the heart of both. 
Thus, the escape from generational obligation entails an escape from 
historical consciousness in a reversal of Ricoeur's emphasis upon the 
necessity of rescuing the memory of the victims and slaughtered 
possibilities of the past. If men are not to die of the debtor mentality 
that keeps them from living for themselves alone, remembering must be 
replaced by an active forgetfulness. In terms of the writing of history 
the aim can be conceived of as the dissolution of those modes reliant 
upon memory in order to return it to the poetic capabilities of man. That 
is to promote a capacity for creative forgetting, so that thought and 
imagination can respond immediately to the present world and shape it 
as current need and desire require. 
Although the historians of the Right do not wish to repudiate history as 
a practice that generates truth, their common belief in an exclusive 
history, often symbolic and mythical, and seen as an indispensable guide 
for the continuing search for identity - racial, cultural, religious, or 
national, constitutes a barrier that allows only certain kinds of history 
to emerge. The radical Nietzschean undermining of history as a SCIence, 
on the one hand seems to support their practice in its insistence upon 
the primacy of the present, and on the other seems to mock their naIve 
attempts to foster historical continuity. Nietzsche himself, would have 
immediately questioned the move to cast a spurious unity upon the past 
and present. What IS quite clear IS that his version of history as 
genealogy is rather more amenable to the discontinuities and breaks In 
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historical consciousness than history as meaning-giving activity is. The 
crucial point for Nietzsche is that the "fullest exertion of the vigour of 
the present" does not shy away from mastering its past. The capacity to 
forget does not entail repression, for this is no solution, the ghosts of 
the past will always come back to haunt future generations. Rather, 
Nietzsche, explicitly says that the greatest strength is required for any 
interpretation of the past and in a sense, this is more so when that past 
IS something as catastrophic as National Socialism. "Like to like! 
Otherwise you will draw the past down to you". (UDHL,91) It would seem 
that unless one IS willing to confront one's past, no matter how 
traumatic, then the danger of repetition is always present. Interpreting 
the present rise of nationalism in Germany as such a case would not be 
especially off the mark. 
According to Foucault, Nietzsche did not accept any of the three main 
modes of historical understanding he had distinguished but instead 
twisted each of them into completely different forms. These altered forms 
"imply a use of history that severs its connection to memory, its 
metaphysical and anthropological model, and constructs a counter-memory 
_ a transformation of history into a totally different form of time." 
(NGH,93) We have already seen that this new form of time is not so 
totally different, and indeed that it retains important vestiges of 
recovery in its relation to the articulation of the suppressed struggles 
and defeats of history. The notion that Foucault is in some sense beyond 
both a critique of society and the practice of freedom is thus not to be 
taken at face value. Whether his challenge to the universalistic 
tendencies of such theories is as extensive as some commentators claim 
will be the subject of the next chapters. 
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When Nietzsche speaks of truly understanding the past "only if you are 
an architect of the future and know the present", he is not calling for a 
blind presentism. Rather he is pointing to how difficult it is to practise 
historical justice. Nietzsche does not simply repudiate the historical and 
I think it is legitimate to associate this notion of the unhistorical, of 
active forgetfulness, with the power of imagination and metaphor that 
Ricoeur has insisted upon In the refiguration of the world by 
historiography. Such a practice from Foucault's point of view, is one 
that does not shirk to do justice to oppositional elements in history, to 
forgotten perspectives and different histories. What IS the impetus 
behind this? I would suggest that genealogy works on the simple level 
of a struggle against the history of the victors and that this is itself 
connected to a concern with historical justice that enables the fragile 
preservation of a distance between fiction and history. Fragile because 
the status of the oppressed and vanquished of history is a matter for 
struggle and conflict in the present and one that inevitably involves the 
notion of risk. I think that Ricoeur is absolutely right in stressing that 
we cannot "eliminate from a social ethics the element of risk." (rU,312) 
Nietzsche would have recognised that no single interpretation of history 
can promote a healthy attitude to the present. The cultivation of many 
perspectives is in this sense vital to life lived in the present. To take 
the example of the cultural identity of a nation-state, it IS the 
acceptance of different and perhaps incommensurable traditions 
constituted by gender, ethnicity, sexuality, race and class that is the 
more difficult path to take. By bringing them into history and into 
recognition and representation there can be an appreciation of the 
complexity that crisscrosses the patterns of the present and that can 
never be turned into the site of a presence because there will always he 
a marginalization of some elements in this articulation. To recognize that 
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something such as the nation as a cultural, linguistic, racial or whatever 
unit is not a closed history, not something already achieved, but an 
open malleable framework in the making, is to be an architect of the 
future without the simplistic option of self-confident national identity 
and historical continuity. The paradox is that historians of the Right, 
such as those engaged in the Historikerstreit, at one and the same time 
profess that history IS something that has already happened, that is 
back there, and yet In their everyday professional activity treat this 
same history as something to be bitterly fought over in the present. 
This should immediately alert anyone to the dangers of consigning the 
past to that which is over and done with. 
1,3 
Chapter 4 
The Normative Critique of Dispersive History 
17-1 
(i) The Delimitation of Social Critique 
As we have seen in chapter three, in any study of Foucault one has to 
take into account the irredeemably Nietzschean basis of his project. 
Quite clearly the attempt to "make differences" bears the structure of 
the endlessness of interpretation even as it does away with concepts 
such as intention, consciousness, author and trace in order to give a 
pure description of the facts of discourse. After AK Foucault explicitly 
turns to Nietzsche to articulate his position. The essay "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History", IS the locus classicus of Foucault's Nietzscheanism. 
Here meaning IS coupled with force to give a notion of interpretation as 
"the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which In 
itself has no essential meaning" and the "development of humanity" IS 
taken to be this "series of interpretations". The hermeneutic process IS 
even more twisted away from its traditional linguistical scheme In which 
the possibility of dialogue or "fusion of horizons" is present in the very 
nature of the process of interpretation. This position therefore defines 
itself against a philosophical hermeneutics that universalizes 
understanding to a ontological characteristic of human being and against 
a critical theory that proposes a normative foundation through the very 
° to t 1 structure of communlca lve compe ence. 
In this chapter I wish to explore some of the leading implications of 
Foucault's work from the traditional perspective of social freedom 
understood as a critical theory of society. Although I agree that the 
1 Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), 
and J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve 
Lectures, tr. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), Lecture 
XI. 
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normative questions ral" sed b "t" I h y crl lca t eorists are important In 
understanding the potential of Foucault's own work on the level of 
emancipatory discourse, I do not think that this emphasis can justify 
the wholesale reevaluation of Foucault as a flawed thinker. Instead, as 
will be seen in the following chapter, I argue that it is precisely this 
apparent incoherence in Foucault's intentions that is a genuine response 
to the difficulty of practising social critique. That this issues in a 
seemingly insular and private practise of ethics and politics, is I wish to 
argue, a misunderstanding of the reevaluations of such fields that 
Foucault seeks. In this sense the appearance of contradictions in the 
practise of living well would not be considered a failure, but rather an 
indication that the correct and difficult exerCIse of freedom was 
flourishing. 
In his most radical Nietzschean guise it would seem that one would have 
to characterize Foucault's position as diametrically opposed to 
philosophies that seek to mitigate the pluralistic nature of interpretation 
or to propose a standard by which to criticize the nature of society. 
Interpretations of Foucault invariably thematize the nature of this 
difference by a comparison with other critical theories. Either he is 
taken to be a critical thinker who deepens our understanding of the 
processes of emancipation and progress (ultimately to the extent of 
questioning the notion of such processes altogether), or he is taken to 
be a misguided or flawed critical thinker who fails to ground his 
critique for a variety of reasons. 
At first it might seem presumptuous to engage Foucault's work along the 
lines of its potentiality as a critical theory of society and to judge it 
from this perspective. This is because Foucault himself hardly ever 
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engages In the traditional debates about the proper methodology, 
epistemology, and ontology of a critical theory of society. Moreover his 
work can be considered as a problematization of the category tthe social' 
and a reconsideration of the human sciences In terms of their own 
historical emergence.2 Nevertheless this presumption is vindicated if only 
by the fact that Foucault's work has been seen as a challenge to the 
possibility of a critique of society by many who work within the human 
sciences.3 The fundamental framework of this thesis being the self-
understanding of the present as a loss of singular universal history 
enables this particular debate about critical theory to be placed within a 
further narrative which In a sociological construction might be phrased 
as the endless coming crISIS of sociology. That Foucault at times 
regarded this challenge as an important part of his work further 
justifies this method of interpretation. Despite this rather indirect 
reason for evaluating Foucault's work along such lines there is the more 
direct one based upon the fact that he did at times reflect upon the 
nature of what he was doing and place himself within the traditions of 
critique springing from the Enlightenment. Thus, the attempt Lo claim 
Foucault as a critical thinker can at least start from, for example, 
Foucault's positioning of his work within the tradition of Kant to be 
found in the text "What is Enlightenment?". 
John Rajchman In MFFP has presented one of the most sustained 
attempts to present Foucault's thought as centred around critique 
orientated towards freedom. He presents Foucault's thought as a new 
form of critical thinking (albeit situated in the tradition of scepticism), 
2 See J. Minson Genealogies of Morals, p. 9. 
3 Cf. A. Giddens, "From Marx to. ~ietzsche? ~eo-conservatism, Foucault 
and Problems in Contemporary PolitIcal Theory , in Profiles and Critiques 
in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1982). 
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one that is best defined through its rejection of traditional Marxian and 
Freudian models of emancipatory thinking. Another study of Foucault by 
Dreyfus and Rabinow characterizes his work as a critical reflection 
upon and rejection of the three principal modern attempts to study 
human beings - phenomenology, structuralism, and hermeneutics.4 This 
study too, takes Foucault to have been centrally concerned with 
diagnosing the current situation of our society and providing critical 
insight into its discontents. In comparison with these two examples, 
other thinkers have interpreted Foucault's work unfavourably precisely 
because it fails to provide for them a coherent critical theory of society. 
This critical reception of Foucault not surprisingly is greatest amongst 
those working within the tradition of critical theory stemming from Kant, 
Hegel and Marx. So for example, Peter Dews argues that Foucault's 
Nietzschean conception of power and knowledge inevitably undermines 
the basis for political critique because the relativism that it implies 
prevents the contestation of other perspectives except on the basis of 
some pre-discursive experience outside of all perspectives.5 Jurgen 
Habermas in PDM similarly treats Foucault from the perspective of an 
attempt to "enlighten the Enlightenment" about the narrow sovereignty 
of reason. Habermas positions Foucault In the counter-discourse of 
modernity and hence as a critical thinker who rejects the resources of 
reason and its claim to be able to achieve emancipation and reconciliation 
within the world. Habermas agrees with Foucault that there are flaws In 
the Enlightenment paradigm mainly stemming from its paradigm of 
consciousness. Unlike Foucault, however, he believes that these defects 
can be made good by further enlightenment, something which he believes 
Foucault's totalised critique of reason does not allow. 
4 BSH. 
5 P. Dews, The Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and 
the Claims of Critical Theory, (London: Verso, 1987) 
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All these interpretations of Foucault agree upon construing him as 
engaged in a form of critique of our current situation despite his 
attempt to distance himself from the various models of a critique of 
society and to point out their flaws. The favourable interpretations of 
Foucault see him as transforming critique into something quite different 
from traditional models; the unfavourable interpretations see him as 
implicitly engaged in critique along similar lines to the traditional models 
and failing to draw the necessary implications of such a position for a 
reflective understanding of his own work. Thus, we have Rajchman 
arguing that Foucault attempts to purge from his critical analysis 
anthropologism and historicism which he finds in thinkers such as Marx 
and Freud and which leads to a critique based on "a kind of norm or 
law - a final truth, a final emancipation." (MFFP,93) On the other hand, 
we have Habermas arguing that Foucault's critique rests on an implicit 
normativism that is not theoretically accounted for and which ultimately 
destabilises the validity of his critical strictures on present social 
formations. 
It is possible to claim that such approaches to Foucault are misguided in 
their reappropriation of his work into the mainstream of critical theory 
of society. This would have to take seriously the extreme Nietzschean 
perspectivism cited above and contend that Foucault advances no 
privileged validity claims for any interpretation of history, society or 
critique. This position although tempting in an analysis of Foucault can 
be taken only so far. There are three main reasons for this. First, given 
its opening out onto other disciplines, it seems inconceivable to argue 
that Foucault's work bears no similarities with other social research and 
critique. Second, as mentioned above, Foucault himself acknowledges at 
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times the nature of his work to be in some way a critique. Third, the 
incoherence of a position that engages other positions and yet claims no 
privilege in this engagement. Put simply, this last point comes down to 
the nature of Foucault's work, which is situated within the academic 
community and functions more or less along the lines of academic 
discourse. This position is succinctly put by Foucault himself in the 
course of discussing the morality of intellectual practice 
contradistinction to the nature of polemics: 
In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work 
of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in 
some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on 
the dialogue situation. The person asking questions is 
merely exercising the right that has been given him: to 
remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require 
more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point 
out faulty reasoning, etc. As for the person answering the 
questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond 
the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse he is 
tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of 
dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the other. 
The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in 
privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree 
to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing 
him to wage war and making that struggle a just 
undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in 
the search for the truth, but an adversary, an enemy who 
is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence 
constitutes a threat.6 
In 
This analysis IS striking In its repudiation of a Nietzschean critique 
based upon force in the form of the will to power. For someone such as 
Dews it indicates Foucault's "belated endorsement of Habermas's attempt 
- an attempt which is in continuity with the tradition of Critical Theory 
- to accommodate the powerful arguments of the anti-foundationalists, 
while nevertheless avoiding the slide into relativism. ,,7 To what extent 
6 Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and 
Foucault Reader, p. 381-2. 1Ji7~L::;O::';&=· c~s;;"""";o~f::--:D~i:-s-:-inte gration, p. 220. 
Problematizations" In The 
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Foucault can be so totally incorporated into this tradition is a matter for 
argument. What does seem clear is that it is by no means presumptuous 
to evaluate Foucault's work along these lines if the question of freedom 
is one's theme. 
We have seen that Foucault's work can be defined most generally as a 
questioning of the various philosophies of history and methodologies of 
historiography that privilege continuity, teleology, totality, presence, 
transcendentalism, anthropologism, and historicism. This is the basis for 
his own genealogical histories which in his words do not "depend on 
frediscovery'" and "emphatically excludes the frediscovery of ourselves.'" 
This dispersal of what IS taken to be unified IS a methodological 
principle that runs throughout the entirety of Foucault's work. Insofar 
as Rajchman, would want to argue that this IS not a positive 
methodological principle or doctrine, he has to characterise it as 
"scepticism" which is a permanent questioning that proceeds case by 
case and has no end. Characteristic of this interpretation is its desire to 
be as elusive as possible about Foucault's intentions and work. A 
description of Foucault as an endless questioner of specific intellectual 
boundaries and assumptions hardly distinguishes him in the history of 
Western thought. That there are critical principles operating in his 
genealogies and that these principles are based upon ontological 
commitments IS an important first step in bringing him into a prod uctive 
relationship with the commitments of critical social science. A large part 
of Rajchman's interpretation follows the negative path of characterizing 
Foucault's thrust as a refusal to accept dogmatic unities and universal 
schemas wherever they might arise. To not characterize this as an 
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equally positive stance seems merely a matter of linguistic usage, 
however. 
Foucault's 
"historical nominalism ,,8 places him In a much closer 
relationship to a position of philosophical hermeneutics than he would 
want to accede to mainly because of the assumption that such positions 
are ultimately caught within a simplistic understanding of the subject 
that recuperates meaning in the process of understanding. His early 
characterization of hermeneutics as commentary that seeks a deeper 
meaning beneath that which is said is a typical polemical categorisation 
of the desires of this philosophical movement. Dreyfus and Rabinow 
argue that through a criticism of both structuralism and hermeneutics, 
Foucault advances a more powerful and subtle position which they call 
"interpretive analytics". This differs from a hermeneutics that proceeds 
by a reading of the background meanings shared by human beings and 
also, more importantly, from a hermeneutics of suspicion that aims to 
uncover a deeper intelligibility beneath the practices of everyday life. 
Such hermeneutics are part of the problem because they fail to reflect 
upon "what the exegetical situation is doing to both actor and the 
hermeneutical authority" and why: 
Since the hidden meaning is not the final truth about what 
is going on, finding it is not necessarily liberating; in fact, 
as Foucault points out, it can lead away from the kind of 
understanding which might help the actor resist the current 
practices of domination. 
Interpretive understanding can only be obtained by someone 
who shares the actor's involvement, but distances himself 
from it. This person must undertake the hard historical 
work of diagnosing and analyzing the history and 
organization of current cultural practices. The resulting 
interpretation is a pragmatically guided reading of the 
8 This notion of historical nominalism is developed by Rajchman, cf. 
MFFP ,50-60. 
coherence of the practices of the society. It does not claim 
to correspond either to the everyday meanings shared by 
the actors or, in any simple sense, to reveal the intrinsic 
meaning of the practices. This is the sense in which 
Foucault's method is interpretive but not hermeneutic.9 
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Central to their interpretation of Foucault IS the theme of the 
constitution of subjects and how they treat one another as objects. For 
them the mistake of AK is to treat language as autonomous and as 
constitutive of reality and they see Foucault as acknowledging this In 
his focus In the seventies upon the way social practices govern 
cognitive discourse. Thus, they argue that As a historian Foucault is 
trying to show how ideas of subjectivity have served as empty notions, 
blinding liberal theorists to the historical reality of the spread of 
oppressive and conformist tendencies in modern societies. This historical 
investigation focuses especially on how subjects are themselves 
constituted? Central to this research is the hypothesis that there is no 
pure subject prior to the forms of description and action appropriate to 
a person. Foucault argues that every way in which I can think of myself 
as a person and an agent is something that has been constituted within 
a web of historical events. This is the reason behind his later research 
into how it came to be taken for granted that subjects, desires and 
interdictions were taken as concepts for explaining history and society. 
The central interpretive problem for Foucault becomes the constitution of 
ourselves as subjects of desire from Christian confessional practices 
through to the Freudian hermeneutic of sexuality and beyond. 
According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault IS offering us an 
interpretive analytic of our current situation. The practitioner of 
interpretive analytics realizes that she herself is produced by what she 
9 BSH,124. 
183 
IS studying; consequently she can never stand outside it. The 
genealogist sees that cultural practices are more basic than any theory 
and that the seriousness of theory can only be understood as part of 
society's on-going history and self-reflection. The archaeological step 
back that enables a bracketing of the serious truth claims of discourse 
and produces the requisite distanciation from the practices of different 
societies, does not mean that one also has to consider these practices 
meaningless. Since we share cultural practices with others, and since 
these practices have made us what we are, we have, some common 
ground from which to proceed, to understand, to act. That foothold is 
not, however, one which is universal, or guaranteed. 
Foucault thus criticizes the attempt to ground social organization by 
philosophical means and once this possibility is removed the attempt to 
legitimate normative principles is also placed into question. What makes 
one interpretive theory better than another on this view has yet to be 
worked out, but it has to do with articulating common concerns and 
finding a language which becomes accepted as a way of talking about 
social situations, while leaving open the possibility of (dialogue', or 
better, a conflict of interpretations, with other shared discursive 
practices used to articulate different concerns. 
This way of presenting Foucault's work IS I think persuasive but 
ultimately ambiguous. One might for instance ask what is the status of 
social research In a strategy that attempts to articulate common 
concerns. Common concerns for whom? Moreover, is there not an implicit 
faith in progress in the reference to a working out of an interpretive 
theory which will become accepted? The appeal to a conflict of cultural 
practices within the horizon of a possibility of 'dialogue' also seems to 
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emaciate the radical Nietzschean thrust of Foucault's interventionist 
history of the present. 
To argue that this position IS somehow tbeyond' hermeneutics IS, 
moreover, to falsely construe the nature of what IS meant by 
hermeneutics in its development by philosophers such as Heidegger and 
even the apparently arch-conservative hermeneut, Gadamer.10 From this 
perspective, hermeneutics is not something one can go beyond. Rather 
what IS normally meant by this claim is the transcending of a particular 
form of hermeneutic theory, as is the case with Gadamer's rejection of 
hermeneutics as a distinct methodology of interpretation. For Foucault, 
this would be a rejection of a hermeneutical theory based upon the 
philosophy of consciousness. If on his own admission all of life IS 
interpretation then transcending this would be to do away with life, to 
bring it to a close. 
Evaluating Foucault's work from the viewpoint of a critical theory of 
society In this respect becomes a necessary task. Whether rival 
interpretations are incommensurable or commensurable IS not the 
question. If they are commensurable then comparisons are legitimate; if 
they are not commensurable this does not prevent, on his pluralistic 
schema, the proposal of rival interpretations, including that of the need 
for commensurability. The argument that such a desire for 
commensurability understood as universalism has to be itself historicized 
cannot subvert the possibility of its appearance and historical claims. 
10 Cf. R. E. Palmer, "On the Transcendability of Hermeneutics", In 
Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, ed. G. Shapiro and A. Sica, (The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1985). 
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Can Foucault be reincorporated into the tradition of a critical theory of 
society that aims to promote values of rational self-clarity and collective 
autonomy? The answer to this question might depend more upon what 
one's model of a critical theory is rather than upon the content of 
Foucault's challenges. If it is one that functions in an idealistic way In 
its assumptions about human freedom and reason then quite clearly 
Foucault's work does not fit within this tradition. Rather it IS his 
explicit aim to criticize such a model for its idealism and for its 
deleterious effects. If, however, a more limited VIew is taken of what a 
critical theory of society might reasonably hope to practice, then 
Foucault's work can be seen as being part of this tradition - what 
Habermas has described as the "unfinished project of modernity,,)1 The 
beginnings of a differentiation between the two models might consist in 
an unpacking of the functioning of the word "unfinished" in Habermas's 
narrative of modernity. Whereas the interminability of interpretation is 
the unsurpassable horizon for Foucault's reflections upon the present, 
modernity as a teleological concept is the point where Habermas's own 
self-understanding becomes unstable. Nevertheless, Habermas's notion 
that the counter-discourse of modernity seeks to enlighten the 
Enlightenment would still be the appropriate model for understanding 
Foucault In this respect. This enlightening would not consist of a 
shedding of light that uncovers more of the same, however, but a 
reorientation towards our finitude that defers the possibility of a 
d " f "t 12 complete understan Ing 0 soc Ie y. 
11 Jiirgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity", New German 
Critique, 22 (1981): 3-14. 
12 See S. K. White, Postmodernism and Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 147. 
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Foucault's critique of critical theory would take the form of an analysis 
of its underlying assumptions, its values and implicit ontology. For 
example, his analysis of the relationship between power and knowledge 
would contribute from this perspective, to a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between freedom and knowledge and thus to the limits 
of emancipation through theory. Similarly his analysis of the role of the 
intellectual and of the role of experts, such as psychiatrists, doctors, 
educators, and human scientists, contributes to a better understanding 
of the relationship between theory and practice and thus to a better 
appreciation of how knowledge can oppress as well as liberate. The 
crucial words here of course are tdeeper' and tbetter'. Such an 
understanding of what Foucault is about necessarily subdues his radical 
challenge to critical theory and might be considered unnecessarily 
appropriative. Despite its desire to avoid such a recuperative model this 
is the inescapable danger that Rajchman's interpretation of Foucault 
faces. Moreover, this is not just because he explicitly places his reading 
within the contours of the possibility of freedom, but the necessary 
consequence of a philosophy of risk. That Foucault does to some extent 
reject the forms and aims of a critical theory of society is clearly not 
disputable. The extent to which this is the case, and whether it is 
possible to coherently repudiate the entire tradition without 
contaminating the purity of one's position IS precisely the problem. 
Might it not be better, from Rajchman's point of view, simply to ignore 
the limits that critical theory wishes to place upon the desire to practise 
a concrete freedom? But then one would be seeking to circumvent some 
very important sites where the labour of liberty can work on its limits, 
that is, those very theories of universality and freedom stemming from 
the promises of modernity. (WE,50) This call to a work on limits it should 
be noted, remains itself within the orbit of the fairly traditional 
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privileging of difficulty in the pursuit of freal' freedom.1 3 Philosophy as 
strenuousness contaminates even the infinitesimal freedoms of everyday 
life; from now on nothing will be considered of value unless it has 
passed through the labour of mediation and subjected to criticism, 
brought to its limit and displayed as contingent and dependent. The 
modern age IS preeminently an inversion of Rousseau's equation of 
Nature and freedom. 
Foucault himself, never tired of warning about the dangers of an appeal 
to a natural body or way of life behind the already constituted 
experience of societal practices. This IS the guiding principle behind 
much of his criticism of traditional critical theories that aimed to liberate 
from oppressive and repressive forms of life through the postulation of 
a fixed point beyond the practices of power. In an interview with 
Bernard-Henri Levy he articulates this most forcibly; 
What you call ~naturalism' signifies the idea that underneath 
power, with its acts of violence and its artifices, we should 
be able to rediscover the things themselves in their 
primordial vitality: behind asylum walls, the spontaneity of 
madness; in and through the penal system, the fertile unrest 
of delin4uency ; beneath sexual prohibitions, the purity of desire. 1 
The reference to the "spontaneity of madness" here shows how far 
Foucault had distanced himself from the notion that psychiatry 
imprisoned the pure experience of madness through a "monologue of 
reason". Foucault's commitment to the idea that there IS no human 
nature, that even the body is a construct that changes throughout 
13 For a discussion of this concept in literary theory, see George 
Steiner, "On Difficulty", In On Difficulty and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978) 
14 M. Foucault, "Power and Sex: An Interview with Michel Foucault", 
Telos, 32, (1977), p. 158. 
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history, distinguishes his work from that of a critical theory seeking to 
ground itself through universal normative values. Accompanying and 
reinforcing this negative principle is Foucault's position that any truth 
claim regardless of its theoretical status involves a function of power. 
The notion that there can be a critical theory that is normatively 
grounded upon the absence of such power relations is therefore short-
sighted. This Foucault believes IS actually borne out by the actual 
emergence and ensuing practice of the human sciences. 
By outlining a basic schema of a critical theory of society I want to 
bring out exactly the main assumptions that Foucault objects to. At the 
same time this will enable the highlighting of certain points of contact 
between a simple reading of Foucault and the basic schema which might 
be fruitful In beginning an analysis of Foucault's claims and 
understanding the objections to such claims. 
The unavailability of a point beyond our interpretations of the world, 
that can provide a principle of selection for such interpretations, marks 
Foucault's distance from critical theory. Critical theory that aims to be 
enlightening and emancipatory proceeds through the assumption that 
human beings are blind to their ttrue' situation and have created forms 
of life that are alienating, frustrating and unsatisfying.15 Liberation 
along this schema involves recognizing this blindness, coming to 
understand one's true nature and thus transforming one's life and 
society In order to promote happiness and satisfy true needs and 
15 I am indebted to Brian Fay's lucid discussion of critical theory in his 
Critical Social Science (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), for the following 
rather basic sketch of a critical theory of society. Fay himself, 
explicates lucidly the idealist elements involved in much of the 
assumptions and values of such theories and goes on to present a case 
for a refined version of such theory that takes into account various 
finitudes that limit the possibilities of rational self-understanding .. 
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capacities. This sl"mple schema b" I " I of o VIOUS y Invo ves a variety 
assumptions, some that are more primary than others but those about 
what human being is and might become are unsurpassable. There really 
IS no room for pessimism here, social freedom IS inseparable from 
enlightened thought even if that thought must undergo reflection on its 
"recidivist element" .16 
A central assumption underlying a critical theory of society IS that 
critical theorizing will enable the production of solutions to the real 
material suffering and dissatisfaction to be found In the world. This is 
in turn based upon the notion that human beings are able to solve their 
own problems, usually through an enlightened re-ordering of collective 
arrangements. Critical theories attempt to rationally understand lhe 
oppressive features of society so that an understanding of this will 
incite its audience to transform their society. The aim of a critical 
theory is to be at once, true, critical and practical. The ontological 
assumptions about human nature and society are thus what may be 
termed activist and rationalist. Secular theories of human emancipation 
are enormously enlarged in regard to this evaluation of the power of 
human knowledge to reveal the basis of existence and to provide the 
means for creating the good life. This enlargement of human reason and 
activity stems from the assumption that there is nothing sacrosanct 
about human forms of life and that change is possible and desirable 
throughout all spheres of human existence. Human characteristics and 
social relations are not fixed but mutable and importantly improvable. 
Here we have the first point of contact between the assumptions of 
Foucault and the basic schema of critical theory. 
16 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, tr. 
by J. Cumming (London: Verso, 1979), p.xiii. 
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The notion that there IS nothI"ng f" d b lXe a out our experience and 
condition is a central premI"se f Ra" h ," 
o JC man s Interpretation of Foucault's 
philosophy of freedom: 
In the place of universalist narrative, he looks for the 
pl~r~lity ~nd singularity of our origins; in the place of 
unIfIe~ sCIence" or rationality, he looks for the many 
changIng pr~cbces of knowledge; in the place of a single 
human experIence! based in our nature or in our language, 
he looks for the Invention of specific forms of experience 
which are taken up and transformed again and again. 
(MFFP,3) 
This we might call the conventionality of human being and society. An 
activist conception of human beings sees them as self-interpreting 
beings who partially create themselves on the basis of their own self-
interpretations and the societies of such beings are thus deeply 
conventional.17 This notion is of course one-sided in its assumption that 
it is possible to change any element of human being or society at will. 
This, however, is not what critical theory itself maintains. There are 
various impediments to the process of change ranging from the sheer 
inertia or conservatism of human beings, the transcendence of language 
and culture in the broadest sense over social actors, and the dominance 
of certain practices through force. Obviously these conditions require 
much unpacking and so already one can see that the ideal schema of a 
critical theory is far too simple for an understanding of its aims and 
methods. Now Foucault himself, would argue that behind the actual 
complex practice of critical theory there still lies the basic assumption 
that human beings can produce the conditions of their existence In 
accordance with their desires and needs. He would question the basis of 
17 Cf. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" In 
Philosophical Papers: 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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this assumption In two ways. First, it is ultimately based upon the 
notion of a transcendental self-reflective consciousness that has been 
undermined by thinkers as diverse as Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. 
Second, even if this structure of subjectivity were the case, critical 
theory fails to recognise the vicious spiral of the domination of external 
and internal nature that it leads to. It is the aim of Discipline and 
Punish and The History of Sexuality respectively to articulate this. 
What worries critical social theorists about the implications of Foucault's 
own position IS that it seems to de-centre the subject so much that the 
possibility for resistance to power or the very coherence of such 
resistance becomes invalid. Thus, Anthony Giddens argues that although 
the lessons learned from, for example the three thinkers mentioned 
above, have to be taken to heart, this only means that we have to 
accept that subjectivity can no longer be taken as a given. Giddens 
argues that he does not: 
accept the idea of a C su bject-less history', if that term IS 
taken to mean that human social affairs are determined by 
forces of which those involved are wholly unaware. 18 
History without "knowledgeable human subjects" would for Giddens 
render pointless any attempt to understand society in order to change 
it. Foucault's reformulation of the problem of agency and determinism in 
terms of power which is the means by which all things happen is just 
too reductive. For him, Marx's phrase "men make their own history, but 
not in conditions of their own choosing" expresses the guiding notion 
18 A. Giddens, "From Marx to Nietzsche? Neo-Conservatism, Fou~~ult a~d 
Problems in Contemporary Political Theory", in Profiles and CrItiques In 
Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 221-2. 
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behind any critical theory that reflects upon its own emergence and 
normative foundations. 
Two questions might be asked of this reception of Foucault. First, does 
he propound such a general, metaphysical theory of power that does 
away with the individual human being altogether? Second, in what sense 
can Foucault be characterised as not contributing to the elaboration of 
the complex questions of oppression and liberation? To the first question 
one would have to initially argue that Foucault does not intend to 
propose such a universal theory. Certainly if we are to accept 
Rajchman's interpretation of his intellectual practice it would be a gross 
mistake to try to understand Foucault in this way. A case can be made 
for arguing that Foucault's analytic of power is designed precisely to 
avoid such totalising and metaphysical aims.19 As to the second question, 
it is rather too hasty to characterise Foucault as uninterested in the 
problem of oppression and resistance. Foucault's scepticism about the 
ability of individual agency to bring about resistance as a result of 
specific acts of will is hardly radical. Critical theory in most of its forms 
proposes just such a scepticism stemming from the Marxist proclivity to 
privilege collective class action and solidarity. From this perspective, to 
argue that Foucault removes the possibility of resistance, IS short-
sighted. On the contrary, his arguments that politics based upon the 
individual subject as sovereign neglects the disciplinary forms and 
technologies through which power increasingly operates In modern 
society, are meant to be just such a contribution to what Giddens calls 
the defending and expanding of the concepts of oppreSSIon and 
19 See J. Minson, Genealogies of Morals, pp. 44-5, and "Strategies for 
Socialists: Foucault's Conception of Power", and also G. Wickham, "Power 
and Power Analysis: Beyond Foucault?" in Towards a Critique of Foucault 
ed. by Mike Gane (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). 
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II· liberation In the face, 
not of power as such, but the massive co-
ordination of power and 
system. ,,20 
exploitation In the contemporary world 
Already Foucault has to t t b 
some ex en een reincorporated into the 
guiding assumption of critical theory: the understanding of social being 
as a conventional entity. This is through the simple recognition that 
Foucault argues that rational control 
over our own history is not as 
great as the Enlightenment proclaimed but IS still possible in a reduced 
manner. Such optimism in the capabilities of human kind has precisely 
been the cause of much of the spread of oppressive structures and 
dissatisfaction through unfulfilled promise.21 
This interpretation of Foucault still inserts him In the structure of 
oppression/liberation that critical theory assumes, and as we have seen 
Rajchman's is a prime instance of this. Foucault's freedom, for him, is 
the more realistic practice of the "dissolution of nature-like categories 
through a tracing of their historical constitution". (One might ask just 
how different this is from the aims of a self-reflective critical theory of 
society). Crucially Rajchman's distinction between the two competing 
models comes down to the notion that for Foucault history has no end 
and that this is the prerequisite of freedom as an endless practice 
rather than a goal to achieve. This is a rather simple distinction to 
make, however, relying as it does on the connection between desires and 
20 Ibid. p. 228. 
21 Reinhart Kosselleck has charted this immediate increasing gap 
between the experience of the acceleration of change and the 
expectations of progress that this brought about with the emergence of 
the concept of Neuzeit in the eighteenth century, in "fNeuzeit': Remarks 
on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement" and "'Space of 
Experience' and 'Horizon of Expectation': Two Historical Categories" both 
in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, tr. by K. Tribe 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985) 
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their ends and the closure implicit in any such process. One might ask 
just what the desire to be free from such a means-end model is if not a 
state (to be reached, achieved, accomplished, realised). Insisting that 
scepticism is permanently nomadic does not imply that it is inimical to an 
fend' of history. Indeed, is it not to characterize history as the form of 
the content of freedom? Whether Rajchman's interpretation does justice 
to how far Foucault wishes to distance himself from the structure of 
oppression and liberation is therefore an important element in comparing 
him with traditional critical theory. 
Once we have decided to incorporate Foucault's oeuvre into a productive 
relationship with critical theories of society, the strengths and 
weaknesses of each can be analysed fairly easily. The differences 
between the two apparently rival interpretations can be underplayed In 
order to emphasize their similar normative grounding and values. For an 
initial understanding of this similarity it might be convenient to show 
how far a critical theorist such as Habermas endorses sentiments that 
are usually taken to be Foucauldian when comparisons between the two 
are advanced. For instance in an interview with Perry Anderson and 
Peter Dews he says: 
Philosophers are not teachers of the nation. They can 
sometimes - if only rarely - be useful people ... the common 
business of political discourses among citizens nevertheless 
stays what it is. It is not a philosophical enterprise. It is 
the attempt of participants to answer the question fwhat 
now?' - in these circumstances, for us particular people, 
b ° tOt to 22 what are or would be the est Ins 1 u Ions. 
22 J. Habermas, "Life-Forms, Morality and the Task of the Philosopher", 
in Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, ed. P. Dews (London: Verso, 1986). 
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The notion that philosophers can "only rarely be useful people" echoes 
Foucault's rejection of the universal intellectual. In another interview 
Habermas admits: 
I would also expect a critical theory to perform the task of 
making enlightening interpretations of situations, which 
affect our self-understanding and orientate us in action. 
Even social theory would overstep its competence however 
if it undertook to project desirable forms of life.23 ' 
Comparing this with Foucault's late interpretation of his work it might 
seem that it is Foucault who is the more optimistic about the potential 
for critical thought: 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, 
certainly as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent 
body of know ledge that is accumulating; it has to be 
conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in 
which the critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits that are im posed on 
us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them. (WE,50) 
Here IS Habermas again: 
Nothing makes me more nervous than the imputation ... that 
because the theory of communicative action focuses attention 
on the social facticity of recognised validity claims, it 
proposes, or at least suggests, a rationalistic utopian 
society. I do not regard the fully transparent society as an 
ideal, nor do I wish to suggest any other ideal - Marx was 
not the only one frightened by vestiges of utopian 
socialism.24 
Obviously it might be considered a fairly simple task to selectively quote 
either thinker in order to emphasize their similar intentions and thus 
23 J. Habermas, "A Philosophico-Political Profile", in Habermas: Autonomy 
and Solidarity, p. 171. 
24 J. Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics", in Habermas: Critical Debates, 
ed. J. B. Thompson and D. Held (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 235. 
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completely obliterate the vital differences that surface In the actual 
process of their respective work' , in what Foucault felicitously called 
"the patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty." (WE,50) 
As I have argued, however, we have to on the most general level accept 
the comparability of Foucault's work with critical theories of society. At 
a superficial level this can be expressed as the inability of a critique of 
critical reason to fully escape the structure it wishes to undermine. 
Derrida's criticism of Foucault's attempt to write a history of madness in 
"itself, in its most vibrant state, before being captured by knowledge" 
is a specific example of this inability to stand outside of the historical 
workings of logocentric reason.25 
In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault does In some way attempt to 
present an alternative to power that creates a stifling moral 
homogeneity, by suggesting that behind the processes initiated by the 
first 'humanitarian' techniques of the treatment of the insane, there lies 
a pure object madness whose "essence of its freedom" is its "solitary 
exaltation." (MC,265) Derrida argues that this is an delusion. Foucault 
cannot escape from the order of language to write the archaeology of a 
silence that is the murmuring of madness, without repeating reason's 
mastering of madness. For Derrida, an escape from the "totality of the 
historical language responsible for the exile of madness" is possible in 
only two ways. Either one does not write about the "silence", or one 
follows the madman's path of exile. There can be no challenge to reason 
except from within reason itself in the form of strategies and stratagems 
that undermine its claims to totalisation. To speak for madness would 
25 J. Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness", in Writing and 
Difference, tr. A. Bass (London: Routledge, 1978). Roy Boyne has argued 
for a fundamental convergence between Derrida and Foucault through 
the subject of the ethics of the Other in his Foucault and Derrida: The 
Other Side of Reason (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
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only be to annex it once more, for madness as the other of reason IS In 
essence what cannot be said. Foucault's claim to be writing a history of 
madness in itself, in order In some way to recover the other of modern 
reason that was repressed by a monologic discourse fails to provide an 
alternative to this discourse. 
Derrida argues that Foucault's choice of the Classical age as the point 
when madness is mastered might seem arbitrary within the history of 
reason. Why not, for example, choose the point at which Socratic 
dialectic emerges from the undivided Logos of the pre-Socratics; this 
would leave the classical age without privilege or specificity. Ultimately, 
however, Derrida wants to suggest that to seek a point of origin where 
reason separates itself from its contrary, whatever this might be, is a 
contradictory aim anyhow. How can one write the history of this division 
if it is this division that first creates the possibility of the writing of 
history? This is what Foucault wishes to argue for when he says that: 
The necessity of madness, throughout the history of the 
West, is linked to the deciding gesture which detaches from 
the background noise, and from its continuous monotony, a 
meaningful language that is transmitted and consummated In 
time; briefly, it is linked to the possibility of history.26 
Thus, ultimately he would be attempting a history of the possibility of 
history; a history of the common root of madness and reason; of the 
unity before the opposition between sense and non-sense. Derrida has 
doubts about this project and its intention to respect the purity of such 
a primitive unity. Madness cannot be considered to exist outside the 
historical conditions of its production and cannot function as the site 
for a critique of reason. The effect of Derrida's criticism can be seen in 
26 Quoted in "Cogito and the History of Madness", p. 42. 
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Foucault's subsequent repudiation of the inside/outside model of the 
critique of power and its corollary the . repreSSIon hypothesis: 
The notion of repression is an insidious one, or at all events 
I myself have had much trouble in freeing myself of it. .. 
~he~ .1 wrote Madness and Civilisation, I made at least an 
ImplICIt use of this notion of repression. I think indeed that 
I w~s positing the existence of a sort of living, voluble and 
anXIOUS madness which the mechanisms of power and 
psychiatry were supposed to have come to repress and 
reduce to silence. But it seems to me now that the notion of 
repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is 
precisely the productive aspect of power. (PK,118-9) 
(ii) The Counter-discourse of Modernity 
That there IS no pure site where critique can achieve a complete 
separation from the determinations of its object is the guiding principle 
behind Foucault's endless rethinking of the relations between power and 
knowledge throughout his career. It is also the basis for arguing that 
his work has a deeply Nietzschean basis. This radical situatedness of 
critique in the languages, cultures and practices of its time is hardly a 
Nietzschean discovery, however. As Habermas points out, the 
desublimation of Hegel's idealistic philosophy began almost immediately 
after its appearance with the transformations of the Young Hegelians and 
moreover, lIabermas wishes to argue that this is still the situation of 
consciousness today: 
The discourse of modernity, which we are still conducting 
down to our day, is also marked by the consciousness that 
philosophy is over, no matter whether this is perceived a.s a 
productive challenge or only as a provocation. (PDM,51-2) 
As we have mentioned, Habermas orients his own narrative around an 
understanding of modernity as an unfinished task and certainly not 
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something that can be rejected totally because of the possibilities for 
oppression and domination it has also unleashed. The fact that Foucault 
fails to fully acknowledge this situation is for Habermas the source of 
his incoherencies. Foucault he argues does not think genealogically when 
it comes to his own genealogical historiography. 
Habermas's understanding of the potentiality of Foucault's work differs 
immensely from that of Rajchman's. Basically he sees genealogy as being 
overtaken by a similar fate to that which Foucault had portrayed in the 
human sciences; it emerges as "precisely the presentistic, relativistic, 
cryptonormative illusory SCIence that it does not want to be." (PDM,276) 
This fate arIses from genealogy's "substitution of the hermeneutic 
elucidation of contexts of meaning for an analysis of structures that are 
meaningless in themselves"; a "substitution of validity claims for the 
power complexes they are functions of"; and the "substitution of 
justifying criticism for value-free historical explanations". Foucault on 
this interpretation attempts to be precisely the pure historian he had 
criticised so vehemently in his own work. For Habermas the claims that 
are advanced by genealogy are placed into question: 
(1) by the involuntary presentism of a historiography that 
remains hermeneutically stuck in its starting situation; (2) 
by the unavoidable relativism of an analysis related to the 
present that can understand itself only as a context-
dependent practical enterprise; (3) by the arbitrary 
partisanship of a criticism that cannot account for its 
normative foundations. (PDM,276) 
Foucault himself recognized these problems but according to Habermas 
failed to draw any conclusions from them. Here, Foucault's attempt to 
eliminate the hermeneutic situation of the historiographer arises from the 
position of a rejection of the philosophy of the subject. The 
:?oo 
historiographer does not attempt to understand what social actors do 
and think through a fusion of horizons of meaning that can arise out of 
the context of tradition. Rather Foucault attempts to articulate the 
underlying practices that constitute the space where meaning occurs. As 
we have seen in Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation of Foucault, the 
historian brackets the very meaning of such practices in order to gain a 
critical distanciation upon them and to grasp them in their material 
structure. Habermas argues that even this attempt is betrayed by the 
fact that technologies of power and practices of domination are only 
explained by comparing them with one another. This is an inevitable 
hermeneutic process and a particular understanding of the modern age 
is in Foucault's work the unthematized starting point for this process. 
Moreover, Foucault's objectivistic attitude sits uneasily with the 
Nietzschean reflection that the will to knowledge IS born of malice, 
passion, instinct and devotion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
this unmasking of the objectivistic illusions of the will to knowledge 
leads to the understanding of history as a contemplation of the past 
solely ln terms of the needs of the present. The difference that sets 
genealogy over other forms of will to knowledge IS its linkage with 
disqualified, marginal forms of knowledge. (see chap 3 pp. 148-52) This 
for Habermas, IS how Foucault attempts to avoid the problem of 
relativism. That IS the problem of how the truth claims of his theory can 
be prevented from turning on the claims of genealogy. Su bjugated 
knowledges are re-articulated through the action of genealogy and 
groups subordinated to the power of official knowledge find their 
medium of resistance in the practice of uncovering its own emergence. 
Genealogy takes the side of those who resist established practices of 
power but the definition of these practices is itself situated in a prior 
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web of power relationships.27 Moreover, such a prIOr and inexhaustible 
conflict over the def" "t" f Inl Ion 0 power only allows for su bjected 
knowledges to count as no more or no less once they too become 
victorious, and victory has to be the goal of any power if it is to exist 
along Foucault's schema. 
According to Habermas, genealogical historiography aspIres to be a 
strictly descriptive attitude, bracketing values and truth claims. There 
IS no fright side' behind the constellations of power. But, Habermas 
argues, Foucault understands himself as a dissident who offers 
resistance to modern thought and humanistically disguised disciplinary 
power. He IS engaged throughout, despite his rhetorical statements La 
the contrary, for even a form of ascetic description is an engagement of 
sorts. He attempts to free himself from the traditional patterns of 
academic theoretical practice but even this is a position of a kind. 
Foucault writes, and for Habermas, the reason for this is precise ly the 
point; he writes for a reason whatever this may turn out to be in a 
particular case. There is clearly no simple discharge of energy involved 
here. It is not that such a description might be possible but rather its 
possibility implies the "on-going transformation of the process of power 
analysis, not its new house.,,28 More importantly for Habermas, these 
specific interventions congeal into a project with a critical thrust. 
11 11" H b ' e tl" n fwhy resl"st?"' Otherwise, para e lng a ermas s qu s 0 the question 
must also arise 'why write rather than not write?' 
27 Gary Wickham 
definition of power 
"Power and Power 
Foucault. 
28 Ibid. p. 145. 
emphasizes the always contested nature of the 
for an understanding of Foucault's power analysis In 
Analysis: Beyond Foucault" in Towards a Critique of 
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In opposition to this reading Rajchman argues that Foucault does not 
want to improve the "language game of d IOtO I mo ern po 1 lca theory (with its 
basic concepts of autonomy and heteronomy, morality, legality, 
emancipation and repression)". Rather he wants to undermine modernity 
and its language games. Genealogical history wages war against the 
forms of modern power because they no longer take the form of the 
models provided by Marx and Freud, of "legitimate power versus 
illegitimate power, or unconscious motives versus conscious motives". The 
critique of ideology presupposed by most critical theories only 
contributes to the danger of strengthening the normalizing forms of 
violence that are all pervaSIve and that invade bodies rather than 
conscIousness. Disciplinary power functions without the detour through a 
necessarily false consciousness and hence IS not prone to counter-
discourse. Even so, Habermas ultimately wants to know why we should 
resist such all-pervasive power instead of just adapting to it? He argues 
that an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent might 
make sense if one intends to fight but the question remains why fight 
at all? Habermas believes that only with the introduction of normative 
notions could Foucault begin to answer this question, and tell us what is 
wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime. 
What compounds Foucault's position, for Habermas, is the fact that he 
does implicitly appeal to standard reasons for resisting.29 These include 
the "asymmetrical relationship of power relationships, the reifying effect 
of technologies of power which violate the moral and bodily integrity of 
subjects capable of speech and action" and, the opaque nature of much 
of the effects of power/knowledge regimes. Foucault's development of the 
29 See Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and 
Normative Confusions", Praxis International 1, (1981 ):283. 
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concept bio-power functions by setting up a notion of the body as one 
objectified and disciplined by scientific techniques and structured by 
the various technologies of truth. According to Habermas, the body's 
experIence of itself IS taken to be the substrate of w hic h these 
techniques operate upon, manipulating it, drilling it, objectifying it and 
stimulating it. In The History of Sexuality, Volume One Foucault appeals 
to a "different economy of bodies and pleasures" which might function 
as a standard for our revolt In the present but this can easily be 
dismissed as utopian dreaming, especially if Foucault's thesis that there 
is no body behind the discourse that articulates it is taken seriously. 30 
Habermas argues that Foucault wants to "leave behind modernity's 
presentist consciousness of time." This consists In a break with the 
privileging of the present In which the future is faced responsibly and 
the past is narcissitically related to. Hence, genealogy IS not supposed 
to search for an origin, but to uncover the contingent beginnings of 
discourse formations, to analyze the multiplicity of factual histories of 
derivation and to dissolve the identity of the history-writing su bject 
and of her contemporaries. From this there is the renunciation of a 
hermeneutics that links the historian with her object in an "effective 
history". History for Foucault cannot be the anthropological collective 
conSCIousness that makes use of material documents to refresh its 
memory. It is part of my argument that Foucault does indeed challenge 
the presentist notion of time but to insist that this refuses the notion of 
"effective history" is short-sighted. Certainly the notion of "effective 
history" as developed by Gadamer and which privileges the inevitable 
continuity of tradition in the hermeneutical situation of the present, 
would appear as a much to rapid universalization of the will to 
30 See Minson's criticisms in Genealogies of Morals, p. 41. 
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understand for Foucault. Its hO to ° I IS rIca emergence as a philosophical 
theory could easily be traced in order to show lOtS 
complicities with all 
those cbad' Enlightenment strategies of inner and outer domination. The 
genealogy that traces the lowly descent of a universal philosophical 
hermeneutics would thus apply a critical standard of its own, however. 
It is precisely such a situation that philosophical hermeneutics seeks to 
ontologize in order to characterize thinking as a much less transcendent 
achievement or work of man. 
Habermas argues that modern time consciousness first articulated 
philosophically by Hegel, has been continually renewed by radical 
historical thinking: from the Young Hegelians through Nietzsche to 
Heidegger and beyond. This radical historical thinking is characterised 
by the idea of "effective history" {Wirkungsgeschicte} In which the 
central conceptual thematization is the notion of an "horizon open to the 
future which is determined by expectations in the present and which 
guides our access to the past. " Insofar as we appropriate past 
experiences with an orientation to the future, the authentic present is 
preserved as the locus of continuing tradition and of innovation at once. 
Benjamin, for example, sought such an "effective history" through an 
anticipation of what is new In the future via a remembering of a past 
that has been suppressed. This is the "revolutionary chance in the fight 
for the oppressed past". 31 This liberating power of memory is not In 
order to escape the past's burden on the present, but to contribute to 
the dissolution of a guilt on the part of the present with respect to the 
past. Benjamin's extension of the future-oriented responsibility to past 
times is Habermas argues: "a decentring counterpoise to the dangerous 
31 W. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", In Illuminations, 
tr. H. Zohn (London: Fontana, 1970), p. 265. 
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concentration of responsibility that mod to . ern Ime-consclousness, oriented 
exclusively toward the future, has laid on the shoulders of a problematic 
present." (PDM,15-16) Such a decentring, I would suggest, IS the 
inevitable ethical thrust of Foucault's dispersive strategy insofar as it 
directs us away from the future-oriented notion of political practice 
towards the site of a radically in decidable and fragile present where 
such understandings of time and history are always contestations of 
power. This is not to argue that Foucault's own understandings of such 
contestations are without their limitations, however, as I will argue in 
the next two chapters. 
Habermas's critique of Foucault seeks to question his work by bringing 
out what he would term half-formulated assumptions and logical 
incoherencies. According to him, Foucault did provide an illuminating 
critique of the entanglement of the human sciences in the philosophy of 
the subject, but he failed to think through the aporias of his own 
position. Ultimately he is trapped in a relativist self-denial and is unable 
to give a normative account of his position. Habermas's proposed solution 
to the philosophy of the subject IS the replacement of it by the 
paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech 
and action. This prevents the objectifying perspective of the isolated 
su bject that IS just one entity In the world. The perspective of 
participation In "linguistically mediated interaction" enables the 
circumvention of the "transcendental-empirical doubling of the relation 
to the self" which sees itself as either constitutive of the world or just 
one entity in that world. For Habermas, all that is required is a simple 
change of paradigm to render obsolete Foucault's perilous dynamics of a 
subjectivity that is bent on knowledge and falls prey to "pseudo-
sciences". It is only if reason is seen to be a universal power bent upon 
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self-assertion and self-aggrandizement, subjugating everything around it 
as an object, that the other of reason can be postulated as spontaneous, 
creative and linked to a pre-discursive realm. Habermas questions this 
exclusive conception of reason and because Foucault cannot appeal to 
reason's other himself, he is taken to have been caught in aporias by 
not himself questioning this exclusive conception. Habermas argues that 
Foucault wants to: 
initiate a special discourse that claims to operate outside the 
horizon of reason without being utterly irrational. To be 
sure; this merely shifts the paradox. (PDM,308) 
This paradox takes the form of a tension throughout Foucault's work 
which is reduced through a emphasis upon one or the other side of the 
problem throughout his career. On the one hand, he lays claim to a form 
of objectivity in his archaeology and rejects hermeneutics in favour of a 
"contented positivism", on the other hand he never gives up the 
Nietzschean insistence on the interminability of interpretation. For 
someone such as Dews, Foucault's "shifting perspectives ... do powerfully 
illuminate, but at the same time fall victim to, the contradictory 
processes which they address. ,,32 However, what is perceived as a 
weakness here can equally be viewed from the interminability of 
interpretation as productive. 
The productivity of this vacillation can be best understood if we return 
to the analysis given by Dreyfus and Rabinow of Foucault's overcoming 
of hermeneutics. Together with a concentration on Foucault's specifically 
historiograp hical problematic; the presentism, relativism and 
cryptonormativism that Habermas finds so debilitating, this attempt at an 
32 Logics of Disintegration, p. 232. 
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overcoming of hermeneutics might be seen In another light. Richard 
Palmer argues, In an essay In response to Dreyfus, that he is "led by a 
Foucaultian conception of hermeneutics to fframe' Heidegger with a 
narrower conception than Heidegger's text calls for. ,,33 Palmer wishes to 
argue that it would be wrong to see Heidegger attempting to move 
beyond hermeneutics insofar as he never gives up thinking on the 
process of interpretation. Similarly, it is possible to argue that Foucault 
himself, never goes beyond interpretation insofar as he constantly 
reflects upon his own practice in relation to its historical situation. 
Foucault's draft proposals for the specific intellectual is part of this 
reflection, as are his thoughts upon the nature of resistance and his 
seemingly interminable (correctly so) analyses of the nature of power. 
On a more general level, the tension between history as meaning and 
history as difference, that is hardly resolved in Foucault's work, is the 
source of a "bad infinite" in which, as Gadamer puts it: "the end keeps 
on delaying its arrival" . 34 For Gadamer: "It IS precisely the 
unilluminable obscurity of our facticity which Heidegger called 
Cthrownness' - that sustains and does not merely set limits to the 
. h D· ,,35 project character of uman aseln. 
This interpretation of Foucault would realign his relationship to critical 
theory via a hermeneutical critique of its aspirations. It would then be 
possible to reinterpret Rajchman's view of Foucault, as excessively 
idealist in the sense previously attributed to the naIve view of critical 
33 R. E. Palmer, "On the Transcendability of Hermeneutics", In 
Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, ed. G. Shapiro and A. Sica 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 
p. 86. 
34 H. G. Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel", in Reason in the Age of 
Science, tr. F. G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1981), p. 40. 
35 Ibid. 
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theory. One example of this is Rajchman's argument that for Foucault the 
point of doing philosophy is to occasion new ways of thinking about the 
forms of experience around which there exists struggle. On this model, 
to discover the sources of our knowledge, experience, and practices IS 
to alter the nature of the debates and struggles that are the product of 
such discourses and thus to alter the discourse that forms ou r 
experience. This practice, accordingly, releases the power such things 
have over us. Such a romantic view of the philosophical enterprise is 
precisely what critical theory sets out to correct through its situating 
and concretization of reason in history, society, body, and language. The 
extent to which this situating of critique in the facticity of life reduces 
the initial promises of enlightenment and emancipation is the starting 
point for the critical theorist.36 
Rajchman's description of Foucault as a philosopher of dispersion and 
singularity is, I have argued, accurate but to further characterise this 
as providing a new philosophy of freedom is not without its difficulties. 
The suspenSIon of judgement about systematic schemes, unified 
narratives, universalist history, human nature, etc. is not without its 
price in terms of a positive will to dispersion that ultimately works 
through a certain parasiticism on the overturned values. This is also the 
case In his analysis of power which relies upon a reversal of the 
ordinary understanding of power as a zero-sum phenomena. Even though 
such an ordinary notion must surely be questioned, the positive force of 
Foucault's own reevaluation arises precisely through the new 
{pessimistic?} VISIon of social existence expressed In the power-
knowledge couplet. To the extent that this new understanding precludes 
the choice between powers, then critical theorists are right to be 
36 See footnote 15 above. 
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suspicious of its own tendencI·es towards b ecoming a master-name In 
social analysis. 
However, insofar as Foucault's permanent questioning proceeds case by 
case and is not a total k t·· ·t 1 s ep ICIsm, I s re ationship with hermeneutical 
philosophy conceived of as a practical philosophy becomes less remote. 
Rajchman argues that the procedure of critique is enmeshed in concrete 
cases and aims not to produce certainty in specific areas but to open up 
new possibilities for thought or action. One could draw comparisons with 
the fundamental thrust of the practical philosophy proposed by Gadamer 
In which the crucial self-understanding is of human finitude in relation 
to its attempt to understand the world. Foucault also vehemently rejects 
the notion that one needs to understand the totality of social reality in 
order to comprehend it or change it. This is especially the case in the 
comprehension of power relationships which do not exhibit a unified 
totality in the first place. Instead, Foucault's proposal to analyse the 
"micro-physics" of power emphasizes the importance of understanding 
the actual everyday sites and processes where power IS exercised 
because it is only at such an immediate and local level that an effective 
understanding of how to negotiate and confront power can be had. It is 
only through such finite comprehension that an effective understanding 
of wider power structures can also be made possible. Moreover, it IS 
only through resisting at such micro-levels that the possibility of 
changing these larger structures is possible. The desire to understand 
the whole before one engages in resistance is not only an impossible 
desire but can actually lead to greater structures of oppression and is 
always prone to the outcome of apathy or pessimism. 
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So, although Foucault rightly gives up the hope of universal progress 
he does not abandon all ideas of emancipation, if by that one means the 
resistance at particular points to local exercises of power. Foucault's 
critique would be In some sense a critique of the desire to have a total 
understanding of society before engaging in specific change of that 
society. Showing historically that this desire for total understanding has 
actually increased dominatory power structures would itself be an 
important task. Rorty sees Foucault's critical histories as correctly 
subverting the quasi-metaphysical comfort implied by Habermas's 
argument for the necessity of presupposing convergence in the long run 
on the rational standards of an "ideal speech community". Foucault 
argued that he was not trying to "formulate the global systematic theory 
which holds everything In place, but to analyse the specificity of 
mechanisms of power... to build little by little a strategic knowledge". 
(PK,131) However, one might still ask why such strategic knowledge is 
necessary. What is the purpose of genealogical histories of contemporary 
power relations if they ultimately stand as temporary interventions? The 
feeling that there is a tacit moral critique behind Foucault's work that 
he never fully acknowledges is something that is bound to constantly 
occur to the reader. It is important to acknowledge that Foucault worked 
within the established academic world even whilst declaring war on its 
established structures and disciplines. Working within the overall 
discipline of language and its rules of plausibility it seems difficult not 
to bring some notion of wider social responsibility into his work 
conceived of as an intervention into social existence. Despite what might 
be misplaced calls for normative grounding from Habermas, there is still 
a deep commitment to normative reversal and dispersal that functions as 
the driving force behind the power of Foucault's work. Whether Foucault 
can function as a specific intellectual dealing In non-systematic 
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interventions in the present system without In some way contradicting 
his avowed neutrality as to what should be done IS an important 
question that I will address in the following chapters. In particular, I 
will argue that the drive for dispersion that underpins this neutrality 
relies upon a simple reversal of the imaginative refiguration of identities 
to be found in the search for utopias, understood as fragile expressions 
of desire without totalizing pretensions. 
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Chapter 5 
Between Ideology and Utopia: The Indeterminacies of the Intellectual 
213 
(i) The Interests of the Present 
Habermas tells us that what l"mpressed h" h 1m w en he first met Foucault in 
1983 was: 
the tension, which resists easy categorisation, between the 
almost serene scientific reserve of the scholar striving for 
o?je~tivity on the one hand, and, on the other, the political 
vTtal~t! of the vulnerable, subjectively excitable, morally 
sensItIve intellectual.1 
He argues that in Foucault "the stoic attitude of the observer who keeps 
his precise distance, obsessed with objectivity, was combined with the 
opposite element of passionate self-consuming participation in the reality 
of the historical moment. ,,2 It is this tension that I have characterised 
as the site of Foucault's productive challenge to the present. Yet, given 
his Nietzschean rejection of the ascetic ideals of disinterested thought, 
it seems perverse to characterise a major element of the style of his 
thought as serenely striving for objectivity. In this chapter I want to 
begin to open out the normative levels of Foucault's work by siting this 
tension along the lines of the couplet ideology/utopia both in relation to 
the ethic of the intellectual and in relation to the refiguration of the 
social understood In Foucault's terms as the transgression of the 
present. 
Habermas's characterisation echoes Bernstein's analysis of the impossible 
contradictions between objectivism and relativism or subjectivism, 
presumably to suggest that Foucault failed to move beyond this simple 
but constraining framework (see pp. 10-13 above). For Habermas this 
1 Jiirgen Habermas, "Taking 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, p. 
2 Id. 
Aim at 
103. 
the Heart of the Present" , In 
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tension is the site of productive contradictions characteristic of complex 
thinking but nevertheless also symptomatic of a deficiency. The essence 
of Foucault's critical thrust, the tearing down of the illusions of natural 
categories, is carried out by dispersive archaeological and genealogical 
studies of social practices but itself oscillates between the twin evils of 
objectivism and subjectivism. That the institution of the "will to truth" 
is an integral element in this critique is it seems ignored. 
For Habermas, the point at which Foucault's thought remaIns 
undeveloped is the point where he baulks at the prospect of proposing 
or producing alternatives to the practices he so effectively criticizes. As 
we have seen in chapter four, this, according to Habermas, is a product 
of his neo-conservatism, a product of the groundlessness of his critique. 
A sympathetic reading of Foucault's position would be to emphasize his 
sceptical notion of freedom and would emphasize the transgressive as 
opposed to productive nature of the work of freedom.3 The question is 
whether this transgressive element can function without a corresponding 
affirmative project, as Foucault seems to imply at times. The notion of a 
critique that functions solely VIa destruction without affirmation of 
something would be pointless. (Here one should perhaps simply note the 
implicit tautology of critique requiring a point being synonymous with 
critique as affirming some point.) The notion of critique as simply 
destruction of all fast-frozen values and assumptions might sound more 
feasible and attractive, yet even this process functions from a site. 
Foucault does have in some sense of the word a place from which he 
practices his critique despite the radical claim that his discourse "far 
3 See Charles C. Lemert and Garth Gillan, Michel Foucault: Social Theory 
and Transgression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), for a 
reading of Foucault's social theory along these lines. 
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from determining the locus in which it speaks, IS avoiding the ground 
on which it could find support." (AK,205) If we were to take one sense 
of the word critique, that of a judgement through a division, then we 
can say that much of Foucault's rhetoric and tone follows this practice. 
This would include: his narrative of the birth of the asylum out of a 
relatively sudden new practice of dividing the inmates of general 
hospitals; his narrative of the birth of modern clinical medicine in the 
space of a few years at the beginning of the nineteenth century; his 
account of the ruptures that shifted the epistemes of the language, 
economics and life; the dramatic division between punishment in the 
classical and the modern age, and so on. Even though we have to be 
wary of characterising Foucault as a historian of discontinuity and 
radical difference, it would not be entirely wrong to emphasize that his 
critique of the present works upon the principle of judgement 
understood as division. At this point one would have to qualify this 
characterisation, however. Much of the criticism directed against 
Foucault himself IS because he apparently does not make any positive 
judgements as to how one should proceed in the present. This IS 
Habermas's point when he asks of Foucault's work "Why resist rather 
than acquiesce?" (PDM,284) This question is justified even in such a 
general form and there are two possible answers to it with respect to 
the work of Foucault. The first would be the response Foucault himself 
sometimes gives when placed upon the spot to justify his writing: 
Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: 
leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our 
papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when 
we write. (AK,17) 
Such a reply implies that Foucault is claiming a special status for his 
writing that does not have to answer to the normal ethico-political 
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demands of justification. This attitude d t oes no consist of complete 
detachment but IS allied "th h 
WI tenon-programmatic role of the 
intellectual: 
To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able 
~ carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the 
~ntellectual to pursue. His role, since he works specifically 
In the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of 
thought can make ..• transformations urgent enough for 
people to want to carry them out. (PPC,155) 
This is perhaps a standard view of Foucault. A VIew that takes him to 
be engaged in criticism In the realm of thought with its own standards 
and methods and to be a thinker who is an endless sceptic, constantly 
questioning our constituted experience. 
From this perspective it would be wrong to expect Foucault to produce a 
programme for either the individual or the collectivity. Instead the role 
of the intellectual qua intellectual is simply to question. It is only as a 
citizen that the concrete process of choosing how to live IS debated and 
practised. This of course, seemingly creates a tremendous divide between 
the private and public domains of living and thinking which not only 
seems artificial but also inadequate. That Foucault does not actually hold 
to such a deep division between the role of the intellectual and that of 
the citizen IS apparent In his notion of the "specific intellectual". 
(PK,126-31) His entire tone is that of the engaged intellectual whose 
thinking has a bearing upon the way we live, to the extent that he has 
been adjudged to be the bearer of Sartre's mantle of the popularizing 
philosopher.4 Yet at the same time there IS a peculiar quality to 
Foucault's work that one can only call ascetic. It IS as if Foucault 
4 See for example, J. G. Merquior, Foucault (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 
157-8. 
wanted to purge his thinking of any of 
undecidability of politics and ethics even as he 
the 
was 
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uneasiness and 
pointing out the 
complexities and fragilities of the practices that have come to define and 
constitute us. 
The second response to the charge of non-commitment and apolitics is to 
argue that Foucault does indeed have a tacit politics of a kind which IS 
simply not fully articulated by himself. Again such a response has to be 
qualified. It is not as if Foucault has a systematic political programme 
behind his work which he has either consciously or unconsciously 
suppressed. The one thing that it is important to emphasize concerning 
the style of Foucault's work is its distrust of totality and of general 
ethical or political values that can be universalized for all times and all 
people. At the same time this tendency towards unsystematicity and 
fragmentation is itself a position defined by just such values. The 
second possible response I want to bring out in reply to the charge of 
apolitics, however, is not just concerned with the argument that even 
the endless practice of dispersion and decentring is itself some kind of 
political or ethical programme. If this were the case then the second 
response would not be much different from the first outlined above. 
Rather I would argue that it is possible to see Foucault's criticism as 
not working from a non-site (something that IS at the least hard to 
conceive anyway) but from the site of the possible future of the 
present. This would be to insert his work back into the tradition of 
political and ethical critique that looks to the future for practice in the 
present. Of course, this might be considered a simplification of 
Foucault's attempt to question the forms of traditional political practice. 
However, I do not think that it is to distort his own practice. Rather it 
is to develop what is implicit within it instead of covering it over with 
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assertions either of his apoliticalness and 1 ° re atIvism, or of his 
dismantling of the traditional connections between theory and politics. 
While it might seem 1 ncongruous to place Foucault's work within the 
tradition of utopian thought it would not be entirely unjustified. A 
statement that is usually taken to task by critics when discussing his 
alleged incoherent stance is his musl°ng about the °bOI POSSI 1 ities for the 
body in the future: 
Moreover, we need to consider the possibility that one day 
perhaps, in a different economy of bodies and pleasures ' 
people will no longer quite understand how the ruses of' 
sexuality, and the power that sustains its organization, were 
able to subject us to that austere monarchy of sex, so that 
we became dedicated to the endless task of forcing its 
secret, of exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow. 
(HS,1,159) 
This appeal to "a different economy of bodies and pleasures" IS of 
course very vague and abstract. It can be interpreted as Foucault's 
admittance that in order to resist our present practices it has to be in 
the name of alternative ones. It is then open to the charge of utopianism 
In the common sense of transcendental ideals that are impossible to fulfil 
In reality. However, it IS hardly likely that Foucault is advocating 
anything here more than thinking that our present practices might 
appear eccentric to others In the future. A different economy of bodies 
and pleasure is open to be filled with whatever content that might 
appear. Foucault's appeal IS not to a positive content but to the 
possibility of thinking and acting otherwise. In one sense this is where 
his theory IS at its most traditional. That is in the sense that he is not 
pessimistic about the fact that there is the possibility for substantial 
change despite all his pessimism about the systems and practices in 
which human beings have entrapped themselves. 
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Of course it would be a gross injustice to Foucault to claim that he 
projects a possible future Whl"ch can stand " In a critical relation to the 
present. He simply does not do this as we can see even in the above 
quote with its careful conditional style. E 11 " qua y, It would be an 
absurdity to claim that Foucault proJ"ects a "t" crl Ique of the present from 
the nostalgic longing for a past golden age to be recovered in the 
present. Even the postulation of a different economy of bodies and 
pleasures does not imply a better economy (although from Foucault's 
tone and critique of existing practices of sexuality it might seem so). It 
could from Foucault's point of view be no better or even worse than our 
present practices as well as possibly being an improvement. All that one 
can say is that there is the possibility of a different regime, not that 
we can evaluate it in relation to our own. In this sense the future that 
is appealed to here is not one that has connections with the present and 
so allows of some comparison. Rather it is a future which has no other 
connection with the present than its negation. This would be the most 
ascetic version of Foucault's critique of the present. On the other hand 
it can be modified to appear more concrete by arguing that the future 
that is appealed to is conceived of as the realisation and fulfilment of 
elements already existent in present society. This is not what Foucault 
himself imagines the negation to consist of and is the cause of much of 
the criticism of his work for not being directly applicable to political 
struggle in the present. (This however, is hardly a criticism that can be 
made of Foucault without qualification) Criticism of Foucault for not 
concretizing his appeal to other possibilities IS perhaps, however, the 
point at which one can understand just how he does practice critique 
and why there might be incoherencies and weaknesses in his position. 
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(ti) The Vicissitudes of the Present 
When the relationshl·p b t th e ween e present and the future 1S 
articulated in terms of a inadequate present and a possible future that 
in some ways could redeem these inadequacies, then it is important to be 
clear on how we are to understand the crossing of the distance between 
the two. Certainly, to conceive the future as nothing but the negation of 
the present in order to bring out the contingencies of present practices, 
leaves little indication of how we are to proceed in the present to 
exercise our freedom. It makes the notion of resistance to the present 
quite like a leap of faith that the future despite its indeterminacy will 
be better. If it is not to be better then the decision to resist does 
appear as a whim. 
This is why the notion of the future as the realisation of elements 
already existent In the present provides a better account for the 
practice of emancipation. It also lessens the suspicion that the present 
is being conceived of as deficient in relation to the fulfilment of the 
future. The present is not simply being understood as that which 
necessarily requires a completion in the future but as the possibility of 
such development. Whether this model is sufficiently non-teleological to 
avoid the dangers associated with the notion of a deficient present 1S 
another question. The idea that the future is not a total negation of the 
present but a reality which can be positively, though partially found in 
the present enables one to justify one's actions with much more ease 
(this of course is no justification for the acceptance of such a model). 
From this perspective, if there IS a utopian element 1n Foucault's 
thought it IS because at a meta-level, his textual production does 
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implicitly appeal to another time where our present practices will appear 
alien. This IS the to h nega Ive t rust of his critique In that the 
transcendence of the present is given no content other than the pure 
possibility of transcendence. It might be said that it is negative only in 
the sense that it avoids depicting the concrete features of a better 
society. However, precisely because Foucault refuses to propose specific 
alternatives to present practices, it might be argued that he has to 
start from an analysis of the present in order to find future concrete 
possibilities for transformation. Now Foucault's analyses are steeped in 
the present in the sense that they always aim at understanding present 
experiences, yet one would be hard pressed to find concrete proposals 
for future practice emerging from these studies. Because of lhe virtual 
absence of such proposals to the point of puritanism, it would be hard 
to adjudge this aspect of Foucault's work as merely his acceptance of 
its limitations. It is an aspect of his work that one has to explain and I 
think can be explained by a number of reasons. Primarily it IS to be 
explained by his distrust of the notion that intellectuals have to 
propound strategies for action that others (the masses) should follow. 
Such a fear IS justified in some respects, especially given the 
appropriation of Leninist notions of the importation of revolution into 
the masses in the twentieth century. It is not necessarily a reason why 
intellectuals should shun all notions of producing concrete or even ideal 
goals, however. To argue that one should not produce political or ethical 
goals through the use of theory because of the dangers of the tyranny 
of ideas is perhaps to overestimate the efficacy of theory emanating 
from the academy in the first place, and underestimate its use In 
ordinary understanding in the second. 
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Now to point out that Foucault stops short of °do prOVl Ing concrete 
proposals for transformation IS not a criticism of his work in itself. It is 
perfectly within reason not to want to use one's position in society to 
impose one's interpretation of what is to be done.5 It IS moreover 
perhaps a virtue given the powers that can accrue to an intellectual 
purely as an intellectual.6 However, what must be dismissed is Foucault's 
claims that the very nature of his work leads to such a position in the 
first place. Indeed such a claim seems to hint that there can be value-
free theory, history, or sociology. 
At this point it would be WIse to acknowledge that for much of the time 
Foucault does not characterise his intellectual practice as value-free. 
The whole point of his genealogies is to be an intervention in present 
struggles. It is because of this, however, that Habermas's accusation of 
"crypto-normativism" carrIes such force. It IS the very fact that 
Foucault presents his work as somehow above the claims to truth that 
animate the practices he studies and yet reserves the capability to 
pronounce upon the unacknowledged dangers of such practices that 
Habermas objects to. 
It might appear that Habermas is talking past Foucault here, however. 
For it is not as if Foucault does not acknowledge the irredeemably 
normative nature of all intellectual practice. Habermas's demand that he 
explicitly acknowledges this in his work might seem superfluous in the 
late twentieth century. Quite simply put, within the context of the 
5 This is the view adopted by, for example, by Weber. See Max Weber 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. and ed. by E. Shils and H. Finch 
(New York, Free Press, 1949), pp. 2-3. 
6 The problem of specific intellectuals encroaching upon areas outside of 
their particular competence, such as doctors and lawyers claiming 
greater political competence by virtue of their profession is one such 
dangerous aspect of this phenomenon. 
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intellectual debates between someone such as Habermas and those he 
accuses of anti-Enlightenment values such as Derrida, Heidegger, and 
Foucault, there is a common frame of debate in that all believe there 
cannot be a foundation or ground for ethical or political values and that 
every position IS value-laden through the very nature of being a 
position in the first place. It would then appear that it is Habermas who 
is being irrational in demanding of someone the very grounds that he 
himself does not actually believe are possible to give. Of course, this is 
to present an interpretation of Habermas's own position that tones down 
the quasi-transcendentalism of the ideal speech situation he proposes as 
the regulative ideal present in all communication.7 It is also to tone 
down Foucault's more extravagant claims about the birth of modern 
rationalism and science from the same ignoble origins as the lunatic 
asylum and the prIson. Not that Foucault argues so dogmatically, but 
Habermas's interpretation of him fixes upon this suspicion of Foucault's 
to the exclusion of the complexities that he articulates about the birth of 
modern reason and its connection with other more dangerous practices 
of dividing, exclusion and objectivication. 
It would be too easy to argue that Foucault has given up on the 
practice of truth claims; that all he writes is indeed only fiction 
designed to have effects but with no claim to be a better interpretation 
than any other. If this were the case then Habermas's charge that 
Foucault is caught within a performative contradiction would have some 
bite. For it would mean that one would be able to claim for the simple 
narrative of Enlightenment progress the same status as Foucault's 
interpretation of modernity. This simple narrative would include not only 
7 See Richard Bernstein's attempt to do just this In his Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism. 
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the privileging of reaso d" 
n an Its power of emancipation, but also the 
notion that there are subjects who are in control of their destiny 
through the transcendentalism of " 
conSCIousness. As a fiction this story 
would have no less claim to being heard than Foucault's, and its effects 
would have equal status with the effects F oucault himself creates 
through his genealogical historl"es. S h "t uc a Sl uation is obviously not 
what Foucault intends. That such a sl"tuatl"on "t ta h eXlS s me -t eoretically he 
would not deny. The conflict of interpretations is a brute fact that 
cannot be overcome. It is at this point that Habermas wants reflection 
upon what makes one interpretation better than another and for him this 
has to be the "force of the better argument". Just what this appeal to 
the tbetter argument' consists of, who decides what is and what is not 
an argument, and what criteria constitutes the better argument is of 
course not something that can be stated once and for all. In regard to 
Habermas's own position upon this situation of the plurality of universes 
of discourse it would be a gross misreading to argue that he believes 
that there can be a consensus wrought purely from dialogue.8 Foucault 
would agree with this scenario and yet his own work is shot through 
with the disinclination to reflect upon its own status as discourse. 
Whether this is such a critical fault as Habermas believes depends upon 
one's view of the situation of the plurality of interpretations in the first 
place. 
To argue that there is an irreducible plurality of interpretations of the 
world can for some, imply that every interpretation is relative and hence 
no interpretation is valid. Such a belief is a consequence of what 
8 On this point see Dieter Misgeld, "Modernity and Hermeneutics: A 
Critical-Theoretical Rejoinder" in Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. with an 
Introduction by Hugh J. Silverman (London and New York: Routledge, 
1991). 
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Richard Bernstein has called the "Cartesian AnXl"ety".9 The search for an 
Archimedian point upo h" h t n w IC 0 ground knowledge finds its first locus 
classicus in modern philosophy l"n D escartes' Meditations. Such a desire 
for one induitable principle is set up to be necessary by Descartes by 
situating its search within a journey of the soul which is beset by the 
terrifying possibilities of madness, darkness, evil demons, and drowning. 
Bernstein points out that the "spectre that hovers in the background of 
this journey is not just radical epistemological skepticism but the dread 
of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, where we can neither 
touch bottom nor support ourselves on the surface."] 0 Descartes sets up 
an apparently inescapable Either jOr according to Bernstein that has 
plagued modern philosophy ever since: 
Either there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the 
forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with 
intellectual and moral chaos.11 
It is this problematic or dichotomy between objectivism and relativism 
that Bernstein wishes to explore and ultimately dissolve In a 
Wittgensteinian manner as a non-problem. In so far as it is a problem to 
be addressed it is thus one that is to be solved therapeutically by 
showing that the dilemma that Descartes and other philosophers have 
placed us in is artificial. The attempt to ground our knowledge and 
values is a product of the anxiety we might existentially feel as a result 
of the very groundlessness of our knowledge and beliefs. As such, it is 
a product of immaturity, of an inability to come to terms with reality. 
Bernstein's reading of the situation is therefore, not just as something 
to be dismissed as a blind alley. Rather, it is an anxiety that has to be 
9 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 16. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Id. 
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worked through in order to "exorcize the Cartesl°an A 0 
nXlety and liberate 
ourselves from its seductive appeal. It 12 This process leads in some sense 
to enlightenment In the classic Kantian sense of maturity 
(Mundigkeit). A similar view about our response to the groundlessness of 
life is developed by a th A 0 no er merlcan, J. D. Caputo, in which the 
situation of radical uprootedness lOS to be f con ronted unwaveringly with 
a stoical heroicism.13 
What Bernstein and Caputo both take to be the unmitigated positive 
possibilities to be had from facing up to such a situation is for someone 
such as Habermas of itself a danger. To accept the nature of the 
situation as unavoidable IS one thing. This IS what Habermas both 
implicitly and explicitly does himself in the development of his theory of 
communicative action oriented to mutual understanding. It is, however, 
another thing to celebrate plurality and difference for its own sake, for 
this can so easily slip into a kind of irrationalist disregard for argument 
and dialogue. The notion of slippage here is very interesting insofar as 
the claims of communicative action are designed to prevent it from ever 
contaminating the prImary social good of uncoerced deliberation and 
evaluation. To be fair to Foucault, he does not simply celebrate or 
universalize the notion of difference. However, although his concern to 
"make differences: to constitute them as objects, to analyse them, and to 
define their concept" (AK,205) is a process with specific political effects 
in mind, just what these effects are is never fully thematized by 
Foucault. In this sense, it It is not unreasonable to see them as being 
the redressing of "asymmetric relationships between powerholders and 
those subject to power, as well as the reifying effect of technologies of 
12 Ibid. p. 19. 
13J • Caputo Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1987). 
power, which violate the moral and bodily integrity of subjects capable 
of speech and action" (PDM,284) 
This interpretation of Foucault's position goes against the grain of much 
of his attempt to dismantle the sovereignty of the subject. It is an 
interpretation that sees this attempt as failing in the sense that he 
himself remains caught in the political paradigms that are nourished by 
the sovereignty of consciousness. According to Mark Cousins and Athar 
Hussain, Foucault has not resolved the problem of the subject, or the 
possibility of the science of the individual, he has merely abandoned it 
with good reason. 14 They argue that Foucault provides a way of 
analysing social practices by focusing upon specific problematics. They 
argue that Foucault provides a way of analysing social practices by 
focusing upon specific problematics. These specific analyses circumvent 
the need for a general theory of the subject but nevertheless this does 
not do away with the problem of the subject as one that can arise in 
social analysis. Indeed, they argue that it surfaces in Foucault's own 
notion of "assujettisement". The technologies of subjectification that 
Foucault hypothesizes function by working on material which they argue 
has to be conceived in some basic sense as human being. The effects 
that these technologies have may indeed be systematic and liable to 
analysis but Cousins and Hussain's question is whether an analysis of 
the successes and failures of techniques of individuation can proceed by 
bracketing off the nature of the material on which those techniques 
work. A successful bracketing Issues in a form of behaviourism which 
still assumes that human beings are a tabula rasa, and thus also carries 
with it a theory of the subject. This is why they argue that it is 
14 Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, Michel Foucault, (London: Macmillan, 
1984), p. 255. 
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necessary to at least assume that the mate rI" al 
upon which techniques of 
subjectification work is already differentiated. 
In as much as Foucault gestures towards new ways of understanding the 
body he has to be necessarily vag d t" ue an cryp IC in order to avoid 
repetition of present understandings. This explains his comment that: "to 
imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present 
system." (LCP,230) How is one to understand this comment? At first it 
seems as if it IS a straightforward rejection of utopian thinking that 
separates itself off from the concrete realities of the present in order to 
set up another system floating in the realm of ideas. To simply imagine 
another system is not to escape the present one, it is only to tie oneself 
more closely to that which is the cause of imagining through a kind of 
negative reaction formation. From this perspective it would seem that 
what is being advocated is real change In the present system to 
eliminate the need for the imagining in the first place. This is very 
much Marx's argument about the phenomena of religion or indeed 
ideology In general. 15 However, I think that Foucault intends this 
remark to stand as a much more specific point about the nature and 
danger of imagining other regimes, systems or societies as replacements 
for our present ones. It is not the possibility of imagining otherwise 
that is the danger (Foucault makes this his critical slogan at man y 
points In his work), rather the danger IS the imagining of other 
rigourous systems such as the communist society that are to be 
implemented dogmatically.16 Once again we are returned to Foucault's 
15 K. Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" in Early Writings, 
ed L Colletti (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), pp. 244-5. 
16 Concomitant with this is the notion that the detailed imaginings of 
alternative societies actually contribute to the spread of oppressive 
modern power structures through their usage in the workings of "bio-
power". 
fear of the practice of creating alternatives to 
our present practices and 
the dogmas that they can so easily produce. 
I think it is necessary to be clear about h" t IS difference between specific 
programmes for the transformation of socI"ety and th e principle of 
change in general in Foucault's work. Foucault lOS bO unam Iguous about the 
importance of critique being "the historical analysis of the limits that 
are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them." (WE,50) This IS something he stresses repeatedly 
throughout his work. It IS when Foucault refuses to indicate the 
possibilities In going beyond such limits that he begins to get into 
trouble. It is not only that this refusal leads critics of Foucault to dub 
him a neo-conservative because of an apparent dislike of radical 
transformation. Rather it is hard to see how Foucault can justify such a 
quietist position within the terms of his own argument about the 
contingent historicality of society. If it is the preeminent role of the 
intellectual to engage in an historical analysis of the limits imposed on 
us then the experiment with the possibility of going beyond these limits 
is also an important task; one that cannot be done systematically by 
everyone In society. The engaged intellectual should not shirk this task 
through an argument that all such experiments lead to nightmare 
regimes that perpetuate and deepen the dangers of the present. Such an 
argument is itself a sweeping generalisation and thus susceptible to 
refutation. It not only implies that the possibility of all visionary ethical 
and political ideals degenerating into dogmatism necessarily means that 
they should be abandoned, but also surprisingly overestimates the 
causal efficacy of such ideals in the real world. 
230 
This is, of course, not to deny the importance of Foucault's insistence 
upon the preeminence of connecting the specific intellectual's work to 
the "daily struggles at grass roots level" f th h o ose w ose fight IS 
"located in the fine meshes of the web of power." (PK,116) That this 
connection has to be made is hardly a surprising one, however. The 
crux of the problem is not that Foucault does not offer hints for 
resistance but that he does not regard these hints as arising from a 
particular position in the first place. It is one thing to provide local 
analyses and specific genealogical histories of present practices in order 
for them to be used by others as they wish in their own struggles; it is 
another not to recognize that such intellectual tools emerge from their 
own specific history and bear their own interests and values. For 
Foucault not to reflect upon the status of the tools (or rather texts) he 
produces for the use of others leaves a serious lacuna in his own 
reflection. 
One might see this as merely the resolute acceptance of the 
groundlessness of his production. It would from this perspective be 
churlish to demand of Foucault grounds for his work when he has 
merely by-passed this problem as a non-problem; as something that 
cannot be provided. This, however, does not excuse Foucault from 
providing an understanding of this situation of groundlessness and its 
implication for ethics and politics. That some have found this implication 
to be intolerable explains the continued demand for something more than 
just "the cool facade of radical historicism." (PDM,275) and the 
reluctance to let Foucault off lightly when he says there is danger in 
everything: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything 
is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If 
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everything IS danger th do.17 ous, en we always have something to 
This distinction between bad and dangerous may be permissible 
regard to one's existential attitude towards the world but as soon as one 
attempts to specify the dangers of the present, one has to have criteria 
as to why they are dangers and for whom. Foucault explains that this 
attitude leads not to "apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism" 
and one might wonder why this is so? In what way does the recognition 
that the world is a dangerous place lead to activism instead of passive 
withdrawal? The answer of course is because the dangers of the world 
are to be evaluated, as Foucault himself immediately insists upon: 
I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make 
every day is to determine which is the main danger.18 
Indeed, it is not just that the dangers are to be described neutrally 
and then evaluated as to which have to be given priority; the very 
decision to pronounce everything as potentially dangerous is an 
evaluative one in the first place. Moreover, it is an evaluation which 
displays a far more utopian attitude to the scope of critical thought 
than Foucault is prepared to acknowledge. Foucault cannot have it both 
ways. He cannot argue that critique can only succeed by becoming local, 
specific and contingent and justify this by a universal appeal to the 
danger of everything. Certainly one can sympathise with the attitude of 
constant vigilance but one should not forget that such an attitude IS 
one specific cultural response amongst others. Just how specific such a 
response this is, is pointed out by Foucault himself In his text "What is 
Enlightenment?". Here, he quite remarkably suggests that it was Kant 
17 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics" in The Foucault Reader, 
p. 343. 
18 Ibid. 
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that initiated a new way of thinking about philosophy and its relation to 
the historical present. It is Kant who fl·rst k 
as s, according to Foucault, 
"What are we? in a very precise moment of history.,,19 This new way of 
thinking is not "doctrinal" but rather: 
the permanent reactivation of an attitude _ 
philosophical ethos that could be described 
critique of our historical era. (WE,42) 
that IS, of a 
as a permanent 
This attitude IS for Foucault a defining characteristic of modernity. 
Modernity for him is not to be "situated on a calendar" preceded by a 
naive premodernity and followed by a troubling postmodernity. It IS an 
attitude of critique that does not "search for formal structures with 
universal value," but is "a historical investigation into events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as su bjects of 
what we are doing, thinking, saying." (WE,46) 
To acknowledge this tradition and one's position within it in this late 
reflection, IS quite remarkable In the light of some of the more 
disparaging criticisms of Foucault as an irrationalist and nihilist. That it 
should seem so remarkable is the product of two major confusions aboul 
Foucault. First, the interpretation of him as abolishing the su bject and 
the concept of man and hence of doing away with any hope for a 
politics that places human beings at the centre of its discourse. Second, 
the interpretation of Foucault that sees him as doing away with any 
notion of liberation because of its appeal to a human essence that 
embodies the liberated state. That Foucault IS open to such an 
interpretation as an irrationalist and nihilist is certainly no doubt due 
19 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", Mterword to BSH,216. 
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to the ambiguities of his rhetoric. It 
IS not hard to read Foucault's 
statements in OT as apocalyptic: 
Rather than the. death of God - or, rather, in the wake of t~at deat~ and In profound correlation with it _ what 
NIetzsche s thought heralds is the end of his murderer" it IS 
the explosion of man's face in laughter, and the return' of 
masks (OT,385) 
However, no one should seriously accuse Foucault of dismissing the 
problem of the subject and the political implications of such a concept. 
The "dispersion of man" that Foucault so optimistically heralds In OT is 
a specific experience and strategy that Nietzsche inaugurated In order 
to awaken one from the "Anthropological Sleep" that Kant initiated 
before him by positing cman ' as the foundation of thought. Man is not to 
be the simple and unproblematic centre of thinking and discourse for 
"man is a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old." (OT ,xxii) 
and destined to disappear as soon as know ledge takes a new form. The 
objection that this knowledge forms at the point of the subject is 
precisely why Foucault wishes to ask the question who is speaking and 
to what ends and difference? The su bject is not to be taken as the 
privileged origin of discourse: 
We should suspend the typical questions: how does a free 
subject penetrate the density of things and endow them 
with meaning; how does it accomplish its design by 
animating the rules of discourse from within? Rather, we 
should ask: under what conditions and through what forms 
can an entity like the subject appear in the order of 
discourse; what position does it occupy; what function does 
it exhibit; and what rules does it follow in each type of 
discourse? (LCP,137-8) 
It IS important to realize that a critique of the subject as the 
transcendental origin of meaning does not mean an anti-humanism that 
reduces human beings to cogs in an objective world process. Such an 
implication would mean that one had not escaped the binary metaphysics 
that made the subject the privileged centre of thlOngs IOn the first place. 
Rather, the task as Foucault t came 0 see lOt , was an historical 
investigation "of the different modes by whloch, In our culture, human 
beings are made subjects. ,,20 What is interesting is that later on in this 
essay Foucault uses the concept of liberation in a fairly traditional way: 
The conclusion would be that the political ethical, social, 
philosophical problem of our days is not ~o try to liberate 
the individual from the state's institutions, but to liberate 
us both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to 
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of 
this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for 
several centuries.21 
Once again we have the mention of "new forms of subjectivity" which 
echoes the "different economy of bodies and pleasures" of HS,1. We are 
cautiously told by Foucault that: 
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, 
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build 
up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political 
'double bind,' which is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures.22 
Refusing what we are IS bound up with an imagining of what we could 
be; it is in other words determinate rather than abstract, even if these 
determinations are themselves imagined narratives. And yet Foucault 
offers us little detail about these new ways of being. It would seem that 
Foucault is himself in a double bind here. The concept of critique is 
bound up with a refusal; for Foucault a refusal of w hat we are now, and 
yet this refusal has to be in the name of something else otherwise it 
20 Ibl·d. 208 p. • 
21 Ibid. p. 216 
22 Ibid. 
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loses all meaning as a refusal. One cannot simply negate everything; 
cannot refuse the present without a future or past with which to define 
this refusal. For Foucault, quite clearly it IS the promise of the future 
rather than the nostalgia of the past that animates the attitude of 
critique. His IS a philosophical ethos based upon the possibilities of the 
future and yet shorn of any telos of progress, of any hope that one can 
discern in the present the potential for improvement in the future. In 
one sense this can be adjudged to be the product of a fiercely anti-
utopian position born of a equally fierce mistrust of traditional 
narratives of liberation and domination. In another sense it can hardly 
be more utopian in its ascetic refusal of the possibilities pregnant within 
the present. Might we not also say that it is a specific cultural response 
that values the ethic of a constant disengagement from narrative 
imagination and that itself implies a tacit narrative about existence. With 
Nietzsche one should ask here: "What then is the meaning of ascetic 
ideals?,,23 
To take an example from Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that the 
"dream of a perfect society" was not just the prOVInce of the 
philosophers and the jurists but was also a "military dream of society". 
(DP,205) Such a dream we are presumably led to believe has gained a 
substantial reality in the "carceral society" of the modern West. We are 
also presumably supposed to be critical of this danger not least because 
it has been an essential element of the twin excesses of Stalinism and 
fascism. If we are to be critical of this objectification and disciplining of 
human beings it is certainly not in the name of the rights of individual 
subjects. For these are precisely effects of discipline in the first place: 
"Discipline tmakes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power 
23 F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, p. 102. 
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that regards individuals both as obJ"ects and . Instruments of its 
exercise. " (DP,170) Foucault IS of course typically silent about an 
alternative to the West's great rationalizing, bureaucratizing and 
Presumably a dismantling of such structures objectivizing structures. 
might be in order but not in a systematic way! Curiously he does give a 
brief indication as to why the structure of the Panopticon is limiting In 
relation to a positive possibility when he says of the prisoner: 
~e is se~n, but he does not see; he is the object of 
InformatIon, never a subject in communication. (DP,200) 
One might reasonably ask who this "subject in communication" could be 
except a further extension of the disciplinary matrix. Indeed this IS 
precisely what Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality, when he 
contends that the practice of subjects in communication oriented to self-
understanding and liberation of the true self contains a power matrix 
that IS oppressive precisely because of its unintended and 
unacknowledged effects. 
Another hypothesis Foucault puts forward In DP IS that the human 
sciences are born out of the disciplinary techniques of surveillance, 
normalization and examination that began to flourish in the eighteenth 
century. This of itself is a reasonable hypothesis; it certainly would not 
be disputed by many practitioners of the human sciences. What IS 
disputable, and especially for such practitioners, is Foucault's argument 
that because these origins are "'ignoble' archives, where the modern 
play of coercion over bodies, gestures and behaviour has its 
beginnings", (DP,191) then by extension the consequent development of 
the human sciences IS irredeemably tainted with this ignobility and 
placed into question. It is important to recognise that this is not the 
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familiar argument that the status of the human SCIences IS questionable 
because they have not yet, nor ever will reach . sCIentific status (on the 
contrary it is the very establishment of a f f orm 0 scientificity in such 
disciplines that is of concern for Foucault). Rather, it is the genealogical 
argument that places a practice of the present into question because of 
its "ignoble" and lowly origins. 
Foucault sees genealogies not just as historical investigations but as 
strategic interventions In current struggles (PK,64,83). However, as 
Cousins and Hussain point out, such a genealogy can not aspire to a 
general critique and it can perform critical functions only under definite 
conditions. Its effects are limited because it IS but one particular 
strategy of critique.24 The ignoble origins of the human sciences may 
be revealed but for that to mean something now, ignobility has to 
function as a critical value which is connected with an epistemological 
value. Foucauldian genealogy may have no systematic epistemology but it 
relies crucially on functioning as an epistemological tribunal to succeed 
as a critical enterprise. Cousins and Hussain thus argue that a 
normative assessment of branches of knowledge cannot be displaced so 
easily. No genealogy of the human sciences can displace or stand in for 
a direct assessment of present theories of the human sciences. If it 
does, then the genealogist is performing exactly the same function as 
epistemologists have done. One might ask why, if genealogy shows that 
the origin and subsequent use of a phenomena are wide apart, then can 
this not apply to the human sciences in terms of their use now being 
beneficial? 
24 M. Cousins and A. Hussain, Michel Foucault, p. 264. 
238 
(iii) Dispersion as an Ascetic Utopia 
This problem of genealogy's critical judgement is quite clearly connected 
with the refusal of the active refiguration of the world. When Nietzsche 
practiced genealogy by tracing the origins of the values of good and 
evil, good and bad, and the notions of guilt and bad conscience; the 
"reward" of this "long, brave, industrious and subterranean 
seriousness" was the "cheerfulness" of "gay science". What is explicit In 
Nietzsche's fpolemic' is the critique of moral values; the questioning of 
the value of present values. For this "a knowledge of the conditions and 
circumstances In which they grew, under which they evolved and 
changed,,25 JS required but this know ledge IS subordinate to the 
reevaluation of all values. Genealogy reveals the base foundations of 
present glories but this baseness is so defined in relation to another 
value scheme. This is the goal of: 
a different kind of spirit from that likely to appear in this 
present age: spirits strengthened by war and victory, for 
whom conquest adventure, danger, and even pain have 
become needs.26 
Nietzsche is explicit about the value of genealogy for the promotion of 
"the redeeming man of great love and t " contemp , the "man of the 
future". All the same, he hardly produces a detailed account of the 
Ubermensch; that IS a task for those younger and IIfheavier with future' 
, NI"etzsche, but it is clear that without such a vision 
and stronger' than 
hI"S own diagnosis of the nihilism of the present as Nietzsche regards 
worthless. 
25 F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, p. 20. 
26 Ibid. p. 96. 
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To justify the description of Foucault's refusal to produce alternatives 
to the present as 
ascetic and hence utopian one only has to read 
Nietzsche's third essay in The G I 
enea ogy of Morals. Nietzsche suspects 
that "when a philosopher pays homage to th 
e ascetic ideal" it is a first 
"indication" that "he wants to gain release from a torture.,,27 Nietzsche 
is speaking broadly of philosophers who are "world-denying, hostile to 
life, suspicious of the senses,,28 and value asceticism for its release from 
physicality, multiplicity, and pain. Foucault's thought is steeped in an 
articulation of physicality, multiplicity, and pain and yet on another 
level one can interpret his refusal to engage in positive valuations as a 
desire to escape the ttorture' of values, of positive political choice. 
One immediately thinks of another intellectual who struggled with the 
problem of values in social science: Max Weber.29 Weber's celebrated 
attempt to create a value-free social science allows that the knowledge 
therein produced may only help to find the best means to achieve 
certain aims.30 It is logically impossible for an empirical discipline to 
establish, scientifically, ideals which define what tought to be'. This IS 
the basic premIse of neo-Kantian epistemology which Weber adheres to 
throughout his work. The social scientist should not promote her own 
values In her work and there IS a radical division between the 
production of impartial social science and one's own personal world-view. 
Foucault of course would dispute the possibility of value-free knowledge 
let alone social science. Weber's realm of values which is a source of 
27 Ibid. p. 106. 
28 Ibid. p. 116. 
29 Max Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. and Ed. E. Shils 
and H. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949). The similarities between 
Weber's and Foucault's interpretations of modernity are obvious, see S. 
K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, p. 120. 
30 Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 5. 
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irreconcilable antagonism and conflict In the world, I"S f 
or Foucault, to be 
extended to all discourse. 
However, the conclusions that Weber draws 
from this value conflict th I" h 
can row Ig t upon Foucault's own attitude to 
intellectual practice. 
Far from drawing the conclusion that pOll"tI"CS "1" 
was SImp y Irrational, 
Weber argued that a responsible, vocational political ethics can be 
achieved through a moral commitment that is disciplined by a rational 
assessment of the realistic possibilities of gaining one's ideals.31 This 
belief mirrors a similar belief in the possibility of vocational commitment 
in the face of the increasing rationalization of life. This notion of a 
vocation recalls the religious notion of a calling and it allows similar 
experiences of passion and the striving for perfection that are to be 
found in a religious calling, albeit in a thoroughly secular way. As 
Jeffrey Alexander points out: "To practise a vocation as the PuriL'l.ns did 
means to be disciplined by a moral spirit that facilitates the realization 
of the self. ,,32 
This interpretation uncannily echoes Foucault's remarks In HS,2 about 
the purpose of philosophical activity: 
After all, what would be the value of the passion for 
knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to 
the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of 
himself? ... The "essay" - which should be understood as the 
assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes 
changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others 
for the purpose of communication - is the living substance 
of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still 
31 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, tr. and ed. by H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (London: Routledge, 1948), p. 120 
32 Jeffrey Alexander "The Dialectic of Individuation and Domination: 
Weber's Rationalizatio~ Theory and Beyond", in Max Weber: Rationality 
and Modernity, ed. S. Whimster and S. Lash, (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1987), p. 200. 
what .it was in time~ past, ie., an "ascesis," askesis, an 
exerCIse of oneself In the activity of thought. (HS,2,8-9) 
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There are ObVl·0US dl·ffere h h 
nces ere, owever. Weber distinguishes 
between the sphere of the public and that of the private, and does not 
believe that the two should encroach upon the other's entirely different 
value spheres.33 The personal and private sphere of the aesthetic and 
erotic should not enter the sphere of science or economics. His whole 
work can be seen as an attempt to understand how one can orientate 
oneself In the modern world given the tremendous development of 
rationalization and the disenchantment of the world through the 
extension of the scientific perspective. In this respect he proposed an 
ethic of personal responsibility that is embedded within the philosophy 
of the subject. It is the subject who chooses how to respond to the 
modern world but independent of how the world is: 
We cannot read off the meaning of the world from our 
investigation of it however perfect, rather we have to create 
th O • 1 34 IS meanIng ourse ves. 
For Weber the human universe is characterised by the existence of 
irreducibly competing ideals. Since there is no single ideal or set of 
ideals which can be shown by scientific analysis to be right or wrong, 
there can be no universal ethics: 
The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of 
knowledge is that it must know that we c~nnot lear.n the it 
meaning of the world from the resu.lts of It~ .analysIs, be 
ever so perfect; it must rather be In a poSItion to c~eate 
this meaning itself. It must recognise that general VIews of 
life and the universe can never be the products of 
increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest id~als, 
which move us most forcefully, are always formed only In 
33 Echoing Kant's distinction in "What is Enlightenment?" between the 
public and private use of reason. 
34 Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 56. 
the struggle with other ideals whl"ch "t 
are JUS as sacred to 
others as ours are to us. 35 
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This distinction between different I 
va ue spheres IS something that 
Foucault obviously does not believe is possible in reality. Indeed it is 
precisely the "will to knowledge" that has to be investigated and 
questioned for the effects it has produced in the West over the last two 
thousand years. Whereas, for Weber, the status of empirical cognitive 
explanation is fairly secure; for Foucault, its entwinement with practices 
of exclusion, marginalisation, objectification and su bjectification signal its 
dethronement as the undisputed intellectual response to the world. In an 
1983 interview Foucault reveals just how close and yet also how far he 
is from Weber's notion of the intellectual practice as a calling in the 
form of a vocation: 
But if I refer to my own personal experience I have the 
feeling know ledge can't do anything for us and that political 
power may destroy us ... All this is related not to what I 
think theoretically (I know that's wrong) but I speak from 
personal experience.... I am not interested in the academic 
status of what I am doing because my problem is my own 
transformation ... This transformation of one's self by one's 
own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the 
aesthetic experience. (PPC, 14 ) 
In terms of the value of knowledge, scholarship, and theory for the 
benefit of the self, Foucault could not be more emphatic. The 
relationship between thought and the self is as passionate here as it is 
in Weber's vocational commitment, but there IS a major difference. For 
Foucault, such a relationship is justified in aesthetic terms; it is in the 
service of the broader task of creating one's self through an aesthetics 
of existence; a case of giving style to one's life and making it beautiful. 
35 Ibid. p. 57. 
One is reminded of Nietzsche's famous doctrine that "it ]S only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon th t . a eXIstence and the ld wor are eternally 
justified. ,,36 For Nietzsche this is an acceptance of ,. 
man s Irredeemable 
judging activity that remains even after the "death 
of God". Foucault's 
notion differs sharply from Nietzsche's sweeping revaluation of all values 
and artistic creation of the world in the way it seems to focus upon the 
intensely private life of the individual. There seems to be no attempt to 
connect this aestheticism of one's existence to the public inter-
subjective world. It is in this apparent privatisation of the ethical that 
Foucault's position appears at its weakest and seems to justify criticisms 
of it as neo-conservative. 
In what ways can Foucault's correlation of intellectual practice and self-
transformation be linked to the wider area of politics? Are we to think 
of this correlation as a source of new political practices that focus upon 
the personal as the preeminent sphere for radical change? If so, what is 
the status of the personal in this model; what are the conditions of 
SUbjectivity that Foucault invokes when he calls for the aesthetics of 
the self? Are we to take his thought as indicating a utopian relation to 
present constitutions of subjectivity; one which, borrowing from his 
genealogies of the subject, breaks radically with existing sources of 
political motivation such as human rights or the dignity and satisfaction 
of subjects? Or can one incorporate this notion of self-transformation 
into existing models of revolutionary political transformation? For 
example, does it provide an instance of how the critical theory of a 
society can be internalized and used by individuals to further their 
36 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, tr. W. Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967), p. 52. See also R. Schroeder "Nietzsche and Weber: 
Two Prophets of the Modern World", in Max Weber: Rationality and 
Modernity. 
emancipation along the lines of a to ° 
crea lve pracbce of existence? One 
criticism of critical theory has b 
een its tendency towards abstraction 
and its subsequent inablollOty t f t 37 
o os er social change. Perhaps 
Foucault's linkage of critical practice to an aesthetics of existence 
provides the connections lacklOng ° h In suc abstractions. That critical 
theories of society are . t ta ° In erpre bons of an already pre-interpreted 
world means that such interpretations have to be accepted by 
individuals in order to provide frameworks for action and change. If one 
accepts that this "double hermeneutic,,38 is a crucial element of any 
interpretation of society and once one sees the importance of connecting 
such interpretations to the self-interpretations of individuals then 
perhaps Foucault's notion of an aesthetics of existence can be seen In a 
more positive light. Whether such a notion IS not too utopian and 
romantic in its emphasis upon human expression is a separate question. I 
want to suggest, following Ricoeur, that the normative content of any 
theory that proposes such change will necessarily have an element that 
can be designated utopian in the sense of its distantiation from that 
which is in existence. This applies as much to a genealogy at the limits 
as it does to a critical theory of society and it is for this reason that 
genealogy as a ceaseless transgression is suspect to the charge of 
utopianism. 
37 See for ego T. McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy, or the 
Seducements of Systems Theory" and Dieter Misgeld, "Critical 
Hermeneutics versus Neo-Parsonianism" who argues that the theory of 
communicative action hovers over the heads of acting and communicating 
citizens and for it to be practically enlightening they need to translate 
it into the situated contexts of their practically organized lives. Both in 
New German Critique, Spring/Summer 1985. Similarly John B. Thompson 
argues: "How the results of a therapeutic dialogue enter into the 
practical deliberations of a subject population is nowhere specified in 
any detail, and hence the way in which theoretical statements provide a 
basis for political strategies remains unclear." Critical Hermeneutics: A 
Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jiirgen Habermas, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 173. 
38 See A. Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987), pp. 18-21. 
For Foucault, it IS the h· h emp aSIs upon t e search for truth and 
grounding of value that prevents the formulation of questions about the 
formation of social practices intimately bound up with such 
preoccupations in the first place. One particular epistemological concept 
of critique that he is sceptical of is that of ideology. In an interview he 
sketches three reasons why the concept of ideology is problematic: 
The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual 
opposition to something else which is supposed to count as 
truth. Now I believe that the problem does not consist in 
drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls 
under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which 
comes under some other category, but in seeing historically 
how effects of truth are produced within discourses which 
in themselves are neither true nor false. The second 
drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think 
necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, 
ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something 
which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, 
economic determinant, etc. For these three reasons, I think 
that this is a notion that cannot be used without 
circumspection. (PK,118) 
This scepticism about the notion of ideology illuminates Foucault's 
distrust of normative foundations for critique. Traditionally a concept of 
ideology implies a negative evaluation of it in relation to a correct or 
ftrue' analysis of conditions. One of the most important problems In 
theories of ideology IS the fact that they give rIse to intractable 
problems of justification. If ideology is an evaluative term; if its very 
use conveys a critical note and calls for a process of critique, then how 
d to others be characterized as can some discourse, as oppose 
ideological? How can one stand outside of social life and assess the 
discourse of others, when that interpretation IS but anoLher 
interpretation. 
One solution to this intractable problem IS the distinction between 
SCIence and ideology which places critical discourse on the side of 
science and the ftruth'. This is in some sense the answer proposed by 
Althusser in his theorisation of Marxism as a science of history and it is 
this distinction between science and ideology that Foucault finds so 
problematic. 
Althusser attempted to formulate Marxism as a SCIence of history by 
claiming that Marx's theoretical revolution of social analysis bore the 
same epistemological features as traditional scientific revolutions. This 
was achieved by importing Bachelard's historical epistemology into the 
field of social theory in order to draw a distinction between Marxist 
science and pre-scientific understandings of the social world. Scientific 
knowledge in this respect, always constitutes itself through a break with 
ordinary experience on to another conceptual plane and such knowledge 
can never be satisfactorily translated back into ordinary experience. 
Thus, Marx's later writing becomes the paradigm of SCIence, In the sense 
that it breaks completely with ordinary understanding of the world and 
ideology becomes a relation to this scientific understanding. This is not 
in the sense of empirical, but In the sense of fundamental knowledge 
which provides the framework for a correct understanding of society. 
For orthodox Marxism the real basis of history for understanding history 
is the forces and relations of production and not the determination of 
individuals in determinate conditions. Ideology is thus defined against 
whatever Marxism identifies as the real basis of history and the object 
of Marxist science becomes the correct knowledge of the real basis, ie. 
the forces and relations of production. 
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Althusser IS the most radical proponent of a form of this orthodox 
Marxism. The theoretical structure of Marxism IS emphasized at the 
expense of versions of it as a philosophy of praxis or as a specific 
historical political movement. Th" tOt t" IS cons 1 u Ion of a scientific Marxism 
necessarily has to eliminate references to 
"real individuals" as th e 
essence and end of history because the point of view of the individual 
is not a structural, that is, scientific point of view. Althusser argues in 
For Marx: 
Strictly in respect to theory, therefore, one can and must 
speak openly of Marx's theoretical anti-humanism and see in 
this theoretical anti-humanism the absolute (negative) 
precondition of the (positive) knowledge of the human world 
itself, and of its practical transformation. It is impossible to 
knqw anything about men except on the absolute 
precondition that the philosophical (theoretical) myth of man 
is reduced to ashes.39 
In defence of this theory he attempts to provide a more sophisticated 
interpretation of the relation between infrastructure and superstructu re; 
one that would seek to answer criticisms such as Foucault's, that the 
superstructure is always In a secondary position In such models of 
society. 
Althusser's attempt at purifying Marxism from its degenerate verSlons as 
a political creed stem from his belief that it should be the "theoretical 
domain of a fundamental investigation, indispensable not only to the 
development of the science of society and of the varIOUS thuman 
sciences,' but also to that of the natural sciences and philosophy. ,,40 
Ironically, Althusser's position can be seen to arise preeminently from 
the specific historical conditions that made the task of preserving the 
39 For Marx, p. 229-30. 
40 Louis Althusser, For Marx, tr. B. Brewster (London Verso, 1969), p. 
26. 
theoretical structure of Marxism seem imperative if it was not to fall 
prey to all kinds of positivist philosophies and opportunist distortions.41 
Subsequent criticisms of Alth' . Usser s assumptIon that Marxism was or 
should be a science necessarily question this notion of a scientific 
history of Marxism. Robert Young points out that the difficulties in 
which Althusser subsequently became involved were a result of his 
ignoring Canguilhem's warning that although the history of science takes 
science for its object, it is not itself a science, and therefore cannot 
claim to be value-free, ie. non-ideological.42 Gregory Elliot points out 
that Althusser allied Marxism with non-Marxist philosophy whilst claiming 
to be a strict adherent of Marxist science. Elliot quotes Martin Jay and 
calls Althusser "the most promiscuous (of Western Marxists) in allowing 
non-Marxist influences to affect his ideas" and wonders whether 
Althusser escaped the fGerman Ideology' only to be bewitched by the 
French.43 
It is clear where Foucault stands in relation to this problematic. It IS 
not the possibility of constructing a science of human being that IS of 
concern (indeed such a possibility already exists In the objectivisations 
of various human sciences) but the very fact that Marxism constitutes 
one such form of savoir that is his objection to it: 
But to all these demands of: tIs it or is it not a science?', 
the genealogies or the genealogists would reply: 'If you 
really want to know, the fault lies in your very 
41 See Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London: Verso, 
1987) "The Moment of Althusser". 
42 See Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West., p. 
:~. Althusser: The Detour of Theory, p. 67. A good a.ccount of the histo~y 
f t t I M . and the influence of Althusser can be found In o s ruc ura arXIsm . 
Ted Benton, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism, (London: MacmIllan, 
1984). 
determination to make a science out of Marxism or 
psychoanalysis or this or that study'. If we have any 
objection against Marxism, it lies in the fact that it could 
effectively be a science.(PK,169) 
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This criticism is based on a questioning of the desire to aspIre to the 
kind of power that is presumed to accompany the possession of such a 
sCIence. It is also apparently aimed at the idea of a theoretical avant-
garde who legitimate certain practices, rules of construction and 
concepts at the same time as disqualifying other types of knowledge. 
Althusser's distinction between scientific Marxism and ideological thought 
is one obvious target in this questioning. Indeed, Foucault argues in OT 
that Marx was a figure firmly embedded In the nineteenth century and 
that far from initiating a radical break In the theories of social, 
economIC and political analysis was a man of his time. Even more 
provocatively for Althusserian Marxists, Foucault suggests that it was 
Ricardo that initiated the break In economic theory that Marx was an 
heir to, by conceiving of value as a product of labour rather than a 
sign of exchange. 44 
Foucault argues that: 
At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism 
introduced no real discontinuity; ... Though it is in opposition 
to the tbourgeois' theories of economics, and though this 
opposition leads it to use the project of a radical reversal 
of History as a weapon against them, that conflict and that 
project nevertheless have as their condition of possibility, 
not the reworking of all History, but an event that any 
archaeology can situate with precision, and that prescribed 
simultaneously, and according to the same mode, both 
nineteenth- century bourgeois economics and nineteenth-
century revolutionary economics. (OT ,262) 
44 See OT ,254. 
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Foucault relates this new arrangement of knowledge constituted In the 
f f " . f orm 0 a serIes, 0 sequential connection, and of development" to the 
revival of "utopias of ultimate development" (OT,262): 
The great dream of an end to History is the utopia of causal 
systems of thought, just as the dream of the world's 
beginnings was the utopia of the classifying systems of 
thought. (OT ,263) 
Marxism's dialectical promise IS merely one example of such utopias and 
when it IS legitimated by an appeal to scientific truth IS dou bly 
dangerous. The role of such scientific arbitration IS one that Foucault 
refuses to adopt. It was Nietzsche who according to Foucault "burned 
for us... the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology." 
(OT,263) and it is since Nietzsche that the question of truth has been 
transformed from "What is the surest path to Truth?" to "What is the 
hazardous career that Truth has followed?" (PK,66) In this respect, 
Althusser's intervention in Marxist theory, although motivated by many 
specific historical and political events can be seen as one more example 
of this career of "Truth" in Western civilization. Foucault's questions are 
posed in relation to this career: 
Science, the constraint to truth, the obligation of truth and 
ritualised procedures for its production have traversed 
absolutely the whole of Western society for millenia and are 
now so universalised as to become the general law for all 
civilisations. What is the history of this fwill to truth'? What 
are its effects? How is all this interwoven with relations of 
power? (PK,66) 
Instead of thinking of political problems In terms of SCIence and 
ideology, Foucault argues that they should be thought of in terms of 
ftruth' and fpower'. In this schema the task is not to change people's 
consciousness but of "ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new 
251 
politics of truth". (PK,133) It IS necessary to question the very 
aspirations we may have when we desire the kind of power that IS 
presumed to accompany scientific discourse. The demand trs it a 
science?' automatically entaI·ls a d· l·f· t· f IS qua I Ica Ion 0 other types of 
knowledge. More especially, the claim that one IS conducting a scientific 
discourse often means that one IS attempting to legitimate a particular 
political avant-garde. This IS certainly the case with Althusser's 
theoretical intervention. The attempt to establish the scientificity of 
Marxism is for Foucault an attempt to invest it with the effects of power 
attributed to science and the central effect In most cases IS the 
establishing of the one ttrue' interpretation of society and the one 'true' 
course of action to be taken in the light of this interpretation. 
Foucault is hardly alone In his scepticism about this project for a 
sCIence of society. Critical theorists of society have stressed the 
irreducibly interpretive nature of theory and critique also.45 However, 
where he differs from such thinkers IS In his response to this 
interpretive element. Far from seeing it as a situation that calls for 
meta-reflection about the conditions and limits of interpretive 
understanding in order to ascertain the possibilities for the formation of 
quasi-transcendental or regulative ideals of critical reason, he regards it 
as a situation that warrants the Nietzschean hypothesis of interpretive 
force. Here meaning, as we have seen, results from the successful 
imposition of an interpretation. It is this notion of success or victory 
that we shall see destabilises Foucault's own emphasis upon the 
subjugated as a critical principle. 
45 See, for example, "Hermeneutics and Social Theory" In A. Giddens, 
Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1982), for a 
sketch of the demise of the positivistic consensus about social theory. 
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The admission of partial interests for a universalist such as Habermas is 
inexcusable. For him, such a declaration vitiates any claims that Foucault 
seeks to make about the nature of the present or the past. It is 
difficult to see why this IS the case, however. That IS, unless Habermas 
IS working with a strong notion of the (truth' In which truth claims are 
warranted only if they are ahistorical. All that can be said of Foucault's 
work is that it is specific and local, which does not exclude truth 
understood as a use value and indeed maybe IS conducive to the 
production of truth claims that are pertinent to the present. Habermas' 
fear is that unless there is an appeal to the universal then a critique 
cannot claim validity for all and thus cannot claim validity. Why a 
critique cannot be in the serVIce of a part of society, or a particular 
historical group at a particular time IS not addressed by Habermas' 
totalising of social critique. The only other way In which Foucault can 
avoid this charge of partiality (and by extension falsity on Habermas' 
strong model of truth), is by arguing that he is not engaged ln 
evaluation but rather In practising a pure historiography stripped off 
any relation other than describing.46 This of course IS not only 
impossible but something Foucault actively renounces: 
Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their 
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and 
place, their preferences in a controversy - the unavoidable 
obstacles of their passion. Nietzsche's version of historical 
sense is explicit in its perspective and acknowledges its 
system of injustice. Its perspective is slanted, being a 
deliberate appraisal, affirmation, or negation; it reaches the 
lingering and poisonous traces in order to prescribe the 
best antidote. (NGH,90) 
46 This is something Habermas thinks is Foucault's real intention when 
he quotes Paul Veyne, who describes Foucault as the "historian in a 
pure state." See PDM,275. 
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(iv) Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault: Three Physicians of Culture 
What is absent In Foucault's project IS precisely what he ascribes to 
Nietzsche: "the best antidote" to the present's problems and dangers. 
Nietzsche is precisely the thinker who evaluates, appraises, affirms and 
negates and it IS curious why, even with such an explicit 
acknowledgement of this crucial aspect of Nietzsche's thinking, Foucault 
refuses himself to do the same. Might we not say that it is here that he 
imitates the paralysis of the present?47 
For Nietzsche, the history of philosophy is a history of ressentiment; a 
history of ideas that are fundamentally life-negating. The Ubermensch is 
free from revenge because he cannot show pity or slander the earth, 
both of which breed revenge. The Ubermensch embodies an active 
redemption In that he unifies time through the will which IS the 
liberator and bringer of joy: "To redeem the past and to transform 
every {It was' into and {I wanted it thus!' that alone do r call 
redemption. ,,48 The "It was" causes teeth gnashing and lonely affliction 
for the will is powerless in the face of it. Redemption cannot overcome 
the past by willing backwards for this IS impossible; the will IS 
imprisoned to only will forward. All revenge arIses precisely out of this 
inability of the will to will backwards in time: "This, yes, this alone, is 
revenge itself: the will's antipathy toward time and time's {It was'. ,,49 
Zarathustra teaches that the will is a creator and to create is the 
opposite of revenge. Creation is redemption from time precisely because 
47 See Ricoeur, Ideology and Utopia, p. 313. 
48 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, 
iHarmondsworth, Penguin, 1961), p. 161. 
9 Ibid. p. 151. 
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the will says 
"1 willed it thus". To create for Nietzsche IS to be 
reconciled with time. 
The ultimate expression of this will to create indeed the highest possible 
formula for the forward looking will free from ressentiment is the will to 
the eternal recurrence of the same. This courage destroys giddiness at 
the abysses that temporal being produces: "Courage, however, is the 
best destroyer, courage that attacks: it destroys even death, for it says: 
tWas that life? Well then! Once again!,,,50 
Nietzsche's project IS thus, irredeemably axiological. Heidegger 
recognizes the importance of this totalisation of self-assertion for 
Nietzsche and concludes that the doctrine of the will to power is the 
keystone of his thought and that this inheritance from traditional 
Western thought bounds him to the past he IS seeking to overcome. In 
his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger shows how all of Nietzsche's doctrines 
even down to the eternal recurrence depend upon the will to power. 51 
The doctrine is a break from substance metaphysics but is similarly 
trapped in metaphysics because it is merely a inversion of its ultimate 
foundations and hence Nietzsche IS the consummate nihilist in which the 
will to power IS the ultimate reality, transforming the negative 
Schopenhaurian model of the will into a creative and yea-saying 
positivity. For Heidegger, this is ultimately meaningless and leads to a 
deeper enslavement in nihilism. Being for Nietzsche, the will to power, IS 
nothing but will to will; a will that wills its own perpetuation. 
50 Ibid. p. 178. 
51 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, (4 vols) tr. by J. Stamburgh, D. F. Krell, 
and F. A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1979, 1982, 1984, 1987). 
For Heidegger, Nietzsche's will to will is no mere curiosity in the history 
of ideas because the epochs of metaphysics are the epochs of world 
history. 52 Pure WI "II I"S b d" d " em 0 Ie In contemporary technological world 
disclosure in which nature becomes a relationship of forces which can be 
represented as a system, a calculable energy supply. This energy supply 
IS for a rapacious subject and this scientific-technological world 
disclosure IS the tbad destiny' of Western metaphysics. But other 
disclosures are possible, and indeed urgent. 
Whereas Nietzsche believes that ressentiment is overcome by the will to 
power of the Ubermensch, Heidegger finds the very essence of nihilism 
In this will to power. Nietzsche's Ubermensch still moves In the 
parameters of representational thinking. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's idea 
of time is a metaphysical idea, a product of representational thinking. It 
IS basically a succeSSIon of discrete tnows ' and belongs to the ordinary 
conception of time rooted In the will to calculate and count. The 
Ubermensch is from Heidegger's viewpoint the last man and Nietzsche is 
a nihilist despite his best intentions.53 
For Heidegger the essence of nihilism is thinking In terms of values. He 
quotes in "The Word Of Nietzsche" what Nietzsche understands by value: 
"The point of VIew of (value' is the point of view constituting the 
preservation-enhancement conditions with respect to complex forms of 
relative duration of life within becoming. ,,54 Value as a kind of seeing IS 
always related to some form of life and ultimately to some form of will. 
52 M. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: tGod is dead'" in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. W. Lovitt (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1977), p. 107. 
53 See M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, tr. J. G. Gray (New York, 
Harper and Row, 1968), p. 104, see also p. 109 
54 "The Word of Nietzsche: (God is dead''', p. 71, see also p. 75. 
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Values and the will to power are th I us corre ative. Nietzsche's project of 
trans-valuation is thus nihilistic precisely because of it being a trans-
valuation: 
!f, however~ v.alue does not let Being be Being, does not let 
It be what It IS as Being itself, then this supposed 
overcoming is above all the consummation of nihilism. For 
now metaphysics not only does not think Being itself but 
this not-thinking of Being clothes itself in the illusio'n that 
it does think Being in the most exalted manner, in that it 
es~eems Being as a value, so that all suestions concerning 
BeIng become and remain superfluous. 5 
Thinking In terms of values IS a "murdering" of Being. It IS animated 
precisely by the spirit of revenge and because of this Nietzsche's 
overcoming of metaphysics only exacerbates the problem. 
In opposition to Nietzsche's attempt, Heidegger argues for a meditative, 
commemorative thinking as an overcoming of revenge and ressentiment. 56 
Life is filled with revengeful thinking and to advocate a thinking free 
from this, one has to transform one's relation to language and abdicate 
the attempt to will a better life. However, this is not simply to become a 
bystander to the difficulty of life, for ressentiment saturates the 
perspective of impartiality more than anything else. 
Heidegger's response to Nietzsche's replacement of philosophy with a 
genealogy of morals IS typically violent In his characterization of 
Nietzsche as the last thinker of the West; the culmination of Western 
onto-theo-Iogical thinking rather than its overcoming. What is clear, 
however, is that Nietzsche's own understanding of his relationship to 
this tradition is one of physician. Nietzsche does not shy away from this 
55 Ibid. p. 104. 
56 See M. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, tr. J. M. Anderson and E. H. 
Freund, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). 
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role of interpreter of the decadence and nihilism that he argues has 
beset the West at least since the tIO me of ' Socrates introduction of 
dialectics into Greek society. 57 Tho 0 0 IS crItIque of nihilism IS quite 
explicitly linked to the philosophy of the future, to the Ubermensch; it 
IS unashamedly optimistic and vital. This particular Nietzschean 
characteristic is as J. G. Merquior points out peculiarly lacking in the 
work of Foucault.58 It is not that Foucault is simply disinclined to offer 
judgements on the present but rather that such judgements are made 
with no consistent valuation or affirmation. Indeed Merquior recognizes 
that Foucault does pass judgement upon the present but that this 
judgement is rendered meaningless by his monolithic view of power and 
totalisation of discipline throughout the whole of society: 
by seeing power everywhere, and by equating (in most of 
his work) culture with domination ... actually ~reatly reduced 
the explanatory force of his power concepts. 
Without a point from which to conduct his analysis of power, Foucault is 
once again deemed to have failed in his attempt to radically transform 
the analysis of politics. That Foucault wished to so radically transform 
the theory and practice of struggle is perhaps a misconstrual of his own 
intellectual practice, however. It is hardly correct to say that Foucault 
was a dark pessimist about man and history, and at the same time argue 
that he intended to radically transform the analysis of power in order to 
provide solutions to the classic questions of domination and liberation 
addressed by previous power analyses. If Foucault is to be a pessimist 
this should surely extend to that most optimistic linkage of human 
thought; the pairing of reason with emancipation. At the same time those 
57 F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, tr. R. J. Hollingdale 
&Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 31. 
8 J. G. Merquior, Foucault, (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 145. 
59Ibid• p. 156. 
~58 
who would see Foucault's fpolitical anatomy' as the "clearest and most 
fully developed version of a new political theory and practice that is 
just beginning to emerge from the discrediting of both Marxism and 
reformism" 60 are equally excessive In their estimation of Foucault's 
intentions In providing new perspectives upon the elusive concept of 
power. 
Where does this leave Foucault's work? In The Twilight of the Idols, 
Nietzsche characterises Socratic thought as dialectic which is chosen 
only in the last resort in the attempt to live the good life. The Socratic 
administration of dialectics to Greek society is taken to be already a 
sign of decadence and decline by Nietzsche: 
One chooses dialectics only when one has no other 
expedient. One knows that dialectics inspire mistrust, that 
they are not very convincing.61 
For Nietzsche, the Greek embracing of reason in the form of dialectics 
indicates the "state of emergency" they found themselves In. One 
counters the dark desires of the instincts by producing permanent 
daylight through the use of reason. This is why Socrates appears as a 
saviour/physician but according to Nietzsche this "entire morality of 
improvement... has been a misunderstanding", "a form of sickness" 
itself.62 Socrates purportedly acknowledges this when he says he owes a 
cock to Asclepius before he dies. For Nietzsche, this IS Socrates' 
admission that life IS an illness and vindicates his interpretation of 
Socratic philosophy as essentially a nihilistic and decadent response to 
life, In which death alone can act as a physician. By implication, 
60 A. Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, (London: Tavistock, 
1980), pp. 221-2. 
61 F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, p. 31. 
62 Ibid. p. 34. 
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Nietzsche is arguing that one cannot be a physician if one IS sick; one 
cannot attend to the dangers of life if one is already a part of the 
danger. Once again it is only a healthy will to power that can perform 
the reevaluation of all values and diagnose the ills of culture. 
Nietzsche's characterisation of dialectic as both a symptom of and 
unconvincing response to an already weak and insecure culture can be 
reevaluated, however. Indeed the production of tmistrust' and 
uncertainty, that IS for Nietzsche a weak response to an already 
uncertain situation, can be interpreted as a response that does not 
shirk the difficulties of existence. This is a fairly standard 
interpretation of Socratic dialectic; one that Gadamer endorses for 
instance in his linking of the finite language-bound questioning of Greek 
philosophy with his own philosophical hermeneutics.63 This reading of 
the Socratic response to a society and culture seeking foundations for 
itself is one that focuses not on the answers supposedly given in the 
Platonic appropriation of Socrates but on the finite, uncertain, and 
dangerous process of dialectical questioning.64 It is this participation in 
the suffering of language which is paramount, not the attempt to bring 
such a process to a stop through the distiling of transcendent, 
ahistorical principles of beauty, truth and the good. 
For Nietzsche, this attitude cannot but be a nihilistic one; Western 
civilization SInce the explicit Greek turning from the instincts IS 
everywhere In decline and dialectics only exacerbates this decline. 
63 See H. G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, tr. ~. G. Lawre~ce, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), and P. ChrIstopher Smith, 
"H. G. Gadamer's Heideggerian Interpretation of Plato" in .Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 12, No.3, Oct. 1981. 
64 See Heidegger's interpretation of Socrates in What is Called Thinking, 
p. 17. 
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Ultimately the problem for Nietzsche IS culture itself. Insofar as man is a 
cultural being he IS sick: " man IS, relatively speaking, the most 
unsuccessful animal, the sl·ckll·est, th t d e one mos angerously strayed 
from its instincts.,,65 M . I an IS a VI0 ent alienation from his animal 
instincts; he is a degenerate being precisely because he is cultural. This 
is why Nietzsche speculates that man IS a transition, a bridge to 
something else and this is why he is a diagnostician operating in terms 
of the future. 
As we have seen In chapter three, Nietzsche singles out the capacity for 
memory In order to distinguish man from animal life and which carries 
with it potentially ruinous rewards. The end-point of Socratic dialectics 
is the nihilism of the present in which ttruth' is dissolved by the will to 
truth and man is left radically homesick by the "death of God". This 
interpretation of modernity IS a subversion of modern historical 
conscIousness first brought to light systematically by Hegel. Modernity 
is here the "glorious . " sunrIse which "has to recapitUlate the break 
brought about with the past as a continuous renewal." (PDM,7) This is a 
phenomena characterised by Habermas as being no longer able to 
"borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models 
supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself." 
(PDM,7) 
On Habermas's reading, the absence of an ontological unity to the world 
and the concurrent fragmentation of social life expanded and deepened 
in the last three hundred years in the West, is something that cannot be 
d Rather the mature r esponse to this plural overcome or renounce . 
65 F. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968), p. 124. 
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unIverse IS the sUbjection of everything to critique, even reason itself 
for it is only in this way that the normative is created out of itself. 
Hegel's own particular response to this situation is seen as a powerful 
and seductive grounding of modernity out of the principles of 
subjectivity and absolute knowledge that could not fail to elicit 
dissatisfaction in his successors because of its dissolving of modernity's 
predicament into the rationality of the real. Hegel's totalized mediation 
appears to be a grand gesture but ultimately IS an over-inflation of the 
concept of reason that forgets its own starting point in the finitude of 
the present. Post-Hegelian philosophy responds to this in various ways. 
The most prominent nineteenth century inheritor of Hegel's attempt to 
reunite a divided world is of course Marx, for whom: 
Communism is the positive supersession of private property 
as human self-estrangement, and hence the true 
appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it 
is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. 
human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and 
which takes place within the entire wealth of previous 
periods of development. This communism, as fully developed 
naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed 
humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of 
the conflict between man and nature, and between man and 
man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence 
and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, 
between freedom and necessity, between individual and 
species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows 
itself to be the solution. 66 
Such a confident prognosis of the solution to the human condition in 
Marx's early work is never renounced even with the turn to a scientific 
analysis of Capital. Indeed such a turn IS designed to cement 
revolutionary self-confidence rather than blunt it through an account of 
the structural limitations on human praXIS. Yet Marx's hopes for a 
66 K. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", In Early Writings, 
tr. by R. Livingstone and G. Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 
348. 
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communist society, (no doubt to some extent because of the influence of 
Hegel) appear no less a hyper-inflation of man's capacity to establish a 
realm of freedom through the use of his powers of reason and agency. 
The disastrous attempts to establish communism in the twentieth century 
are certainly enlisted in the service of such a judgement. As Habermas 
points out however, the central components of this judgement do not 
take into account that for most critical theories of society: 
"revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical self-certainty are gone"; 
both because of the "incalculability of interventions into deep-seated 
structures of highly complex societies" with which there is a concomitant 
"risk of catastrophic alternatives", and because of the entry of Marxism 
"into the academy" where it has to submit itself to the prevalent 
"fallibilistic consciousness on the side of theory. ,,67 Such a guarded 
response to the capacities and hopes of a critical theory of society in 
the Marxist tradition does not go far enough for Lyotard who suspects 
that there still lurks a metanarrative of legitimation in the form of a 
'd I d" b hl'nd Habermas's clal·ms.68 That such ('1 I ea lscurslve consensus e 
consensus might be totalizing and conformist is for Lyotard only part of 
the problem. The fact that it IS based upon a blindness to the 
heterogeneity of language games and "the absence of a universal genre 
of discourse to regulate them ,,69 means a blindness to the problem of 
politics itself. 
(v) Refigurations of Culture: Utopia as Positive Disruption 
67 J. Habermas, "A Reply to my Critics" in Habermas: Critical Debates, 
ed. J. B. Thompson and D. Held (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 222. 
68 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on .Know.ledge, tr. 
G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Manchester: Manchester UnIverSIty Press, 
1984), p. 60. 
69 J. F. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, tr. G. Van Den 
Abbeele (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. xu. 
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The absence of a common criterion of validity from which to judge 
competing claims is a situation that Karl Mannheim starts from in his 
formulation of a sociology of knowledge70 Anticipating Lyotard, Mannheim 
argues that it is not so much that there are conflictin g interests in the 
world but that rather there is an absence of a universal grid of 
interpretation for ascertaining a common reality. The demise of an 
ontological unity to the world highlights the fact that every perspective 
on reality is relative to a specific social origin and that this has been 
obscured only by hitherto relatively unitary and stable social 
formations. 71 In the modern situation of a fragmentary social structure, 
there is the ever increasing possibility of a vicious spiral of relativity. 
This is because every perspective will ultimately come to see itself as a 
partial one and bound by social conditions even as it denounces others 
for their social origins. No group may claim to be the bearer of 
universality, neither the proletariat nor a universal intellectual 
vanguard. Mannheim considers the sociology of knowledge to be a. way 
out of this situation of plurality and conflict by providing a complete 
description of all the forces in society in order to understand every 
ideology and locate its specific social causes. As Ricoeur points out, this 
project ultimately rests on the case for a sociology that stands outside 
of its object and for the position of the sociologist as a disinterested 
observer of the competing ideologies.7 2 This stance is quite obviously 
illogical in the light of Mannheim's own ontology. The necessity for an 
absolute observer who undertakes research along the lines of Weber's 
value-free sociology is ultimately the downfall of his argument. 
70 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972) 
71 Ibid. pp. 84-5 
72 P. Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. by G. H. Taylor 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 171. 
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Mannheim speaks of the striving towards a ever-widening total VIew of 
the whole of all the limited points of view. This IS a quasi-Hegelian 
attitude without the foundations of the Hegelian Absolute Knowledge. 
According to Ricoeur, Mannheim fails ultimately to admit that we are 
trapped within the circle between reflection and ideology, and to admit 
that total reflection is not a human possibility. 73 It is only if one 
believes that it is necessary to perform reflection free of ideology in 
order to produce knowledge that one will see this circle as a problem, 
however. As soon as the nature of the human situation is grasped as 
one that IS irredeemably caught within a finitude that prevents such 
aseptic knowledge and one realizes that previous attempts to provide 
Archimedian points have been on the wrong track, then one can accept 
the limitations of knowledge. Ricoeur argues that this apOrIa of 
Mannheim's provides fertile ground for a understanding of the 
relationship between ideology, reflection, and critique. He says: 
what we must assume is that the judgment on an ideology 1S 
always the judgment from a utopia. This is my conviction: 
the only way to get out of the circularity in which 
ideologies engulf us is to assume a utopia, declare it, and 
judge an ideology on this basis. Because the onlooker is 
impossible, then it is someone within the process itself who 
takes the responsibility for judgment •... the judgment is 
always a point of view - a polemical point of view though 
one which claims to assume a better future for humanity -
and a point of view which declares itself as such. It is to 
the extent finally that the correlation ideology-utopia 
replaces the impossible correlation ideology-science that a 
certain solution to the problem of judgment may be found, a 
solution .•.• itself congruent w~tf the claim that no point of 
view exists outside the game. 
This conviction of Ricoeur's assumes a basic dialectical nature to social 
life. It assumes that there is present in the ontology of social life an 
73 Ibid, p. 171 
74 Ibid. p. 172-3. 
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oscillation that provides the rhythms of change and conflict, stability 
and integration with an impulse that is almost theological in its dualist 
conception of the struggle between ideology and utopia. In order to 
avoid such a simplistic schema, however, he does qualify the nature both 
of ideology and utopia so that both concepts eventually come to embody 
much of each other in a complex interrelation of mutual constitution. As 
far as Ricoeur's own philosophy is concerned this interpretation of social 
life is merely one more symbolic representation of life that attempts to 
catch its own reflection through an endless articulation of human 
existence VIa the long detour through symbols, values, beliefs and 
Weltanschauung of human culture. 
Ricoeur does not break out from the basic circular nature of the 
problem and thus can In some ways be seen as merely repeating the 
aporIa of how one IS to practise critique from a position within the 
processes that are constitutive of critique. With judgement being placed 
within a hermeneutic circle the intractable problem of the distinction 
between ideology and science in social life is dissolved, but does this 
necessarily make the nature of critique any more transparent? What it 
does do is situate the problem of critique and reflection firmly in human 
finitude, where critical judgement is part of the on-going process of the 
constitution of social life. This does not, however, provide those who are 
looking for answers with answers. It simply states that it is only with 
the making of judgements and the asking of questions that one begins 
to open up human finitude. Critique is firmly embedded in the historicity 
of human culture. 
Ricoeur finds in Mannheim's characterization of utopia hints of how we 
might conceive of the hermeneutic distantiation he believes is possible in 
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social life. These are the two formal criteria of utopia which Mannheim 
proposes. The first criterI"on I th t f sao a certain noncongruence or 
noncoincidence with the state of realI"ty l"n h" h " W IC utopIa occurs. This 
definition immediately begs the question of what freality' is, however as 
Ricoeur points out: "Mannheim seems to want to return to a 
nonevaluative concept of both reality and ideology precisely in order to 
judge what is and what is not congruent. ,,75 Mannheim attempts to 
resolve this dilemma by claiming that one can have a understanding of 
the whole by being thoroughly aware of the limited scope of every point 
of view. This, however, still begs the question of why such an reflective 
grasp is to be considered above the limitations imposed upon other 
definitions of reality because of their social origins. 
The second formal criterion for utopia is much more promising for an 
understanding of critique according to Ricoeur. This is that a utopia 
tends to undermine the prevailing order In opposition to ideology which 
tends to preserve the order from whence it originates. On a simple level 
the sterility of ideology is opposed to the fruitfulness of utopia which 
acts as a catalyst for change. For Ricoeur this is too simple a schema 
because it ignores the positive functions of ideology as well as the 
negative effects of utopian discourse. 
In ordinary language the concept of utopia IS normally pejorative; it is 
that which IS precisely unrealizable, an empty fantasy bearing no 
relation to reality. In a crucial sense this depends upon who is speaking 
in the labelling of the chimerical nature of utopia. Although the formal 
definition of utopia that Mannheim proposes aims to be nonevaluative 
this very possibility seems to be denied by the perspectival constitution 
75 Ibid. p. 171. 
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of social existence. Hence what appears as utopI"an" I I t" IS a ways re a lve to a 
status quo and those protecting this status quo will be inclined to call 
utopian everything that goes beyond the present existing order, no 
matter if it be an absolute utopia or a relative one realizable within 
certain conditions. By obscuring this distinction the present order can 
suppress the validity claims of a relative utopia which aims for realistic 
change. It thus becomes a question of who decides what is realizable 
within a given social life. Those who are dominant are able to impose 
their interpretation of social existence as the real, and hence any 
challenge to this can be dismissed as utopian In the sense of fantastical. 
Realizability thus becomes an empty criteria for the definition of utopia 
because this IS subject itself to social conflict. If the criteria for 
determining what is realizable are in actuality always provided by the 
representatives of dominant or ascendent groups then the notion of 
utopia as a positive challenge to the order that they promote can never 
establish itself. From this perspective, by definition utopia belongs to 
the marginal; to those dispossessed of the power to Impose their 
interpretation of reality and in consequence it remains unrealisable and 
illusory. 
Instead of being caught within a bind here and having to admit the 
inadequacy of the concept of utopia for an understanding of critique, 
Ricoeur argues that this situation throws light upon possible criteria for 
a definition of the ideological. It is the capacity to reveal something as 
ideological which utopian possibilities establish. This is firmly embedded 
in the problem of power, however. If it is always a utopia which defines 
what is ideological, characterization is always relative to the assumptions 
of conflicting groups. Thus, any claim to a scientific view of ideology IS 
merely a claim. Ricoeur argues that this insight is just another way of 
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saying with Aristotle that in human matters we cannot expect the same 
kind of accuracy as in scie tOfO tt n I IC ma ers. Politics is not a science, but 
an art of orientating oneself among conflicting groups. Moreover, the 
definition of politics must itself remain polemical.76 If utopias shatter 
and ideologies preserve given orders then the nature of domination and 
the place of power in the structure of human existence become central. 
The question is not only who has power but how is a system of power 
legitimized. Thus ultimately it is legitimacy which is at stake in the 
conflict between ideology and utopia, but not the kind of legitimacy that 
requires a meta-narrative of universal normative standards .. 
One might ask how far Ricoeur's analysis has really advanced our 
understanding of critique. Insofar as it is a interpretation of how we 
are to understand ideology and utopia it remains itself as particular as 
any other. That it is a plausible description really only comes about In 
the social milieu of Mannheim's modern intellectual seeking to grasp the 
specific ideologies of all social groups in a particular society. It is not 
so plausible for instance, to a Lukacsian Marxist who claims that the 
proletariat expresses the universal interests of the totality. Unless 
Ricoeur is appealing to the quasi-Hegelian survey of the whole, which he 
chastises Mannheim for implicitly proposing, then it is hard to see how 
his claim that utopia acts as a shatterer of fast-frozen social forms 
functions. One still wants to know by what right a utopian criticism of 
existing relations claims to be valid as a motivation for action. The 
notion of critique as a source of valid judgements about social existence 
is once again replaced by those forces of social existence that are in 
opposition to the prevailing dominant forces, echoing Foucault's linkage 
76 bOd th d ta dlOng of theoretical models I 1 • pp. 178-9. This echoes e un ers n 
of power as always already contested models. See note 27, chapter four. 
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of genealogy with the subjugated. The question remains: why side with 
the powerless, the marginal and the oppressed (profoundly un-
Nietzschean in Foucault's case!) rather than the empowered? Unless one 
is able to specify why the utopian frame of mind (in this sense of the 
disenfranchised frame of mind) IS privileged over the ideological, one 
remaIns unable to justify the claim of utopia to be critical simply 
because of its "preservation of distance between itself and reality. ,,77 
The burden of proof in Ricoeur's interpretation remains with those who 
wish to change existing social relations. 
Ricoeur in some ways circumvents this problem by appealing to the fact 
that societies are constituted by noncongruence in the form of social 
conflict at some level or another. The absence of this phenomena 
according to Ricoeur would signify the very "death of society" because 
there would be "no distance, no ideals, no project at all. ,,78 Society is 
functioning here as an concept that is by definition riven by ideology 
and utopia. The notion that we are facing the end of ideology in modern 
post-industrial society IS precisely the ideological concealment of 
opposing ideals and projects. I think that Ricoeur is right to stress this 
connection of utopia with opposing ideals and projects and I hope to 
show in the next chapter that it is a stress that limits Foucault's will to 
dispersion in a productive way. Ricoeur argues that there is no mind 
which liberates itself suddenly without the support of something else79 
and certainly an understanding of historiography that uproots all our 
identities is one that attempts to deny this. 
77 Ibid. p. 180. 
78 Ibid. This echoes the postmodern argument that consensus IS a 
dangerous political concept because ultimately it prefigures the total 
society. See Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 66. 
79 Recall Foucault's comment that "thought cannot help but liberate and 
enshLve" in OT ,328. 
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Chapter 6 
Foucault and Ricoeur: Dispersive Versus Comprehensivp {Ttopias 
~o~ m~, history can be conceived only in n dimensions. This 
IS In~h~pens~ble. Its fundamental definition is of a concrete 
pluridlmenslonal history ... life is multiple, but it is also 
one. 
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On reading Paul Ricoeur's article "Hermeneutics and the Critique of 
Ideology,,2 one is struck by the all too effortless arbitration between the 
philosophical positions of Habermas and Gadamer. The suspicion that this 
IS a false synthesis, dissolving genuine differences can never be far 
from the reader's mind. Is the result a bland philosophy of hope or an 
insight into the genuine common roots that both thinkers in their desire 
to delineate strong positions had themselves covered over? The latter 
conclusion emerges to the fore given that both philosophers had 
themselves engaged In a fruitful debate between their respective 
positions that had seen both seek to come to an understanding about 
their respective similarities and differences. The possibility of such a 
dialogue is always an indication in philosophy that there is something 
more to say, especially about hidden concerns that both partners share, 
and that this something more is guided by the philosophical position of 
a desire to reach an understanding in the first place. This desire, for 
example, immediately sets off the Habermas/Gadamer debate from the 
Derrida/Gadamer debate that failed to take place some years later. 
Marked as they are by the shared influence of Heidegger the latter 
couple's lack of dialogue might indeed seem perverse. However, this can 
be explained on a simple level as highlighting Derrida's suspicion of 
ever securing understanding and concern for difference tn all its 
manifestations. Given this position of a SUspICIon about the very desire 
1 F. Braudel, "On a Concept of Social History" in On History, p. 131. 
2 In HHS. See also "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer tn 
Dialogue", Philosophy Today, 17, (1973) 
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to reach understanding and agreement, a desire that is as prevalent in 
Habermas' philosophical ethos as it is in Gadamer's, it is no wonder that 
Derrida's refusal of an encounter has been seen as a t t . s ra egIc response 
to the dangers of a hermeneutics of understanding.3 
What would Ricoeur himself make of this unfulfilled dialogue? It might be 
argued that Ricoeur had made it easy for himself in dissolving the false 
antimony "between an ontology of prIor understanding and an 
eschatology of freedom",4 a conflation of interests might be harder to 
sustain if he took the work of Derrida as the foil for philosophical 
hermeneutics. This is more so In the case of Foucault. Would it be so 
easy to put him into a relationship with hermeneutics? The immediate 
answer IS of course no. Any attempt to appropriate the critical 
strategies developed by Foucault into an expanded philosophical 
reflection based ultimately upon the hermeneutical drive to 
understanding must necessarily cut short their own peculiar applicability 
as interventions of force. 
One position that could be taken over this possibility would be to argue 
that the critical point to Foucault's own work arises precisely from the 
aggressive stance it takes towards all philosophies of the subject and 
that his attitude towards historical consciousness IS particularly 
concerned to avoid the appropriating tendencies of philosophical 
hermeneutics. More importantly, given Foucault's understanding of the 
modern age as defined by "History" as the "unavoidable element In our 
thought" which is "probably not so very different from Classical Order", 
it would be an absolute travesty to characterise his work as a desire to 
3 See David Wood, Philosophy at the Limit (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 
f P • 118-30. 
HHS,100. 
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continue this seemingly "unavoidable element" Anoth °to th t 
. er POSI Ion a can 
be taken, IS that Foucault's decision to remove the problems of the 
philosophy of the subject by a fierce reduction of it to merely the 
effect of systems of discourse or apparatuses of power/knowledge 
(PK,117) inevitably leads him into problems that can only be resolved by 
giving the. subject a larger role albeit one that is not transcendental; 
and this of course is to be provided by a philosophical hermeneutics. 
This would be to take the notion of the tunavoidability' of history far 
more traditionally as the starting point for a critical practice rather 
than that which one seeks to transgress in order to continue critique. 
Between these two sketchy positions the possibility of a Ricoeurian 
mediation might lie but it is far from obvious or promising at first 
glance. There is, for instance, the common concern of history and its 
philosophical importance. Philosophical hermeneutics as developed by 
Gadamer, for instance, from the work of Heidegger, places Immense 
significance upon the historicity of man and understanding. Foucault 
similarly places great emphasis upon radically historicising philosophy 
and social practice but under the influence of Nietzsche this becomes 
something extremely different to the centrality of historicity as 
understood by Gadamer. Indeed history is so placed into question as 
being a recent production of t man" which in turn is also a recent 
production of the modern "episteme", that Foucault was often accused of 
being anti-historical. Foucault of course did not intend to be so 
construed and yet there is something more than just rhetoric In his 
claim that "Discourse is not life: its time is not your time", (AK,211) 
something which alms at a rupture from the position of historical 
understanding as the master framework In which to produce critical 
strategies in the present. In order to preserve the effect of this 
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distance from historical understanding it is necessary to be clear about 
Foucault's own practice of archaeology and genealogy and to understand 
his reasons for opposing traditional methods of historical inquiry. 
Although in a simple sense Foucault is at great pains to claim that to 
understand the present we must understand the past, this 
understanding IS by no means easily achievable and is itself fraught 
with dangers, not least that traditional historical methods have 
functioned to legitimate present practices rather than help In 
transforming them. The presentation of archaeology and genealogy as 
techniques that enable a certain transgression of traditional historical 
methods is as we have seen In chapter three, crucial to Foucault's 
strategy. This is when his work appears the most provocative and thus 
perhaps unavoidably radical. It IS also the point at which he IS 
vulnerable to criticism because of the suggestion of the desire to go 
beyond the work of reason and oppose it by an appeal to an other of 
reason. As the criticisms of Derrida point out, this particular strategy IS 
itself prone to contradiction, and also to the specific dangers of 
utopianism and naturalism. Foucault is quick to disassociate his own 
project from such ends, however, and it is this that should immediately 
sensitize us to the much more subtle, and difficult, strategies that he 
does employ In order to continue critique in full consciousness of the 
enslaving discourse of historical understanding. This desire to produce 
work in tfull consciousness' of the problem of historicity is also a point 
at which Foucault's strategy begins to fall into contradiction. For it IS 
at this point that his own strategy repeats the Enlightenment desire to 
work within a space that is not a space, a historical nominalism that 
seeks to undermine its own situatedness because of the dangers of co-
option and reformism. This repetition is curiously similar to the desire to 
write beyond the history of the Same and articulate the Other that 
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Derrida had exposed as dangerously utopl"an and I" u tImately impossible. 
Although Foucault may have aimed at a history of the present that 
avoided such utopianism, his own strategies might in fact repeat the 
structures of such forms of thought on a tacit level. 
And yet there IS also in Foucault's work a strong thesis that the 
founding of political practice upon a future telos that breaks with the 
present is also to remain locked within the present system. This IS the 
reasoning behind his remark "that to imagine another system IS to 
extend our participation in the present system." (LCP,230) Taking as his 
example the Soviet Union, Foucault argues that its apparently radical 
institutions were modelled upon those of "bourgeois society In the 
nineteenth century" and that this was a result of the "Utopian 
tendencies" of the Soviet experiment rather than because of practical 
difficulties. Even though this may be an underestimation of the pressing 
concerns that afflicted the nascent Soviet state, as is pointed out by 
one of his interviewers, Foucault's point IS that such concerns (the 
forming of a stable and economically strong state) are themselves the 
product of theoretical models that ultimately are utopian in character 
and that this utopianism is as much the function of the myriad practices 
of social administration and disciplinary techniques as of visionary 
politics. This leads him to wonder whether we should not "reject theory 
and all forms of general discourse" because the "need for theory is still 
part of the system" which produces the oppressive totality of the nation 
state and all its disciplinary armatures. (LCP,231) Theory, in the form of 
both grand meta-narratives or the micro-techniques of social 
administration for the ordering, functioning, and improvement of social 
life are as much the problem to be faced as the solution to present 
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difficulties, and something that politics invariably fails to reflect upon.5 
It is what might be termed the f th ht' f un oug 0 Western politics as it has 
developed since the Greeks. 
Foucault's concern IS to expose the problematic condition of such a 
politics that does not recognize its formation from the desire to control 
nature and society and l·n dOl·ng so I ·t If to eaves 1 se open an ever 
burgeoning will to power that seeks to resolve all problems via an 
instrumental reason. He shares such a thesis with other interpreters of 
modernity, notably Adorno and Horkheimer In The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and Heidegger In his later works concerning the 
technological, subject oriented nature of the modern age.6 This IS 
something Foucault IS well aware of, his essay "What is Enlightenment" 
IS In some sense a re-affirmation of such thinkers concerns and a 
placing of his own project within such a tradition. What Foucault shares 
with such thinkers IS a SUspIcIon of projecting utopias in the service of 
radical change. This SUspICIon immediately places a bind upon the 
projection of any formulation of alternative social practices. How are we 
to produce non-utopian projections if projection is itself a characteristic 
of utopian thinking? Foucault's immediate and somewhat vague response 
IS that instead of the possibility of utopia he would oppose present 
"unsatisfactory" practices with "actual experiences": 
It is possible that the rough outline of a future society is 
supplied by the recent experiences with drugs, sex, 
communes other forms of consciousness, and other forms of , . 
individuality. If scientific socialism emerged from the UtoPlaB 
of the nineteenth century, it is possible that a real 
socialization will emerge, in the twentieth century from 
experiences. (LCP,231) 
5 See "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An Interview" in The 
Foucault Reader, pp. 385-6 
6 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 
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S peaking just after the event f M '68 s 0 ay and the transformations in 
certain sections of society that the sixties had apparently brought 
about, Foucault's remarks now se . I . . em naIve y optImIstic (utopian?) 
themselves.7 More importantly, what IS the status of this "real 
socialization" ? Is it not defined in relation to the transcendent and 
fantastical discourse of utopian projects? The question that immediately 
springs to mind here, is what legitimates Foucault's confidence that such 
actual experiences can claim the authority that IS signified by the 
adjective "real"? Does not such an appeal to f reality , veer dangerously 
close to an appeal to the present, or in other terms, the fpresence' of 
the actual? 
It is at such points, when Foucault is attempting to steer a path 
between the dangerous utopianism of theoretical solutions and the 
repetition of the Same that is political reformism, that Foucault himself 
begins to sound politically ineffective. As remarked above, this is to 
judge Foucault's strategy by a discourse (the political) that he wishes 
to question as to the "position it takes and the reasons it gives for 
this,,8 One would need to ask what value is being placed upon the 
notion of political effectiveness here and whether it does not contribute 
to a suppreSSIon of alternative practices and frameworks for 
understanding. Foucault's suspicion of this tendency to judge alternative 
practices by existing political frameworks is perfectly valid and yet it 
itself prone to his own strictures on the nature of utopian theoretical 
practice. This is why he has been accused of justifying the status quo 
by Marxists and of spuriously proclaiming the fend of politics' and 
7 Although, see J. Minson on the irrelevance of 1968 for Foucault's 
thought, Genealogies of Morals, pp. 41-2 
8 The Foucault Reader, p. 385. 
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contributing to a radicalism shorn of "a choice between powers". 9 It 
seems that in attempting to have the best of both worlds: a critical 
practice that is not totalising and hence not utopian and yet is still 
~beyond' traditional political frameworks and hence echoing utopian 
desires, Foucault has placed his practice in an impossible bind. Yet his 
refusal to offer alternatives could be symptomatic rather than a cause of 
this tension. Foucault resolutely denies that he is practising critique 
from a position outside of our present framework, this is the point of 
genealogy, and is the reason why he opposes utopian projections of an 
alternative future to be worked towards. Yet there remains a residue of 
a desire to be beyond current practices, especially In terms of 
traditional political solutions, that conditions his critical practice. This IS 
the second sense of utopian which, along with the first, he attempts to 
position himself between in order to create a fruitful strategy out of 
their tension. It might be argued that he fails to really escape the 
dangers of the second sense of utopia, however. This would justify one 
in labelling his work as aspiring to precisely the kind of ~non-place' 
which he criticises as the starting point for both objective history and 
general discourses on the "whole of society". (LCP,232-3) 
That this IS a possible characterisation of Foucault's work arIses 
perhaps from his scepticism about the universality or naturalness of the 
Western political framework that encourages a certain conception of the 
subject and the possibility of transformation of the systems that subject 
inhabits. His work on the disciplinary apparatuses of modernity aim at 
showing how the modern subject is not just repressed by certain social 
structures from which it can liberate itself, but is an essential element 
9 P. Dews, "The Nouvelle Philosophie and Foucault", In Towards a 
Critique of Foucault, p. 100. 
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In the constitution of such systems. If thO IS IS the case, however, it 
remaIns of Immense importance to ascertain just what is implied by the 
hypothesis that subjects are as h·f t muc 1 no more the effects of 
power/knowledge regimes than the producers of such systems. Certainly 
it is not a blind functionalism that Foucault wishes to imply by revealing 
the manifold levels of discursive constitution that produces the modern 
subject. Rather, as I have argued in chapter four, the unavoidable 
horizon that one has to place his work within is not that of a pessimism 
about social change but that of the tremendous complexity involved In 
social practice and hence difficulty in the conscious transformation of 
such practice. 
Crucial to this notion of complexity IS that it also consists of an 
unavoidably opaque element. This is not a thesis about the futility of 
social change but a claim that no matter how much one attempts to make 
discursively explicit the nature of the systems one inhabits, there will 
always remain a residue of unanticipated practices and conditions. The 
notion that one can become completely clear about one's situation is an 
impossible dream that has contributed to the type of dangerous utopias 
that Foucault is concerned to expose as the reactive product of modern 
disciplinary societies. Given that complete penetration of the social 
complex is impossible and the desire to achieve it a sort of hubris, 
Foucault's call for a genealogy of the micro-practices of 
power/knowledge makes sense. The will to transform our existence IS 
prevented from becoming an over-inflated will to power by curtailing its 
ambitions and channelling the desire for change into local and 
immediately problematic areas of social existence. There is something 
quite Greek about this attitude, a philosophical ethos that bears 
comparison with the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy which 
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as Gadamer points out, IS different from the "putatively specialized 
knowledge of the expert who enters upon the task of politics and 
legislation like a nonparticipating observer." 10 
The linkage that Gadamer makes between hermeneutics and practical 
philosophy here revolves around the tremendous importance of our 
unacknowledged cultural background as the origin of our normative 
practices. This is not something that IS immutable, however. Gadamer 
characterises practical philosophy thus: 
Practical philosophy presupposes that we are already shaped 
by the normative images or ideas in the light of which we 
have been brought up and that lie at the basis of the order 
of our entire social life. That does not at all suggest that 
these normative perspectives remain fixed immutably and 
would be beyond criticism. Social life consists of a constant 
process of transformation of what previously has been held 
valid. But it would surely be an illusion to want to deduce 
normative notions in abstracto and to posit them as valid 
with the claim of scientific rectitude. The point here is a 
notion of science that does not allow for the ideal of the 
nonparticipating observer but endeavours instead to bring 
to our reflective awareness the communality that binds 
everyone together. 11 
This endorsement of a practical philosophy of finitude contrasts starkly 
with Foucault's own version. Genealogy too, is opposed to finding "its 
support outside of time" and pretending to "base its judgements on an 
apocalyptic objectivity." (NGH,87) It is explicit also In its "affirmation of 
knowledge as perspective." Even though genealogy shares this rejection 
of a scientific methodologism aiming at timeless truths with philosophical 
hermeneutics and practical philosophy, it veers violently away from the 
ethos of a consideration of the limits of social action and reason. Instead 
genealogy as "effective history" seeks to engage in an almost warlike 
10 H. G. Gadamer, 
Reason in the Age 
11 Ibid. p. 135. 
"Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task" In 
of Science, p. 135. 
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transgression of our taken for granted assumptions precisely because 
they are constitutive of our being. The conclusion to be drawn from the 
constant transformation of social life is not that there is a unitary 
thread of participation that binds every interpretation but rather that: 
"humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus 
proceeds from domination to domination." (NGH,85) 
The genealogical frecording' of these rules has obviously been 
transformed here from the simple transcribing of the "systems of rules" 
that have appeared to an active interpretative stance that applies a 
deeply partisan judgement. Where philosophical hermeneutics may be 
characterised as possessing a important drive to bridge the gaps 
created by the fviolence' of interpretation, genealogy's desire is to drive 
a wedge between such attempts at interpretative fusion, which it sees as 
dangerously unhistorical in its search for unities. 
In short the difference between the two is their attitudes towards the 
conceptual couplet continuity/discontinuity. This is of course a gross 
exaggeration of the actual practices of hermeneutics and genealogy but 
nevertheless a crucial point of divergence. Philosophical hermeneutics as 
developed by Gadamer IS concerned to emphasize the notion of 
I d " "ff t" h" torI"cal conscI"ousness". As Ricoeur distanciation invo ve In e ec Ive IS 
puts it: 
~ffe~tive hist~ry i~ eff~cacy at a di~tance ..... Thus, the 
fusIon of horIzons whIch happens In every transmission of 
meaning can occur precisely because of the ttension between 
the other and the self, between the text of the past and the 
point of view of the reader.12 
Continuity here IS not a smooth transition from interpretation Lo 
interpretation in Hegelian sublation, but a process that is a play of 
finite interpretations which can never be articulated In one single 
horizon. Equally, Foucault is concerned not to be taken as advocating a 
philosophy of absolute discontinuity. Instead he aims to "untie all those 
knots that historians have patiently tied" to increase differences and 
blur the "lines of communication, ... to make it more difficult to pass from 
one thing to another". (AK,170) In its archaeological instantiation, 
Foucault's historical sense: 
considers that the same, the repetitive, and the 
uninterrupted are no less problematic than the ruptures; for 
archaeology, the identical and the continuous are not what 
must be found at the end of the analysis; they figure in the 
element of a discursive practice; they too are governed by 
the rules of formation of positivities ... they themselves are 
actively, regularly formed. (AK,174) 
The point IS not to replace continuity with rupture but to analyse 
"change and transformations" without recourse to the traditional 
reductive metaphors of fmovement', fflux', and fevolution'. 
Nevertheless, Foucault IS concerned to avoid these traditional props of 
continuous history for a ultimately political reason. As we have seen In 
chapter three, the political motivation behind the questioning of the 
document is clear, yet as Foucault articulates it there is a residue of 
ambiguity about this questioning. As we have seen the new "general 
history" endeavours to fwork' upon documents from "within" a.nd to 
12 HHS, 76, and see p. 74. 
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ltd I 't" N eve op 1 • ow when Foucault characterises this work as dividing, 
distributing, ordering, arranging, serialising, defining unities, describing 
relations, it would seem to be a deeper extension of traditional 
historiography, despite, or maybe because of, its structuralistic appeal 
to conceptual knowledge. What after all is distinguishing "between what 
IS relevant and what is not", if not the work of historical judgement. 
Distinguishing between relevant or irrelevant patterns and series is no 
less the province of traditional historiography than Foucault's 
alternative. Foucault's concern with discursive formations prior to 
individual conSCIousness IS the real point of difference between 
traditional questioning of historical archives and his own. Whereas 
traditional questioning starts from the assumption that the document is 
produced by a subjectivity that was the master of its production and 
meaning, Foucault intends to produce a history where the subject IS a 
historical matrix to be investigated rather than taken for granted. This 
IS not only because the transcendental subject has been a major element 
In the justification of a impossible and politically dangerous total 
history, but because it IS itself an historical phenomena that arises in 
the modern age. One can only surmIse that the methods Foucault devises 
in order to displace the human subject as conSCIousness from the 
theoretical concern of history are designed to produce a historical 
sensibility that is itself marked by historicity and consequently in some 
sense a tbetter' history. 
No doubt at the point when Foucault wrote AK the possibility of 
challenging the "great historico-transcendental destiny of the West" 
(AK,210) with its privileging of continuous history and a sovereign 
conSCIousness that ensures this through the mastery of meaning, was 
easier to formulate In terms of a radical de-subjectification of history. 
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Foucault's ambiguity, or rather unwillingness to site his own 
archaeological machinery, except as an as yet preliminary and scarcely 
stable discourse about discourses, clearly stands out at the beginning 
and the end of the book, however. (AK,17, 205-8) That the seemingly 
innocent practice of organizing the document into relevant relations IS 
as much a political activity as any other emerges with a vengeance In 
Foucault's subsequent methodological tract: "Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History". As we have seen, genealogy IS equally vehement in its refusal 
of objective, continuous history. 
Historical sensibility as Foucault formulates it in NGH is based upon an 
opposition to "the three Platonic modalities of history." It therefore does 
take certain values as important in the practice of genealogy, Foucault 
defines them thus: 
The first is parodic, directed against reality, and opposes 
the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the 
second is dissociative, directed against identity, and opposes 
history given as continuity or representation or a tradition; 
the third is sacrificial, directed against truth, and opposes 
history as knowledge. They imply a use of history that 
severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and 
anthropological model, and constructs a countermemory - a 
transformation of history into a totality different form of 
time. (NGH,93) 
These three modes of a new historical sensibility are closely interrelated, 
each drawing upon the implications of the others to produce a counter-
history that functions through an inversion of traditional 
historiographical values. The desires to grasp (reality' unsullied by our 
own historical position, to create stable identities from the continuity of 
tradition, and to reach universal truths through historical research, are 
all called into question as productive of exclusionary narratives that 
cover over the heterogeneity and mutability of history. 
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With this new understanding of historical existence comes a dilemma, 
however. The decision to privilege anti-Platonic modalities of history 
cannot arise from what might be termed a greater understanding of the 
mechanisms of history for it too is prey to the dissipations of further 
interpretation. Although Foucauldian genealogy purportedly takes its 
strength from revealing the inadequacies of history as practised In the 
West SInce the nineteenth century, it cannot be claiming a closer 
relationship to the truth, for on Foucault's own terms this would merely 
be a repetition of the claims of traditional historiography. Rather, it 
should be seen as operating as an interpretation that emerges from a 
systematic reversal: "the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a 
system of rules,... In order to Impose a direction, to bend it to a new 
will, to force its participation In a different game." Genealogy cannot 
exempt itself from the chain of dominations but must take its own 
historical understanding as the point at which its own justifications 
begin. 
This is not to imply that anything like the traditional justifications for 
discourse that the West produces are to be applied to genealogy. This IS 
especially the case with the justifications that emerge from the will to 
truth that Foucault sees as increasingly assimilating all other systems In 
an implacable machinery designed to exclude. (OD,56) Here we have the 
key to genealogy's status. For it is a machinery that IS not designed to 
exclude but to recover "subjugated knowledges" from the hierarchical 
claims of a "theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse". (PK,85) 
It is a machinery that contests the power that emanates from the will to 
truth and the "attempt to think in terms of a totality" which has 
produced a certain blindness in research. (PK,81) The point to Foucault's 
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onslaught on the ob]oectivity, to °t con InUI y, and truth that history has 
hitherto taken as its principle values ° h IS t at, such values, despite their 
claims to comprehensiveness, exclude dOff 1 erences because of the very 
desire to reach a totality. History, not only buries "the ruptural effects 
of conflict and struggle" (PK,82) but represses its own origin In 
"nineteenth-century Europe: the land of interminglings and bastardy, 
the period of the (man-of-mixture.'" (NGH,92) A real "historical knowledge 
of struggles" has been impossible because the access to this: specialised 
areas of erudition and disqualified, popular knowledge, has been " even 
up to this day ..• confined to the margins of knowledge." (PK,83) 
In the attempt to reinstate these margins, however, new margins are 
created. The values of identity and continuity are placed under 
suspicion because of the political effects they have become implicated 
with and are thus pushed to the margins of genealogical concern. 
Genealogy initiates its own exclusions In order to function In the 
struggle for dominance. Foucault VOIces the concern that genealogies 
might themselves "run the risk of re-codification, recolonisation" (PK,86) 
and become part of the dominant discourse as soon as they are no 
longer ignored and discredited. This outcome might seem highly unlikely 
given the nature of Western societies. Rather, as Foucault points out, 
genealogies are much more likely to be greeted with a "prudent silence" 
that seeks to devalue their claims as well as forestall institutional entry. 
Nevertheless, this probable position of permanent opposition to dominant 
discourse, although bestowing upon genealogy an appearance of equally 
permanent radicalism, does not mean it is thereby free of exclusionary 
processes. For if it is possible to say that genealogy will never be a 
"homogeneous theoretical" discourse because it ceaselessly questions the 
?,-,-
_Of 
desire for such a discourse, thl"S does not mean that it IS thereby free 
of its own strategies of constitution. 
These strategies are invariably based upon criticisms of existing 
practices that have become taken for granted. Thus we have the 
negative work carried out in the chapter "The Unities of Discourse" in 
AK debunking the diverse themes of continuity in order to clear a space 
for Foucault's own machinery of discourse analysis which remains 
stronger on articulating what it is not, rather than w hat it is. There are 
also the negative judgements made by the genealogical studies upon the 
practices of the disciplinary society and of the scientia sexllaJis. 
Although these practices are not criticised by an appeal to another 
standard of social organisation they are nevertheless, strongly decried 
both for their consequences and because they arrogantly assert 
themselves as a progression from previous practices.13 It is precisely 
because modernity sees itself as having to give itself its own normative 
foundations and be self-generating, that it is seen as being sunk deeper 
into the pit of unreflectiveness and more arrogant than previous epochs. 
That this self-confidence In its own legitimations IS a problem IS 
acknowledged by all those who would wish to rescue the project of 
modernity, however. Maybe it should be viewed as a condition of 
increased rather than decreased reflection. Certainly it is as much an 
unhistorical assumption as any other to proclaim our present age as 
more narrow minded than any other. 
13 Along with this arrogance of progression there is also a certain 
privileging of the present that seems essential to its own. self-image. 
This is why modernity is seen as being so dangerous for thInkers such 
as Heidegger and Foucault. See J. Caputo on Heidegger's philosophy as a 
contestation of the master names for Being, "Demythologizing Heidegger: 
Aletheia and the History of Being", The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XLI, 
No.3, (March 1988). 
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Foucault's technique of starkly contrasting differing orders is renowned. 
The punishment of Damiens in DP serves as an origin from which the 
West has supposedly progressed. The "monotonous nights of the 
Victorian bourgeoisie" have long been left behind in the quest for sexual 
liberation. (HS,3-5) These, of course, are the simple narratives that 
Foucault subverts through his genealogical research. The present is 
dependent upon the past but In ways much more insidious and 
dangerous than previously thought. Instead of progression we have the 
replacement of systems of exclusion and division for ever more 
implacable and invisible regimes. It IS almost a narrative of 
Enlightenment in reverse, except that Foucault does not really believe 
that there was a golden age left behind. If he does look to the lime 
when the "Greek Logos had no contrary", (MC,xiii) or when an aesthetics 
of existence was the dominant problematization of the free, adult male of 
Greek society (HS,2,253) this is more a comparison of different systems 
in order to shake present assumptions rather than a expreSSIOn of 
longing for a Greek golden age. Indeed there is hardly any intimation of 
such desires in Foucault's work after Madness and Civilisation, to the 
extent that his few isolated remarks about the possibility of new ways of 
being are eagerly gleaned from his statements either as an indication of 
his largely undeveloped and incoherent normative foundations or as the 
implicit desire driving his "patient labour giving form to our impatience 
for liberty." (WE,50) 
Either way, genealogy cannot effectively escape judgement as to its 
desires. A radical counter-discourse that emerges in opposition to 
perceived dominant discourses, such as history and the theoretical 
totalisations of philosophy, functions, no matter how self-consciously, as 
a recovery of those buried and disqualified knowledges and experiences 
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that constitute the other of Reason or the tradition. That in some cases 
these obliterated experiences can no longer be articulated, as for 
example, that of madness before the monologue of reason strait-jacket it 
into a moral and medical problem, implies that the notions of recovery or 
restoration are not necessarily the right ones to use for Foucault's 
practice. Nevertheless there IS an important h" h th sense In w IC . e 
articulation of the limits of present thought, language, discourse, etc., 
through the presentation of the alterity at their heart, remains a task of 
disclosure. This task, which parallels that of a hermeneutics of SUspICIon 
In seeking to foreground the hidden structures of exclusion that 
constitute current practices and understandings of the Western 
tradition, radically diverges from such a hermeneutics by making the 
transgression of the limits it uncovers a constant project. This is where 
Foucault's genealogy departs from a theory of interpretation that seeks 
to recover "the extinguished voices of the past" in order to bring t.hem 
into a ever expanding tradition. (TN,3,223) The sense of the possible that 
emerges from Foucault's own discourse is a product not of the spinning 
of a multitude of alternatives, least of all one master remedy, but a 
product of a relentless differentiation of the interpretations that 
currently hold sway. The weaving of a more inclusive and less 
constraining tradition is not the aim of genealogy because it knows that 
there will always remain a residue, a limit, an outside to this production. 
Hence, the repeated imagery of warfare that Foucault chooses to couch 
his own understanding of how genealogical practice proceeds. Whatever 
interpretation a particular genealogy places on the present, and by 
implication the past and the future as well, it cannot appeal to a place 
above the power conflicts of the society from which it emerges. 
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And yet there IS nevertheless an underlying moral thrust to this 
rhetoric of war, conflict and struggle. Might we not also detect a strong 
puritanical streak in Foucault's adoption of such rhetoric. Despite the 
appearance of a rejection of ordinary moral arguments, war is being 
waged on behalf of the dispossessed, the suppressed, and that which 
has hitherto been neglected as trivial and contemptible. Despite 
Foucault's protestations to the contrary, there is a strong element of 
speaking for others that cannot be eliminated in this advocacy of the 
permanent belligerence of the Other. Even though theoretical practice 
may take up the cause of already existing struggles and not attempt to 
represent their ttruth' but serve as an instrument for strategic use, 
there are still difficulties in such a neutral, tool-like image of discourse. 
The notion that theoretical practice conducted in an academic institution 
can act purely as a relay between one set of practices to another and 
remain neutral In its effects IS naive and precisely a notion that 
Foucault is concerned to dispel. Yet in presenting his own position in an 
as effacing way as possible, and as seeking to renounce any links it 
might have with the origin of struggles, Foucault begins to sound as if 
he believes in the possibility of serving the struggles he chooses to 
stand alongside in an objective, impartial way. So to be consistent, 
Foucault has to accept that his own work, not only acts as an 
articulation of existing power struggles in a different voice, but is also 
constitutive to some extent of these struggles. This I have argued IS 
particularly the case in his reversal of the ordinary understanding of 
historiography. Of course the extent to which his discourse is a product 
and producer of the relations is a matter for argument. Nevertheless the 
claim that the intellectual can no longer speak the truth to those who 
have yet to see it IS merely the reversal of the belief that the 
intellectual's role consisted of this in golden age of bourgeois struggle. 
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To overturn such a simplistic Vlew f th . I ' o e lnte lectual s role, even though 
it may exist as a dominant (and by thus by definition dangerous) 
conception of her role in society, can only be an initial move in a much 
more complex attempt at understanding the nature of power as it exists 
in its current forms and the part academic discourse in the form of 
genealogy plays in reinforcing as well as subverting these current 
forms. 
This would perhaps mean: not being so quick to dismiss as fascistic the 
notion that the intellectual can speak for others. Certainly the notion 
that the intellectual should aspire to possess the universal law and 
represent the interests of justice, is one that requires much scrutiny. 
Not just because, as Foucault points out, it belongs to a quite different 
age and is derived from "a quite specific historical figure" that may no 
longer be applicable to our own, (PK,126-9) but because the belief in the 
possibility of achieving such a universal consensus has waned to the 
extent that it has become an ever-receding goal which the desire to 
achieve has come to be seen as part of the problem rather than solution 
to conflicts. Despite this healthy scepticism about the function of the 
universal intellectual as a force somehow above the fray of battie, there 
is a danger that such scepticism threatens to swamp the equally healthy 
drive to seek systematic solutions to the systematic injustices of the 
modern world. The rejection of the category of the tintellectual' as a 
free-floating arbiter of social interests, does not necessarily imply the 
rejection of the attempt to mediate between conflicting interests. 
Although we are a long way away from Mannheim's attempt to produce a 
non-evaluative mapping of every ideological viewpoint, there is still a 
moment in this attempt worth preserving. For if it IS our ineluctable 
situation to judge from normative convictions then one might wonder 
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how this position can be reflectively come to terms with other than 
through the attempt to articulate the basis of ones judgements. Tn 
philosophical hermeneutical terms, this would be the central critical task 
of any reflection. 
Now it may be that the limiting of this activity to a small group 
designated by the term t intellectual , and consisting of a variety of su b-
disciplines such as that of the historian, sociologist, psychoanalyst, etc. 
is something to be deplored in terms of its implications both for the 
control and production of knowledge and for the practice of a 
democratic politics. That this is the case, however, does not mean that 
such activity must therefore be dismissed. This is certainly not what 
Foucault advocates in terms of his own work. Indeed it is a common 
point of agreement amongst both his critics and supporters that the 
general movement of his work consists of the articulation of hitherto 
hidden processes, practices and structures that constitute the present. 
That this is in no wayan attempt to lay down hard and fast universal 
principles of understanding IS indicated by Foucault's own peculiar 
intellectual honesty (Nietzsche's famous Redlichkeit) in never failing lo 
qualify his claims as the product of very specific historical and political 
circumstances. The paradoxes of reflection are not so easily dismissed 
via the rhetoric of war and perspectivism, however. The honesty of the 
modern intellectual is a crucial problem for Foucault, to the extent that 
the attempt to come to terms with its paradoxes leads him not to the 
honest failure of theory that plagues every intellectual who attempts to 
resolve them, but to a certain aestheticism: 
For me. i~tellectua~ work is related to what you could call 
~esthetIcIs~, meanIng transforming yourself ... I am not 
Interested In the aca?-emic status of what I am doing 
because my problem IS my own transformation. (PPC,14) 
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Such a broad dismissal of the traditional role of the academic runs 
throughout Foucault's work, but it IS nonetheless qualified by an 
understanding of the relationship between the intellectual and his 
audience that tacitly retains much of the original edifying element. 14 
Thus, we are told that, although the History of Sexuality does not teach 
us an ethics in the sense of telling us how to act, it does intend to be 
an ethics on the level of one's relationship to oneself. It is in effect an 
attempt to show that an ethics of sexual behaviour IS only contingently 
connected to the processes of revealing deep truths about one's 
sexuality and that there are other possible ways of relating to oneself, 
that of an "ethics of pleasure, of intensification of pleasure" being 
Foucault's preferred alternative. (PPC,15) Although this short-circuits 
the dangerous desire to be told deep truths about the world a.nd 
oneself, it nevertheless remaIns a revelation that there is no such deep 
truth to be found. Foucault could not be more an exemplar of a equally 
important traditional quality of the intellectual here, that of the 
debunker. Allied to the call to transform oneself through a relationship 
to oneself that does not consist of following heteronomous laws, his own 
peculiar intellectual position can be viewed as much Socratic as 
Nietzschean. The call to build one's own ethics is as much a implication 
of Socratic maieutics as it might be of Nietzschean active nihilism and 
14 This traditional role is reflected in Foucault's argument that: "It is 
through the analyses that he carries out in his own field, to question 
over and over again what is postUlated as self-evident, to disturb 
people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate 
what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions. and on 
the basis of this reproblematization ••. to participate in the formatIon of a 
political will (in which he has his role as a citizen to play). PPC, 265. 
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Foucault echoes the Socratic method of intellectual midwifery when he 
argues: 
People have to build their own ethics, taking as a point of 
departure the historical analysis, sociological analysis and so 
on, one can provide for them. I don't think that people who 
try to decipher the truth should have to provide ethical 
principles or practical advice at the same moment, in the 
same book and the same analysis. All this prescriptive 
network has to be elaborated and transformed by people 
themselves. (PPC,16) 
The nature of this historical and sociological analysis appears peculiarly 
external in origin to those who might find a use for it. Not that this 
might be taken as a criticism of Foucault's work, only as a point of 
inconsistency with his own avowedly organic view of the relationship of 
theoretical work to practice. The notion of specific intellectuals who 
work "at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work 
situate them" does not seem to apply so clearly in the case of Foucault's 
own immediate sphere of activity, that of historical research. He as much 
as admits this when he states that his history of psychiatry from the 
seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century does 
not automatically constitute a vindication of the anti-psychiatrist 
movement. (PPC,15)15 Nevertheless there is at least a case to be argued 
that Foucault addresses his own specific position by subjecting to 
historical analysis the claims of disciplines that constitute themselves as 
knowledges or sciences in order to gain effects of power. This, as he 
argues, enables one to see ttruth' as a "system of ordered proced u res 
for the production, regulation, distribution and operation of statements" 
and linked to "systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to 
15 Given that the history of madness is the history of the Other - of 
that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, 
therefore to be excluded to reduce the interior danger and its shut 
away to reduce its otherness; this claim has to be taken 
circumspectively. 
295 
effects of power whl"ch lOt " d d In uces an which extend iL" (PK,133) 
Although this leaves the problem of how one is to compare the different 
political, economic, institutional regimes of the production of truth intact, 
it nonetheless opens out the intellectual's role in any regime to immense 
questioning. Detaching the "power of truth from the forms of hegemony, 
social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present 
time." (PK,133) would mean at the least, a radical devaluation of the 
power of the academic as purveyor of solutions. Yet, if this is the case 
then it will equally apply to the notion of the academic as bricoJeur 
providing tool-kits for others to use. 
(i) Resistance as Utopian Desire 
If Foucault refuses the utopias of liberation that have accompanied 
anthropocentric thinking this does not have to mean that our use of his 
work need couch itself in similar anti-utopian rhetoric. 16 Once we are 
more aware of the implications of employing such rhetorical strategies 
then the consequences of its use might become less debilitating and 
disastrous. We are after all, from the position of the late twentieth 
century, relatively cynical about the prospects of liberatory movements, 
especially those of a utopian bent, providing genuine radical change. 
From out of this cynicism a reconsideration of what might be termed 
post-metaphysical utopian desire is possible. This would be a desire that 
recognizes its own limits both in terms of fulfilment, and in terms of 
historical situatedness, something altogether different from traditional 
conceptions of utopian politics. 
16 This is especially the case if we are to follow the example of 
Foucault's own admiration of the violence of interpretation and usage. 
See chapter one, p. 33. 
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This return to the tradition of utopian thinking can be seen in many of 
the new social movements that have emerged since the hey days of 
proclamations of the death of man. These have not just been on the Left 
but also been an important element In the rIse of the New Right 
throughout the world in the 1980's. Although utopian thinking is usually 
associated with oppositional movements there is no reason to limit it to 
them. As Ruth Levitas points out, neo-liberal and conservative utopias 
have been very much the politically dominant projects of the last ten 
years in the industrialised West. They are as much concerned with 
change as other utopian projects even though they are often couched in 
terms of preservation of the status quo. Levitas argues that the 
"complaint that the utopian imagination has weakened may be a reflection 
of the fact that the dominant utopias are not recognised as such 
because utopists find them uncongenial." 17 The utopian nature of the 
conservative stress on tradition, authority, and nation refers "not simply 
to a past state, but to the past as immanent in the present." 18 Coupled 
with a utopian model of society based upon free market principles whilst 
still retaining a strong interventionist state in certain key areas, such 
projects have been "much more politically potent in terms of actually 
effecting change than the oppositional utopias of socialism, ecology or 
feminism in recent years." 19 This is in contrast to the traditional image 
of the true conservative, who lacking a vision of rational progress, 
distrusts theories of the meaning of history as the rhetoric of the 
Utopian Left and IS alarmed by the notion of general change which 
might result In wholesale social engineering. Such an attitude often 
17 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 
1990), p. 186. 
18 Ibid. p. 188. 
19 Ibid. p. 189. 
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regards the research methods of history as an antidote to this sort of 
theory; being painstaking and attentive to the minutiae of human affairs. 
Levitas wonders whether: 
By defining these (New Right values) as utopias rather than 
ideologies we can ask whether there really has been a 
decline in the role of utopia in politics or whether, in the 
struggle between class committed projects, the utopias of 
subordinated groups have themselves been subordinated.20 
My point in referring to Levitas' argument is to bring out the possible 
implications of a refusal of utopian thinking. Foucault's refusal of such 
modes of thinking arises from three major factors. First there is the 
historical factor of the failure of Marxist and other radical political 
projects to address their own power effects. This failure reveals itself 
most clearly precisely when such utopian revolutionary movements have 
succeeded In taking power, as In the Soviet Union or China, and 
attempted to realise a political programme which is more rational, more 
intelligent, more transparent, and hence better than the systems they 
replace. The main focus for Foucault here is the way in which such 
revolutions of totality reproduce and indeed Increase the systems of 
power and discipline developed in modern societies. (PK,59-60) This 
might be termed the refusal of the totalizing political project that has 
dominated Western politics from Plato, through Hobbes and Hegel to 
Marx. Insofar as political theory professed to explain the totality of 
society and provide universal programmes for its transformation then it 
can be designated as utopian in the sense of unrealistic and dangerous. 
The second main reason why Foucault is vehemently anti-utopian is 
connected to the first in terms of political implication. This is the 
rejection of any stable conception of human nature and society upon 
20 Id. 
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which to base utopian desl°res. ThO I IS wou d include a rejection of the 
notion of a utopian impulse or mentality within human nature. Utopian 
desires are thus by definition unhistorical because they project a future 
state of fulfilment based upon some notion of human nature: 
In the nineteenth century, the utopia is concerned with the 
final decline of time rather than with its morning •.. when, 
with the promised evening, the shadow of the denouement 
comes, the slow erosion or violent eruption of History will 
cause man's anthropological truth to spring forth in its 
stony immobility; calendar time will be able to continue; but 
it will be, as it were, void, for historicity will have been 
superimposed exactly upon the human essence... Finitude, 
with its truth, is posited in time; and time is therefore 
finite. The great dream of an end to History is the utopia of 
causal systems of thought, just as the dream of the world's 
beginning was the utopia of the classifying systems of 
thought. (OT ,262-3) 
The third anti-utopian argument follows from this rejection of a identical 
human nature and is connected with the difficult practice of freedom 
within such an anti-essentialist matrix. Rajchman draws the distinction 
between real and nominal freedom in order to characterise Foucault's 
own project as something that by definition cannot be "instituted or 
guaranteed". Formal freedom always exists within contingent historical 
practices which we are free to analyze, contest and change but our real 
freedom is what makes this formal freedom possible: 
If utopian thought has been the dream of a world in which 
our formal freedoms would become real, nominalist history 
contributes to our real freedom in exposing the nominal 
nature of our formal ones. Such history is therefore an 
active challenge to anthropologism. Anthropology entails that 
we are free because we have a nature that is real or one we 
must realize;... Our real freedom is found in dissolving or 
changing the polities that embody our nature, and as such 
it is asocial or anarchical. No society or polity could be 
based on it since it lies precisely in the possibility of 
constant ch~nge. Our real freedom is thus political, though 
it is never finalizable, legislatable, or rooted in our nature. 
(MFFP,122-3) 
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Freedom here is not the release from history or the end of dominations 
but the "revolt through which history may constantly be changed." 
(MFFP,123) Rajchman's thesis nicely defines an important strand In 
Foucault's work but one wonders if it does not itself repeat the error of 
seeking to thematize its own dispersal. After all, the conclusions of a 
sizable majority have been that Foucault dis-invests us of any hope in 
the sorts of freedom that Rajchman insists are of Foucault's concern. 
The freedom of a "permanent questioning of those systems of thought 
and problematic forms of experience in which we find ourselves" might 
mean nothing if ultimately the systems and experiences that replace them 
cannot be said to be of any more value than previous ones, and equally 
susceptible to the same fate of dispersion. Rajchman points out the 
logical conclusion to the thrust of Foucault's work, however. Set adrift 
in the everchanging forms of our constituted experience, liberation can 
never be a process with an end, nor a possession to be gained but a 
constant practice applied to the concerns of the present. 
Although it is clear that utopian projects in the traditional sense would 
stifle the fragile mode of being that constitutes Foucault's patient labour 
of liberty, it does not necessarily mean a total rejection of all the 
elements and functions associated with the utopian impulse. The 
functions of utopia are manifold and it would be mere reductionism to 
su bsume its many varieties under the notion of wishful fantasizing with 
no basis in reality or as serving a compensatory role in societies where 
there is little hope of changing social and material circumstances. 
One of the major functions of utopia that has generated much 
controversy as to its efficacy is that of a constructive criticism of the 
present by reference to a hypothetical future. Such a function of 
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utopian thinking quite obviously depends upon the notion of possible 
implementation of the pr " t f d "thO oJec s oun WI In its province and it is this 
possibility that is often deemed as unrealistic. The Marxist tradition, for 
example has been predominantly negative in its estimation of utopianism. 
This criticism is based not so much upon the nature of the ideals and 
goals projected (although the content of utopianism is often adjudged to 
be delusions and hence especially amenable to reactionary and fatalistic 
politics) but upon the process of transformation to be taken in achieving 
these ideals. What is interesting of course, is the fact that the charge of 
utopianism is often levelled at Marxism both for its ideals and for its 
confidence that these will achieved (either combined or singly) by the 
inevitable dialectic of history or by human will. 
It is not only the Marxist tradition that has been vehemently anti-
utopian, however. Within colloquial usage the attachment of the epithet 
futopian' is nearly always derogatory in meaning. This is reinforced by 
the expressly anti-utopian position of much political thought.21 To this 
extent, the designation of other people's views as utopian IS as much a 
part of the political struggle as any other activity. In terms of 
promoting one's own aspirations as realistic and worthy of endeavour it 
is also an important element for oppositional groups seeking to change 
society as well as those seeking to retain or increase their power within 
the status quo. 
The function of utopian thinking is thus often portrayed in negative 
terms and derided as being nothing more than the unfeasible projects of 
21 Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies (Lond~n: Rout~edge 
and Kegan Paul, 1966), for example, has been inst~u~ental In crea~ln~ a 
common belief in the essential links between utopianISm and totalitarIan 
societies. 
301 
political factions. This negative judgement can be reversed, however if 
the concept of possibility IS taken In a much broader sense. The 
recognition that one person's utopia is another's dystopia or fantasy is 
essentially the recognition that our notions of what is possible within a 
given society are themselves socially structured and open to 
contestation. This problematic is an important element In Mannheim's 
definition of utopia as "situationally transcendent,,22 to the present state 
of reality, for example. How one is to determine this concept of reality in 
order to evaluate whether certain ideas and interests are compatible 
with it leads one into further evaluation and inevitable circularity. As 
Ricoeur points out, this problem renders unstable Mannheim's further 
definition of utopia as that which shatters "either partially or wholly, 
the order of things prevailing at the time ,,23 For although utopia IS 
often connected with such a function, this is further dependent upon an 
evaluation as to its realizability that effects the initial definition. Utopias 
are precisely the kinds of things that groups protecting the status quo 
attempt to disqualify because they do indeed challenge the existing 
order's claim to naturalness. The form that this disqualification takes is 
invariably that of designating such utopias as unrealizable. Now this 
designation is precisely a political evaluation that immediately gives the 
lie to the attempt to define utopia through content alone. What IS 
designated as utopian is as much a product of who is speaking as its 
content, and thus what IS unrealizable for one group with vested 
interests may be in reality quite feasible. As Mannheim says: 
The very attempt to determine the meaning of the concept 
tutopia' shows to what extent every definition in historical 
thinking depends necessarily upon one's perspective, i.e. it 
contains within itself the whole system of thought 
representing the position of the thinker in question and 
22 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 193. 
23 Ibid. p. 192. See IU, 178. 
especially the political evaluations which lie behind this 
system of thought.24 
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Thus, designating a particular project as utopian may have little to do 
with its actual content in a formal sense but a lot to do with how this 
content IS percel"ved by those h bl to taO th" w 0 are a e sus In eIr own 
interpretations in a field of power struggles. 
This can be seen very simply in the way radical ecological alternatives 
to avert an impending teco-catastrophe' are portrayed by capitalist 
interest groups. Undoubtedly such projects would Incur tremendous 
costs in terms of the social and psychological restructuring that would 
be required with the dismantling of the whole industrial production 
system. Nevertheless such a transformation is possible in the minimum 
sense of the word. Opposition to such alternatives are, however, 
invariably couched in terms of absolute unfeasibility either because they 
appear to be a reversal in history to much simpler forms of life or 
because they contradict human nature which could only desire a greater 
rather than lesser material life. Radical eco-politics is thus portrayed as 
utopian in the sense of unfeasible because objective and subjective 
historical conditions do not allow the fulfilment of its proposals. This 
unfeasibility does not consist of a contradiction of physical or biological 
laws, however, which Marcuse argued should be the only sense in which 
we speak of utopia: 
I believe that we can now speak of utopia only in this latter 
sense, namely when a project for social c~ange ~ont:adicts 
real laws of nature. Only such a proiect IS utopIan In the 
strict sense, that is beyond history. 5 
24 Ideology and Utopia, p. 196-7. 
25 H. Marcuse, "The End of Utopia" In Ramparts April 1970, pp. 28-34. 
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Disqualification of the proposals of the ecological movement is eaSIer if 
its more radical alternatives are condemned as unfeasible by dominant 
groups. Certain projects are thus excluded from consideration if they 
can be tainted by association with that which has been classed as 
utopian. This phenomena permeates the ideological battle over utopia and 
renders any appeal to realizability in order to judge between competing 
visions of society a particularly dangerous one. 
This IS why utopia considered as an expression of desire does not 
necessarily have to be chained to perceived possibilities of the present. 
Although, as mentioned above, a principle criticism the Marxist tradition 
has of utopias is of the means to achieve such alternative visions rather 
than their actual content, this has been overshadowed by a tendency to 
regard any speculation about the form and content of the future 
communist society as liable to be wishful thinking. Levitas points out 
that Marx and Engels never lost sight of the powerful insights into, and 
criticisms of, capitalist society generated by the utopian socialists but 
crucially differed from them on their views of social change: 
the imputed lack of realism applies less to the content of 
the utopian systems in question than to the models of social 
change associated with them. Since the primary concern of 
both Marx and Engels was with fostering such changes, the 
rejection of utopia is a rejection on the basis of its imputed 
social function - that of distracting the working classes 
from more suitable political activity, from (conscious 
participation in the historical process revolutionising society 
b ,26 efore our very eyes . 
L "ta th t th dOIDl"nant meanl"ng in Marxism, identifying eVl s argues a e 
tutopian' with tunrealistic' and encouraging reticence about the 
26 R. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 57 
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expreSSIon of alternative visions of the future good life, has led to 
tensions that have been difficult to resolve: 
The ambivalence between the need for a VISIon to inspire 
and mobilise, not simply to articulate desire but to express 
a~d create ho~e, and the danger that such a vision may 
mIslead and dIsable by expressing the wish without the will 
and power to effect change, lies at the heart of the Marxist 
response to utopia. 27 
She suggests that this tension has been addressed by a few thinkers 
within its tradition such as Bloch, Marcuse, and, E. P. Thompson who 
have argued that "dreaming is an activity necessary to transcending ou r 
present sorry state, and that such dreams have both an educative and a 
transformative function. ,,28 This activity itself has a historical context in 
which its urgency may increase during times of little social change. As 
Anthony Giddens argues: "The tutopian moments' of critical theory are 
necessary precisely where what is immanent does not disclose a practical 
means of reaching those more inclusive goals; and for a critical theory 
without historical guarantees this situation IS likely to be exceedingly 
common. ,,29 The education of desire has its dangers but it IS a process 
that radical movements may ignore at their peril. 
It is the education of desire that Foucault IS SUSPICIOUS of when he 
refuses to tie critical thinking to the entertaining of possibilities and 
alternatives to replace that which is being criticized. One might say that 
this refusal IS expressed in the replacement of the term trevolution' for 
that of tresistance'. This substitution summarizes three main themes of 
Foucault's own political practice. 
27 Ibid. p. 126. 
28 Ibid. p. 127. 
29 A. Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1985), p. 337 
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First, instead of grounding political action in a theory with claims to 
truth, one resists power simply because it always demands such 
resistance, Foucault argues in HS,l, that "where there is power, there is 
resistance" and that this resistance·" . IS never In a position of exteriority 
in relation to power." (HS 1 95)30 Alth h thO , , oug IS appears to be a deeply 
fatalistic attitude, it is in fact a simple recognition that there can never 
be one single revolution that would end all need to question the power 
relations that emerge after this revolution. Indeed this scenario IS 
precisely the pure form of utopia characterised as something beyond 
history and geography. It is a situation that orthodox Marxism echoes in 
its vision of the withering of the state and disappearance of class 
antagonisms but it is also a scenario hinted at by the tend of ideology' 
thesis of writers such as Daniel Bell who sought to deny the presence of 
major ideological rifts In post-industrial society.31 Linked to this 
rejection of the one true and final revolution IS a belief In the 
irreducible plural nature of resistances; there IS "no single locus of 
great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of 
the revolutionary." (HS,1,195-6) Instead resistance is to be conceived as 
"distributed In irregular fashion... spread over time and space at 
varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a certain 
way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, 
certain types of behaviour." (HS,1,96) This whole notion of heterogeneous 
and fluid resistance is quite clearly adverse to the setting of definite 
goals for social organization. On a general level this translates into what 
30 Similarly Nietzsche argues in Ecce Homo tr. R. J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), that the condit~on of eve~y stron,~ 
nature is that: "It needs resistances, consequently It seeks reslstanc.e~. 
31 See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of PolItIcal 
Ideas in the Fifties (New York: Free Press, 1962). 
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IS perceived to be a absence in Foucault's thought, that of a lack of 
normative grounding for resistance. 
Second, although Foucault refuses to suggest alternatives to present 
power regimes, this does not mean that he believed that resistance was 
futile. He quite obviously sympathises with certain struggles that either 
implicitly or explicitly express normative commitments, but it seems that 
as an academic he is able to distance himself from these commitments 
because he is not a t genuine' participant in the conflicts generated by 
them. Thus, normative grounds are available for those who are involved 
in specific conflicts of power so long as these do not become frozen into 
general rules for resistance, but for Foucault they are a dispensable 
epiphenomena of the actual mechanisms of power and not required in its 
analysis. In this distance, Foucault appears to imitate precisely those 
bloodless historians who consider it an imperative not to engage in value 
judgement. There would seem to be a rift between Foucault's work and 
the groups it might serve as a ttool-kit' for fighting the power that 
they face. Social movements are thus ideally conceived as self-generating 
and any attempt to provide formative guidance to what might be 
inchoate and ineffective movements is to be treated with suspicion. This 
situation is in itself an impossibly high ideal. It ignores the probability 
that for most of mankind the time and resources available for critical 
diagnosis of the limits and obstacles that define existence is likely to be 
very limited. It is in some ways a repudiation of a very important role 
of the modern intellectual, who despite having little In common with 
those she might identify with, nevertheless still might have the better 
opportunities to engage in a coherent understanding of their desires, 
needs and the methods best available to achieve these. A coherent 
understanding of desires in order to aid in their coming to be might 
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also reasonably include a redefinition of these desires in the sense of an 
education of desire. This would not only seek to enlarge and transform 
present expectations but also provide the stimulus for transformation 
that might otherwise have b I k" een ac Ing In merely compensatory 
imaginings of future society. 
Nevertheless, Foucault's disquietude about the relationship between what 
he designates as "a certain plebeian quality or aspect" in the social 
body (PK,138) and the modern (university?) intellectual has deeper roots 
than the divergence of experience. Essentially it rests upon the fact 
that such a relationship is liable to be dependent upon the (will to 
truth', which In modern societies is increasingly su bject to a regime of 
constraints that prevents the emergence of radically different ways of 
power functioning. Foucault conceives of (truth' as being "produced and 
transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great 
political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media}." 
(PK,131-2) It is in this principle that knowledge is linked to specific 
power regimes that effectively limit the possibilities for subverting these 
regimes through the production of the true in relation to the false that 
the particular regime condones that leads to Foucault's most radical and 
also most fragile hypothesis. That is, the questioning of the politics of 
truth that currently holds sway. This questioning IS vulnerable because 
it will at times vehemently refuse the necessity to undergo reflection 
upon its own status, but it also draws its critical penetration because of 
this Nietzschean contestation of the desire to ground existence. The 
question is whether such a strategy is pertinent in the political field. At 
once it calls into question the dominant justifications for political 
practice and saps the desire to negotiate with this practice in order to 
produce a practice that would by comparison be preferable. The shaking 
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of traditional political problematizations functions VIa a rejection of the 
totalizations it offers in which other problems are marginalized. Foucault 
regards this practice "as concrete and general as possible" but the 
truth IS that his attempt to "approach politics from behind" tends to 
couch itself in terms of a rupture which is inimical to engaging 
reappropriation of already present strategies.32 It IS all very 
In a 
well 
expressing a distrust about the success of traditional Leftist political 
thinking but when this becomes a refusal of connecting these already 
constituted processes with one's own political ethos then this distrust 
becomes unlikely to produce the kind of subversion that Foucault 
intends. Functioning as a negation of politics understood as the winning 
of power and the ordering and exercise of this power according to 
grand principles such as justice and liberty, Foucault's micro-politics IS 
in constant danger of remaining a marginalised exercise itself. Politics IS 
precisely the subversion of principles by need, interest and pragmatism. 
On one understanding, this marginalisation IS the strength of such a 
politics, because it is precisely the kind of disengagement from the 
existing political process that enables a recontextualisation of its 
methods and problematizations In unforeseen and unacknowledged 
frameworks, such as the relations between sanity and insanity and the 
questions of sexuality and punishment. On another level, micro-politics 
consists, not just in an attention to the marginalised subjects of the 
traditional political process, but in a reevaluation of the analysis of 
power relations. This is the third main reason for the substitution of 
resistance for revolution in Foucault's political vocabulary. This is his 
hypothesis that the power exercised In modern societies SInce the 
eighteenth century is of a radically different nature to that described 
32 See The Foucault Reader, pp. 375-6. 
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by the theory of sovereignty to be found exemplified in the absolutist 
states that flourished . to· prIor Its emergence. (see PK,103-8) This 
disciplinary functioning of power accordI·ng to a "natural rule, a norm", 
which produces a 
"society of normalisation", cannot be challenged 
through an appeal to sovereign rights and definitely cannot be 
undermined through a revolutionary seIzure of the institutions that are 
more the product than the producer of this disciplinary web. Indeed 
such a seizure is more likely to result in a expansion of strategies of 
power. Although Foucault IS attentive to the strategy of equating 
Marxism with the inevitability of the Gulag (PK,134-7) it is clear that he 
regards Marxist revolutionary movements as forced to " possess 
equivalent politico-military forces" as the State apparatus in order to 
achieve their aims. He argues that: 
among all the conditions for avoiding the repetition of the 
Soviet experience and preventing the revolutionary process 
from running into the ground, one of the first things that 
has to be understood is that power isn't localised in the 
State apparatus and that nothing will be changed if the 
mechanisms of power that function outside, below and 
alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and 
everyday level, are not also changed. (PK,60) 
The transformation of these mechanisms is not something that is possible 
through a simple change in the State apparatus and it is not something 
that can be initiated from without, rather "it is a matter for those who 
do the fighting." (PK,62) The question of marginalisation takes on a 
different light in respect of this understanding of the extremely complex 
system of power relations in society. For within this analysis, emerging 
social movements do not require the traditional metanarratives of 
political action. Rather it is the growth In incredulity toward such 
metanarratives of revolution embodied in a universal subject that allows 
the flourishing of other quite different voices in the political field. The 
310 
societal or revolutionary rationalization of life can be countered only 
through a refusal of identification with conce·ptI"ons of b " "" su JectIvIty that 
are constituted by these same structures of power. To struggle against 
social control means to battle agal"nst one's " "d prIor I entification with it 
and to directly oppose power through a SI" "I t "k ml ar power IS 0 rIS being 
defined by that power's structuring of reality. This IS why Foucault 
condones the "ramified, penetrative perception of the present,... that 
makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points, positions 
where the instances of power have secured and implanted themselves by 
a system of organisation dating back over 150 years". (PK,62)33 All this 
in the service, not of a coordinated programme of social change hut, as 
an instrument of analysis for those who wish to utilise it in their own 
struggles. 
What is to be asked here is, how can Foucault conceIve of such analysis 
playing a free-floating role in the very power structures it seeks to 
undermine? Surely on his own premises this is the impossible dream of 
producing truth in a vacuum. If on the other hand he maintains the 
much more plausible principle that such analysis is of itself implicated in 
the structures it challenges, then he must abandon the notion that 
resistance emerges regardless of critical thought, and therefore, having 
no necessary connection to it, must be vigilant about the constraints it 
might put upon the spontaneity of resistance's "plebeian quality". This 
is the more likely position to be taken if one is to argue that because 
power IS a constitutive element in all social organisation, then resistance 
must be nomadic and ceaselessly seek to disengage from the solidified 
forms it might take. Moreover, Foucault's concern about the intellectual's 
role as a professional counsellor to social movements, whether she be a 
33 See also PPC, 36-7. 
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historian, psycho-analyst or "I" t SOCIO OgIS, suggests the possibility of 
construing resistance and struggle 1 th I" a ong e Ines of authenticity. 
Foucault cannot at once I" th t th c aIm a ere IS no naturalistic referent 
which resistance expresses and that resistance IS constantly in danger 
of being corrupted by the programmatic frameworks of the intellectual's 
own analyses. 
(ii) Temporary Identities? The Debt to the Past as a Fiction of the 
Present 
I think that this worry about the professional role of the intellectual in 
modern society is a legitimate one but also exaggerated by Foucault. The 
"vain hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access 
to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our 
historical limits" (WE,47) does not extricate the professionalized academic 
from the risk involved in concrete projections of alternative forms of 
life. If it does then this IS to claim for the intellectual a cert':lin 
distanciation from life qua intellectual. Simply because one has achieved 
a reflective distanciation from the attempt to understand one's 
historicity does not entail that one can adopt an ironic cynICIsm about 
projections of alternative forms of life. Indeed the positioning of oneself 
in the ethos of undecidability is just such a form of life and a 
traditional one for intellectuals to adopt. 
Foucault says that The Order of Things arose out of a passage 1n 
Borges that shattered "all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our 
thought ... Breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with 
which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things" 
and threatening with collapse "our age-old distinction between the Same 
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and the Other." (OT xv) Tho f 
, IS IS 0 course Borges' famous Chinese 
encyclopedia with its fantastical yet somehow still familiar taxonomy of 
animals. Foucault summarizes a major theme of his own thought when he 
says of this taxonomy: 
~n the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend 
In one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is 
demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of 
thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility 
of thinking that. (OT ,xv) 
Foucault wonders if there is a worse kind of disorder than that of the 
incongruous, that IS the disorder of things laid out in sites so different 
that it is impossible to find a common locus for them. He says: 
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real 
locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untrou bled region 
in which they are able to unfold; ... Heterotopias are 
disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and 
that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because 
they destroy (syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax 
with which we construct sentences but also that less 
apparent syntax which causes words and things •... to (hold 
together'. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: 
they run with the very grain of language and are part of 
the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias ... 
desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the 
very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our 
myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. (OT ,xviii) 
The history of order imposed on things IS the history of the Same - of 
that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore 
to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities. 
Foucault finally argues that: 
In attempting to uncover the deepest strata of Western 
culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile 
soil its rifts its instability, its flaws; and it is the same 
ground that'is once more stirring under our feet. (OT,xxiv) 
Ricoeur's concern with tradition and utopia in volume three of Time and 
Narrative, is it would seem, a far cry from these concerns of Foucault. 
Whereas Ricoeur IS concerned to rescue tradition and utopia as 
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categories of thought that can orientate thinking about emancipation 
within the finitude of historicity, Foucault is at pains to distance his 
own thinking from such traditional concepts. Heterotopias dissolve the 
myths of identity and order and are fundamentally disruptive of 
language. It is in the hidden interests of this disruption that I have 
sought to begin an opening out of Foucault's work onto the terrain of 
utopia. 
As we have seen, Ricoeur defines utopia in relation to ideology. Utopia 
consists of a shattering of existing relations and identities as opposed to 
ideology's preeminent role of preserving identity and contributing to the 
integration of groups and cultures across time and space. tn this 
schema, the pejorative senses of ideology and utopia are displaced 
through an analysis of attempts to position ideology in a subordinate 
relation to scientific or critical knowledge purified of the ideological. We 
have seen that Foucault refuses the possibility of such knowledge too. 
Ricoeur's positive evaluation of utopia as the shatterer of existing 
relations because it is noncongruent with those relations would only 
appear to Foucault as an over-inflation of the productive imagination. 
Such an emphasis upon utopia will only serve to entangle one more in 
the discontents of the present. Curiously this is to take a deeply 
orthodox Marxist view of utopia in which it IS associated with the 
unrealizable and the fantastical. We have seen how Foucault's analyses 
pose questions to this orthodoxy in areas such as power relations and 
history so it is surprising that he should dismiss the possible ru ptu ra.l 
effects of utopian thinking so rapidly. This we have linked to his more 
fundamental worry about the intellectual projecting alternative forms of 
life and offering solutions to problems and struggles in the present. Rut 
what might we ask IS the attempt to restore to our "silent and 
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apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws" if not the 
advocation of a form of life and one constl°tuted primarily in terms of its 
refusal of the positive function of l°deology or t dOtO ra 1 Ion. Foucault does 
not seek to ground forms of life with philosophical principles it is true. 
Yet there is implicitly a call to a changed relationship to all forms of life 
through the ceaseless revelation of their constituted nature and limited 
configurations. This is not a simple substitution of ordinary forms of life 
for the philosophical form, but it might as well be in terms of the 
relationship it takes up with those ordinary forms.34 
There is in short, no sense of participation in Foucault's analyses, even 
though he is writing from within the constellation of the present. 
Participation in the sense that the impetus of his work; its drive to 
dispersion and desire to transgress any temporary identities that might 
form In its reception, is peculiarly recalcitrant to being used by 
ordinary social actors. Moreover, this will to dispersion is itself a 
utopian hubris if its strategy is applied as a transcendental principle of 
social organisation. One might applaud the intellectual honesty that IS 
exhibited in the refusal of systematicity and questioning of traditional 
political frameworks but ultimately one should ask what is the purpose 
behind such honesty? 
If, as I have argued, Foucault's work cannot claim a complete break from 
the tradition of critical theories of society, then the purpose can only 
be that of a more enlightened sense of freedom.35 It is to show people 
34 This is for example a conclusion that can be drawn from the thrust 
of Heidegger's work in its disclosure of the openings and hence closures 
that every epoch of Being brings. See J. D. Caputo, Radical 
Hermeneutics. 
35 Ironically freedom is what many commentators have seen as missing in 
Foucault's histories. Clifford Geertz sees Discipline and Punish, for 
example, as a "kind of Whig history in reverse - a history, in spite of 
itself, of the rise of Unfreedom." New York Review of Books, January 26, 
E1978. 
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that they are actually much freer than th lhO k h ey In t ey are. This 
freedom would presumably be at its ~purest' when it IS practised as a 
constant detachment from constituted experience; when In fact one is not 
only shown that their experience is constituted but is able to live the 
life of the intellectual qua Foucault and ceaselessly question the limits of 
, ° 
one s experIence. Now I have characterised this as a deeply utopian 
Principle itself desplOte lOtS ObVloOUS tt to It II II a rac Ions. IS a very we 
characterizing ordinary experience as just one form of theoretical 
penetration of the world with no less claim to status than the 
professional thinker, whether she be historian, sociologist, philosopher 
or psychologist. It is another to claim that the practise of freedom is 
really constituted through the constant exploration of ones thoughts and 
its limit. This in itself merely repeats the importation of theory into 
ordinary life that Foucault is so SUSpICIOUS of. Unless the "freedom of 
philosophy" can be genuinely translated into the world from which it 
arIses then it IS itself susceptible to the charge of unrealizable 
utopianism. The tendency towards a transgressive philosophy of the limit 
sits therefore in an uneasy relationship with the desire to show people 
that they are actually freer than they think. Being freer for more 
freedom cannot be the ultimate end of social life conceived of as always 
already the temporary establishment of identities, unities and narratives. 
Once one places Foucault's work within this light then it becomes much 
less incongruous to compare it with the thought of philosophical 
hermeneutics. In particular, Foucault's concern to avoid the 
Enlightenment "blackmail" of the necessity for normative foundations in 
order to practise critique can be reassessed as comparable to the 
hermeneutical concern with the finite and always already situated nature 
of social life. The attempts to come to terms with this situated ness are 
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most typically summed up by Gadamer's notion of consciousness being 
exposed to the efficacity of history ( Wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewusstsein),36 in which there is much more an emphasis upon Being 
than conSCIousness. This IS why the approach of a philosophical 
hermeneutics which understands reality as always already constituted 
symbolically through language and takes this finitude as the starting 
point for reflection cannot be so easily dismissed. In this sense, 
Ricoeur's emphasis upon the dialectic between ideology and utopia can 
be seen as just one more refiguration of an already sym bolically 
structured praxis. It is one more narrative fiction added to the primary 
interpretation or figuration of human action and testifies to his belief 
that narrative IS a redefining of what IS alread y defi ned, a 
reinterpretation of what IS already interpreted. Given the long tradition 
of ideology and SCIence the couplet ideology/utopia serves to both 
integrate and explode the alms of the prIor distinction. 
Parallelling the positive functions of utopian politics, Ricoeur argues that 
literature has the capacity to put our quotidian existence into question 
by supplementing this primary representation of the social with its 
narrative representation. They both effect a metaphorization of the real, 
a creation of new meaning. We might say that this too is the resu It of 
Foucault's radical reinterpretations of power and knowledge relations, of 
history, and of the self. We think "more honestly" after Foucault, but 
not necessarily differently. 37 
Ricoeur insists upon the mutual interweaving of narrative fiction and 
history insofar as they both refer to a fundamental feature of our 
36 See H. G. Gadamer Truth and Method, 267 ff. 
37 See G. Gillan's ~onclusion in tFoucault's Philosophy' In The Final 
Foucault, Philosophy and Social Criticism, no. 2-3, 1987. 
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individual and social existence, identified by the notion of historicity, 
which expresses the fundamental and radical fact that we make history, 
are embedded in history and are temporal beings. Both narrative forms 
contribute to the description and redescription of our historical 
condition, the relation between narrativity and historicity. 
Thus, there IS an intricate and inextricable connection between narrating 
history and actually being in history, between writing history and being 
historical. The form of life to which narrative discourse belongs is our 
historical condition itself and there IS more fiction In historical 
narratives than the positivist conception allows. For historicity comes to 
language only in the process of telling it and yet we belong to history 
before this telling or writing in such a way that the act of narrating 
itself becomes caught up In the actual reality that is told. To follow 
Gadamer, the history we recount or write belongs to the "effective 
history" of the things that have happened; to the "Wirkungsgeschichte" 
of historicity itself. This applies especially to the work of Foucault 
which partakes and contributes to the great historical event of the 
West's loss of centre and the consequent loss of universal History. An 
understanding of Foucault's work in terms of Ricoeur's notion of 
refiguration becomes even more plausible when we consider one of his 
own understandings of his texts: 
I am well aware that I have never written anything but 
fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is 
therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists 
for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to 
induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a 
true discourse engenders or tmanufactures' something that 
does not as yet exist, that is, tfictions' it. One tfictio~s' 
history on the basis of a political reality that makes It. true, 
one tfictions' a politics not yet in existence on the basIS of 
a historical truth. (PK,193) 
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When one considers the nature of the politics that IS to be fashioned 
here from a "historical truth" then one l"S led to the I" conc USl0n that, as 
with Ricoeur, this truth is to be the recovery of the hitherto repressed 
and slaughtered possibilities of history. In more familiar terms, the 
victims of history. This is certainly the conclusion to be drawn from 
Foucault's linkage of genealogy with the "claims to attention of local, 
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges" in its concern for 
"the painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude 
memory of their conflicts." (PK,83 ) 
The idea of repaying a due to the past and to the people of the past IS 
one that Ricoeur stresses as a guiding principle in the differentiation of 
fiction and history. The inevitable reference to the ideal of a certain 
correspondence between historical narratives and what really happened 
finds its impetus in this principle. Even though historical narratives are 
necessarily refigurations of the course of events narrated, historians by 
instinct would like their constructions to be re-constructions. Ricoeur 
argues that this desire to do justice to the past, to render it tas it 
was', implies on the ethical plane that we have an unpaid debt to it, we 
seek to render its due to what is and to what once was. 
This indebtedness comes to the fore most vividly In histories that 
attempt to recount the story of the victims of history. That IS of those 
people and events which have been ignored or lost to hitherto existing 
histories. It is profoundly un-Nietzschean, both in the status given to 
the notion of debt to the past and of the preeminent connection of this 
debt to the claim of the victims of history. Genealogy tacitly gains its 
normative and critical force from its connection with just such a notion 
of debt towards the marginalized, and repressed of history. 
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Ricoeur argues that in relation to the commemoration of the great 
founding events of commu "t" th t I nIles a are ce ebrated and remembered 
principally for their integrative function, the ultimate ethical motivation 
for the history of victims is driven by horror which isolates events by 
making them incomparable and unique and thus never to be forgotten. It 
is in this sense that the Holocaust has been considered a negative 
revelation, an Anti-Sinai. (TN,3,187) Explanation binds historical 
phenomena together whereas horror singularizes them, but Ricoeur does 
not wish to depict these two modes of understanding as alternatives. 
Rather, he argues, each enhances the other. The more we explain in 
historical terms, the more indignant we become; the more we are struck 
by the horror of events, the more we seek to understand them. 
It is in this sense that we can understand the ethical interests which 
animate Foucault's historical research. There is a tremendous underlying 
horror in the charting of the development of the carceral matrix or the 
moral division between madness and sanity that makes such texts so 
arresting. This is the reason why his genealogical approach can be seen 
as consisting of identifying current problematizations, describing with 
some detachment how these situations arose, and at the same time, 
inciting reflection and concern about the pervaSive and insidious 
dangers of current social forms. This is also why genealogy is a product 
of shared concerns and IS driven ultimately by the historian's interest 
m ffacts' understood as the rendering of these present concerns their 
due. Here the function of the intellectual is one of identifying the 
specific forms and specific interrelationships which truth and power 
have taken in our history. If the aim is not to denounce power per se, 
nor to propound truth, but to use his analysis to produce a grid of 
intelligibility for understanding the specific dangers that each specific 
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type of power/knowledge produces then this I'S I'n turn h d' 
, anc ore In an 
interest in communication. As Ricoeur argues, this interest expresses the 
situation of the historian as a member belonging to the field which she 
studies. Consequently any procedure of objectification, distanciation, 
SUspICIon, or dispersion that makes historiography a form of critical 
research is in the service of this interest in communication. 
This IS why I have argued that the tendency to de-structure the 
present In a way that privileges the necessity of dispersion over any 
finite identities sits uneasily with the ethical thrust of Foucault's 
genealogies. Not only is the privileging of fragmentary and dispersive 
selves and political groupings utopian (in the traditional transcendental 
sense) in its desire, but it is also contrary to the ethical aims of a 
historiography that seeks to articulate the hidden and subjected 
struggles and resistances behind existing histories. Ricoeur's emphasis 
upon the narrative possibilities of human existence is thus a timely 
reminder of the dangerous tendency towards dismissing such 
possibilities as nostalgic fictions concerned with throwing a skein of 
order over an essentially disordered reality and with arresting the play 
of interpretation in dangerous presences and myths of identity. Nothing 
In this emphasis leads one to conclude that narration is to contribute to 
fixed identities or schemas for action. The search for narrative 
continuity is not just nostalgic illusion but a contestation of the spread 
of uni-dimensionality In society. The history of the oppressed and 
inarticulate demands to be told precisely because it renders fissile the 
apparent permanence of cultural identities. Narrative selection focusing 
on the plot of suffering reverses the normal narrative ordering of 
history, and new sets of events and relations take precedence. This 
applies equally with Foucault's anonymous shiftings of power-knowledge 
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as it does with the relations of labour and production In Marxism. 
Narration that orders the past is not necessarily conservative closure to 
what is new. 
Moreover, by trying to t d pu or er on our past, by retelling and 
recounting what has been, 
we acquire an identl"ty and thO I" IS app les 
equally to Foucault's principles of rupture and dispersive constitution in 
that they contribute to the narration of the present as one of fractured 
identities which is nonetheless b" t to th d su Jec e anger of acquiring a 
privilege of its own. One might ask with Ricoeur, whether th " e creatIve 
process of reinterpretation can operate if narrative continuity IS 
completely broken? One must remain critical lest one reduces even an 
initial liberating anti-narrativism to another reified version of events. 
Reinhart Koselleck has drawn attention to the fact that the modern age 
is characterized by a contracting of the space of experience, which 
makes the past seem ever more distant, and also an increasing gap 
between our "space of experience" and our "horizon of expectation". 38 
The dream of a reconciled humanity constantly withdraws and we are 
ever more uncertain of its realization. The task becomes a utopia where 
our horizon of expectation withdraws from us faster than we can 
advance toward it. This experience of modernity can be seen as the 
38 See R. Kosselleck, Futures Past, pp. 267-88. Kosselleck believes that 
what is constitutive of individuals and societies is how they conceive of 
their own temporality and in particular their future. He thus seeks a 
history of the conceptions of historical time. One might compare Hans 
Blumenberg's defense of modernity's self conception in relation to 
Kosselleck's portrayal of Neuzeit's emphasis upon the acceleration of 
progress. Blumenberg's celebration of theoretical curiousity which serves 
a "rationality of humane consideration" is a important rehabilitation of 
human self-assertion in the context of the attack upon the principles 
that drove modern science to develop. Here, the symbol of an unfinished 
world serves the purpose of promoting ethical-epistemological moderation 
in the present and surely influenced Habermas' notion of modernity as a 
unfinished project. See The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, tr. by R. M. 
Wallace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983). 
basis for Foucault's reflections upon the undesirability of presenting a 
project of rational grounds or prescriptive policies with a political 
intent. The present in this sense is caught between the two disappering 
horizons of the surpassed past and "thd" a WI rawIng endpoint and more 
and more sees itself as one of fCrI"SI"S'. R" Icoeur argues for the 
universalism of Koselleck's categories which IS "assured" by their 
"permanent ethical and political implications". (TN,3,214) For Ricoeur, to 
admit that there is no history that is not constituted through the 
experiences and the expectations of active and suffering human beings, 
is to imply that the tension between the horizon of expectation and the 
space of experience has to be preserved if there is to be any history at 
all. 
The tension characteristic of modernity, between expectations that 
distance themselves from all prIor experIence, IS precisely when 
modernity recognizes itself as a new time. It also inaugurates the 
possibility of the idea of progress still destined to a better future being 
abandoned for the idea of utopia with no connection to acquired 
experience. With such utopias the tension of modernity becomes a schism. 
The ethical and political task, according to Ricoeur, is to prevent the 
tension between these two poles of thinking about history from becoming 
a schism. We must resist the seduction of utopian expectations insofar as 
they prevent the formulation of practical paths to the ideals they 
postulate. It is imperative to keep our horizon of expectation from 
running away from us by connecting it to the present by means of a 
series of intermediary projects. Along with this caution, however, we 
must also resist the narrowing of the space of experience.
39 
This is 
39 See Richard Kearney, "Between Tradition and 
Hermeneutical Problem of Myth", in On Paul Ricoeur: 
Interpretation, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 
discussion of this tension and its productive creativity. 
Utopia: The 
Narrative and 
1991), for a 
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precisely the point where the struggle against the tendency to VIew the 
past as done and unchangeable becomes ethl"cally necessary. Thus, we 
have to re-open the past, bl"t re-ena e 1 s unaccomplished, " even 
slaughtered", possibilities In order t t o preven our experience from 
becoming determinate. In short we have to make our expectations more 
determinate and our experience less so.40 These are two sides of one 
task. Only determinate expectations can have the retroactive effect on 
the past of revealing it as a living tradition. "It is in this way that our 
critical meditation on the future calls for the complement of a similar 
meditation on the past". (TN,3,216) 
40 Ricoeur's sensitivity to the possibility of the critical rupture of 
utopia sliding into the dangerously schizophrenic utopian discourse 
which projects a static future without ever producing the conditions of 
its realization is a problem that Boris Frankel engages in his study of 
post-industrial utopias. The Post-Industrial Utopians (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987) Frankel seeks a dialogue between the economic strength and 
experiences of the labour movement and the eco-feminist and eco-pacifist 
critiques of existing societies in order to fuse the strengths of both. At 
the same time, he shares the Marxist ambivalence towards utopian 
thought in that no matter how desirable post-industrial movements may 
be, they remain fantasy unless they are linked to concrete plans of 
action and organization. Frankel is not. Simply dismissive of the utopian 
elements of new social movements. It would be defeatist to ignore their 
positive elements and even their theoretical and practical weaknesses are 
invaluable in forcing us to find more plausible alternatives and 
strategies. He concludes that politics is about the "hard grind" and fthe 
art of the possible' and yet without the imaginative ideas of people, 
politics becomes nothing more that the myopic, self-justifying and often 
cynical hard grind. If earlier generations had not dared to think the 
impossible, we would not have achieved much that is now taken for 
granted. Yet if the alternatives are not feasible, all the passion in the 
world will go tragically astray. 
The problem is that even if we find such alternatives unfeasible this 
still does not refute the call for radical change. Indeed it might be 
argued that subjecting such alternatives to criteria of feasibility based 
on the existing system and values is to miss their point altogether. This 
is especially true of criticism based upon the value of maintaining 
existing economic production in capitalist countries. How are we to judge 
genuine radical alternatives if the criteria for their success does not 
exist in present societies? The notion of feasibility is a very broad and 
vague term unless it is circumscribed by actual existing notions of 
economic and social viability, but to so define feasibility is to limit 
radical alternatives in the first place. 
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As Ricoeur argues, it is "not that we are without utopia but we are 
without paths to utopia. ,,41 The deflation of utopia is a necessary event 
in social and political thought, but there IS still a place for the utopian 
discourse of rupture which remains critical of the powers that be out of 
a fidelity to an telsewhere', to a society that is not yet. This fidelity to 
an telsewhere' is necessarily a dangerous discourse insofar as it IS 
always liable to a relinquishing of present tasks In the name of the 
liberation to come. However, with and against Foucault's ultra-caution 
about such discourse, we might say that everything is dangerous but 
not all of the time. This IS to say that, even though historiography 
might find its justification In the present through the reactualization of 
its dispersive capacities, this cannot remain its only ambition. Thus, we 
might say, following Ricoeur, that historiographies practised as a 
"symbolic confirmation of the past" and as a "symbolic opening towards 
I ta " 42 the future are comp emen ry. 
41 P I R" "Th Creativity of Language" an interview with Richard 
au Icoeur, e " ntinental Thinker: The 
Kearney, in Dialogues With Contemporary Co .' 
" " (M h t . Manchester Unlverslty Press, PhenomenologIcal HerItage anc es er. 
1984), p. 31. 
42 Ibid. p. 30. 
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To propose a particular reading of Foucault's work In terms of its effect 
upon the time of action as conceived In the notion of historical 
inauguration is to some extent to recuperate hI·S k' to wor In an ordinary 
understanding of politics and tI·me. Ult· t I I h' k h 1ma e y t In t is can be 
justified by the limitation of his own productive transgressions. These 
are specifically: the reversal of continuous, memorative historiography to 
that of a dispersive, effective genealogy concerned with intervention In 
the present and the making of differences; the reversal of the problem 
of the good life from a mode of a universal ethos to that of an 
aesthetics of existence concerned with the transformations and creation 
of the self; and the reversal of a critique of social relations as a 
normative practice to that of a ceaseless transgression oriented around 
the notion of a resistance of power wherever it may form. I hope to 
have indicated the tensions that such reversals entail. That they are 
productive tensions IS, however, an important element In an 
understanding of their limits. These limits are not to be understood as 
dialectical moments to be recuperated in a broader model of social reason 
and action but as the points where work conceived In the present 
initiates its penetrative capacities. This is particularly pertinent In the 
analysis of the (present' as a metaphysically loaded term. In this sense, 
Foucault's reevaluation of historiography IS part of the long 
philosophical reinterpretation of the ordinary understanding of time. 
Similarly his ethics of dispersion and questioning of the ordinary notion 
of power as repressive and hence freedom as emancipatory from such 
power are radical reinterpretations of ordinary understanding. Foucault's 
own vision of the world is never ethically neutral and indeed could not 
hope to be so. Even the stoical implications of his models of power are 
re-invested with the passionate call for the difficult and ceaseless 
practise of disengagement and recreation. 
3')-'- I 
Contrary to the notion that philosophy I eaves everything as it IS, 
Foucault's work demands of the reader an Immense . reorIentation of one's 
relationship to existence and In particular the historicity of existence. 
have argued that this itself cannot be insulated from the charge of a 
certain utopianism. Despite the productivity of its strategic 
interventions, the drive to dispersion is simply to great a call on the 
ordinary understanding of history and cannot re-occupy the entirety of 
its field. Moreover, Foucault's privileging of the Cather' is shot through 
with a normative stress upon the disenfranchised, the repressed and the 
defeated of history in much the same way that Ricoeur orientates his 
rather more traditional understanding of the ethical limits of 
historiography. It is too simple to present this recovery of the Cather' 
as an endless task in historiography. For one, this would merely be to 
mImIC the endless epistemological rectification of traditional 
historiography which seeks to expand indefinitely the historical field. It 
is the real force of Foucault's work to have shown the misguidedness of 
this desire both politically and epistemologically. The insertion of the 
historical enquirer in a specific constellation of power relations simply 
precludes the notion of an ever expanding understanding of history. 
Following Nietzsche, a certain active forgetfulness is called for in order 
to practise a history of the present. This too, is the conclusion of an 
hermeneutics of historical consciousness, stressing as it does the always 
already finite temporal situation as the horizon of the interpreter within 
which understanding proceeds. The concrete disclosure of possibilities 
always forecloses others. It is this finite apprehension that leads to 
Ricoeur's stress on the necessity of a "wager" on a certain set of values 
and the "risking of our whole life on them" in expectation of achieving a 
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"better life, to see and to understand things better than others." 1 With 
Foucault the wager seems to be truly a trl·al b t dif e ween ferent ways of 
understanding but with none of Ricoeur's faith in the better life that 
grounds the appeal to a risking of one's life. 
This, I have argued IS misjudge the force of Foucault's own 
reevaluations, which far from being ethically neutral, contribute to a 
philosophy of risk which demands of the reader.2 It is the status of this 
demand that ultimately enables the narrative recuperation of Foucault's 
work into the ethical concerns of critical theory and philosophical 
hermeneutics. Specifically it IS In the mutual interplay between the 
production of his texts and its subject matter: whether this be the 
techniques of objectification and subjectification of subjects; power-
knowledge relations; or anonymous discourse analysis, that these ethical 
concerns are at their most traditional. Following Giddens' 
characterisation of the "double hermeneutic" in social theory, in which 
the second order concepts of the social theorist are always prone to 
appropriation by lay actors as first order concepts regardless of their 
original intentions, we might say that Foucault's own theories (and in 
particular that of the danger of the universal intellectual pronouncing 
on social and moral problems and serving as an arbiter of struggle) are 
themselves peculiarly prone to incorporation in the universe of meaning 
and action of lay actors. The fact that reflection on social processes 
(even if this is aimed at a dissolution of the categories the tsocial' and 
the tsubject', or of tcontinuous history') necessarily becomes entangled 
1 P. Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 312. . . 
2 "I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalitIes .... 
who, wherever he moves contributes to posing the question of knowing 
whether the revolution is worth the trouble and what kind, it being 
understood that the question can be answered only by those who are 
willing to risk their lives to bring it about." (PPC, 124 ) 
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in the world it intervenes in, means that the attempt to purify reflection 
from that world is a deeply misguided desire. This, I would argue, IS 
especially the case with a genealogy that attempts to uproot all 
identities In the service of that which is marginalized, and a theory of 
power that tends towards an uprooting of projective action.3 That 
Foucault's concrete work makes implicit choices for powers is both and 
indication of the impossibility of understanding without evaluating and 
of the importance of the imaginative refiguration of models for resistance 
which he was particularly concerned with promoting. The history of the 
effects of Foucault's work in this sense, is a prime exemplar of his 
dictum in The Order of Things that "thought cannot help but liberate 
and enslave." 
3 Ricoeur articulates this situation well: "This process of suspicion which 
changed us. We are more 
to the point of lacking 
committed. I would say 
started several centuries ago has already 
cautious about our beliefs, sometimes even 
courage· we profess to be only critical and not 
that p~ple are now more paraylzed than blind. tt 
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